Militia (China)

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Militia of China
中国民兵
Zhōngguó Mínbīng
Emblem of the Militia
Founded1927; 97 years ago (1927)
Country People's Republic of China
Allegiance Chinese Communist Party[1]
BranchGround militia
Maritime militia[2]
TypeMilitia
Military reserve force
Role
  • Preparations against war
  • Defense operations
  • Assistance in maintaining public order
Size8,000,000[3]
Part ofArmed Forces of the People's Republic of China (under the Central Military Commission)[4]
March《民兵进行曲》
(English: "March of the Militia")
Engagements
Commanders
Chairman of the Central Military CommissionXi Jinping
Director of the National Defense Mobilization CommissionLi Qiang
Minister of National DefenceGeneral Li Shangfu
Director of the CMC National Defense Mobilization DepartmentLieutenant General Sheng Bin
Insignia
Badge
Sleeve Badge

The Militia (Chinese: 民兵; pinyin: Mínbīng)[4] or Militia of China (Chinese: 中国民兵; pinyin: Zhōngguó Mínbīng) is the militia part of the armed forces of China, the other two parts being the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the People's Armed Police (PAP).[4] The Militia is under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)[1] and serves as an auxiliary and reserve force for the PLA.[5] It is one of the largest militias in the world.

History[edit]

The role of the militia in the PRC has varied over the years. During the 1940s the militia served as a support force for the PLA.[6] After the 1949 foundation of the PRC, the party used the militia to reconstruct the country (in particularly the devastated railway system), to maintain Law and order in the countryside, and for defense of the borders and coast. One of the problems the militia attempted to solve was the large number of Kuomintang troops (estimated to be around 400,000) that had been discharged but had not returned to their homes. Some of these resorted to banditry to survive, and all represented a permanent security threat.[7]

It was, however, the crisis in the Korean peninsula that provided the impetus for the integration of the militia with the armed forces. In June 1950 , a “Department for People's Armament” (人民武装部, pinyin Rénmín Wǔzhuāngbù) was created at the Central Military Commission, which was responsible for recruiting, organizing and training the people's militia. This department set up branches in every district and every city, and it assigned all able-bodied men between the ages of 18 and 35 who were not already serving in the People's Liberation Army to a people's militia unit. In addition to their regular professional activities, the militia cadres had to complete 30 days of training, which they had to complete within a year; the ordinary militia members underwent 15 days of basic training.

The militia did not, however, receive a formal legal basis until 1955, when the "Conscription Law of the People's Republic of China" (中华人民共和国兵役法, Pinyin Zhōnghuá Rénmín Gònghéguó Bīngyìfǎ) was passed by the 1st National People's Congress.[8] Article 58 of the law specified the militia's duties, which included responsibility for public security and the protection of the means of production. The implementing regulations stipulated that the Department for People's Armament set up offices at lower levels, in townships and street districts. Militia units were set up not only in every community, but also in every large work unit (danwei), every mine, and in every larger company. It was at this time that the main difference between "Cadre Militia" (基干民兵, pinyin Jīgàn Mínbīng ), i.e. the members of the core group of the people's militia, and the “common militia” (普通民兵, pinyin Pǔtōng Mínbīng ) was set up. The cadre militia should mainly be former members of the People's Liberation Army under the age of 28, and women could only serve in separate women's departments of this cadre militia. All other men between 18 and 35 were assigned to the Common Militia.

With tensions rising with the USA, the CMC met May 27 to July 22, 1958 to discuss paths to military strengthening. Peng Dehuai attempted to modernize the PLA, work more closely with the USSR, and build the militia as a reserve force for the PLA. Mao Zedong preferred to emphasize People's war and the militia was expanded under the slogan "Everyone is a Soldier". After the Kinmen Crisis of 1958, Mao became convinced that China could not rely on the USSR as an ally in case of war with the US and the Republic of China. The expansion of the militia became even faster. By January 1959, the total militia manpower had grown to 220 million out of a population of 653 million, that is to say, almost every single man and woman of military age.[9]

This degree of mobilization and the workforce depletion that training this mass force caused was a contributing factor to the disastrous famines of the Great Leap Forward.[10] At a four-week Politburo meeting in July 1959, Defense Minister Peng Dehuai, concerned about the operational capability of the People's Liberation Army due to food shortages, voiced strong criticism of the Great Leap Forward. Mao admitted to making mistakes, but then ensured that the Central Committee ejected Peng as defense minister in August under the pretext of collaborating with the Soviet Union. Lin Biao was appointed as his successor on September 17, 1959. Like Mao, Lin was a supporter of the People's War concept, but he was also an experienced field general. He was aware of the limitations of a poorly trained militia armed with only light weapons. Lin reduced the militia size, and changed the focus to more in-depth training over quantity. Every people's commune had to have a militia company (连) with around 200 personnel. This added up to around 5 million men and women.[11][12]

