1982 Ethiopian–Somali Border War

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1982 Ethiopian–Somali