The militia naturally became entangled in the continuous conflict and fighting of the Cultural Revolution, and became deeply fragmented in the complex factional struggle of the times. Like everything else in China, training and organizational quality decayed in the chaos. The Gang of Four also attempted to build up the urban militia as an alternative to the PLA, but the urban militia failed to support them when Hua Guofeng and other moderate military leaders deposed them.

In 1979, China fought a short but sharp war with Vietnam over Vietnamese involvement in Cambodia. 200,000 PLA soldiers were supported by several thousand "front support militiamen" (支前民兵, pinyin Zhīqián Mínbīng) from Guangxi and Yunnan provinces,[13] who carried ammunition and food to the frontlines, and removed the wounded to the field hospitals. The fact that the militiamen were dressed in civilian clothes and many spoke Zhuang rather than Mandarin resulted in several cases of friendly fire.

In the Reform and Opening era, the militia and its role in a possible war with the USSR became a focus of debate. On May 31, 1984, a new conscription law was passed by the National People's Congress, where the tasks of the militia were defined in more detail in Article 36: 1) Serve as a training service as preparation for war. 2) Provide border protection 3) Maintain public safety [14]. The need for free-moving labor and the massive migration from the countryside that came with the rapid economic growth distorted the basis of the traditional militia.

In the “Guidelines for Militia Work” (民兵工作条例, Pinyin Mínbīng Gōngzuò Tiáolì ) issued by the State Council and the Central Military Commission on December 24, 1990, it is further specified in Article 11: Companies or battalions of the People's Militia were to be set up in the countryside, with village as the smallest unit. In the cities, platoons, companies, battalions and regiments of the people's militia were to be set up within urban danwei, be them companies or public institutions, or within the street district as the smallest territorial unit. Technical troop detachments should be set up in the cadre militia units in accordance with the need for preparation for war and the available equipment. In particular, anti-aircraft battalions and regiments should be set up at important civil defense facilities in cities, in transport hubs, and other areas requiring protection.[15] People's militia training centers were to be set up in the various districts progressively, provided with the necessary training material and equipment by the General Staff of the PLA. The militia members were to be compensated for the loss of earnings during training, farmers would be compensated by the municipal administration, workers and employees in the cities were to be compensated by their employers.[16]

On November 29, 1994, the Department of People's Armament at the Central Military Commission was transformed into the “National Defense Mobilization Commission” (国家国防动员委员会, Pinyin Guójiā Guófáng Dòngyuán Wěiyuánhuì), which is dually subordinate to the State Council and the CMC. Until now, the chairman of the commission has always been the Prime Minister. The Popular Mobilization Commission has branch offices in every district. After the 2015 reform, the CMC the “National Defense Mobilization Department” (中央军委国防动员部, Pinyin Zhōngyāng Jūnwěi Guófáng Dòngyuánbù ) in which border protection and civil defense competencies have been pooled. The National Defense Mobilization Department has the authority to give instructions to the National Defense Mobilization Commission, and in fact the Main Office of the National Defense Mobilization Commission (国家国防动员委员会综合办公室, Pinyin Guójiā Guófáng Dòngyuán Wěiyuánhuì Zōnghé Bàngōngshì) is located within the office the National Defense Mobilization Department in the PLA Building (八一大楼, Pinyin Bā Yī Dàlóu ), 7 Fuxing Street, Beijing.

As China has moved further and further away from a "People's War" model, the role of the militia has diminished but not disappeared. The emphasis is in using it in disaster situations[17] and other non-war crises: during the COVID-19 pandemic, militia units were mobilized to enforce public health mandates.

Roles and tasks[edit]

The formal tasks of the Militia remain those defined by Article 22 of the Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defense: the Militia, under the command of military organs, shoulders the tasks of preparations against war and defense operations, and assists in maintaining public order.[4]

According to Article 36 of the Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China, the Militia's tasks are specifically:[5]

  1. take an active part in the socialist modernization drive and be exemplary in completing the tasks in production and other fields;
  2. undertake the duties related to preparations against war, defend the frontiers and help maintain public order with law enforcement organizations established by law; and
  3. be always ready to join the armed forces to take part in war, resist aggression and defend the nation at all costs.

The militia is organized into regional militia corps in every theater command of the PLA, which in turn oversee militia divisions and subordinate formations, and is further subdivided into specialty militia units. It is overseen by the National Defense Mobilization Commission, which can order the deployment of its personnel during either peacetime and wartime contingencies, according to the instructions by the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, who, as also the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, is overall supreme commander-in-chief of the armed services of the People's Republic.

Maritime Militia[edit]

China Maritime Militia (CMM) is a subset of China's national militia. The CMM trains with and supports the People's Liberation Army Navy and the China Coast Guard in tasks including[2]

In the South China Sea, the CMM plays a major role in controversial maritime activities to achieve China's political goals.[2]

Maritime Militia funding and associated paramilitary training led to a reversal of the downward trend of the Chinese commercial fishing fleet. This Maritime Militia fueled expansion has led to an increase in illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.[18]

See also[edit]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Regulation on Militia Work (2011 Revision), Article 2: "The militia is an armed organization composed of the people not released from their regular work under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), is a part of the armed forces of the People's Republic of China and is an assistant and reserve force for the Chinese People's Liberation Army."
  2. ^ a b c d Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017 Archived 28 August 2017 at the Wayback Machine by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, United States Department of Defense
  3. ^ Xu (徐), Ping (平) (19 October 2018). 民兵到底穿什么服装?这里面的讲究还真不少. 81.cn (in Chinese (China)). PLA Daily. Archived from the original on 15 October 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2019.
  4. ^ a b c d Law of the People's Republic of China on National Defence Archived 15 June 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Article 22: "The armed forces of the People’s Republic of China are composed of the active and reserve forces of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, the Chinese People's Armed Police Force and the Militia. ... The Militia, under the command of military organs, shoulders the tasks of preparations against war and defence operations and assists in maintaining public order."
  5. ^ a b Military Service Law of the People's Republic of China Archived 2 July 2019 at the Wayback Machine, Chapter VI The Militia, Article 36: "The militia is an armed organization of the masses not divorced from production and is an assisting and reserve force for the Chinese People's Liberation Army. The tasks of the militia are: ..."
  6. ^ Peng, Dehuai (1984). "The War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression(July 1937-August 1945)". In Grimes, Sarah (ed.). Memoirs of a Chinese Marshal: The Autobiographical Notes of Peng Dehuai (1898-1974). Translated by Zheng, Longpu. Foreign Languages Press Beijing. p. 446. ISBN 0-8351-1052-4. During the Anti-Japanese War,.... There were ordinary and core members of the militia. There were militia teams in villages, core militia companies in districts, and in dependent militia regiments, battalions or detachments in counties.
  7. ^ Stephen Uhalley Jr.: A History of the Chinese Communist Party. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1988, pp. 81 and 96.
  8. ^ "中华人民共和国兵役法". www.npc.gov.cn. Retrieved 10 May 2024.
  9. ^ Stephen Uhalley Jr.: A History of the Chinese Communist Party. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1988, pp. 116–120.
  10. ^ Stephen Uhalley Jr.: A History of the Chinese Communist Party. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1988, p. 121.
  11. ^ "请尊崇我们的民兵英模". 3 January 2018. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |hrsg= (help); Unknown parameter |accessed= ignored (help)
  12. ^ http://www.stats.gov.cn/english/statisticaldata/yearlydata/YB1999e/a01e.htm
  13. ^ King C. Chen: China's War with Vietnam, 1979. Issues, Decisions, and Implications. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1987, p. 114.
  14. ^ "中华人民共和国兵役法(1984年)". 31 May 1984. {{cite web}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |hrsg= (help); Unknown parameter |accessed= ignored (help)
  15. ^ The Chinese People's Militia and the Doctrine of People's War. Thomas C. Roberts. September 19, 1983 Archived April 13, 2024, at the Wayback Machine
  16. ^ "民兵工作条例". 27 August 2009. {{cite web}}: Unknown parameter |accessed= ignored (help)
  17. ^ "Militias participate in rescue operations of North China landslide - China Military". eng.chinamil.com.cn. Retrieved 10 May 2024.
  18. ^ Kraska, James. "China's Maritime Militia Vessels May Be Military Objectives During Armed Conflict". thediplomat.com. The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 7 July 2020. Retrieved 8 July 2020.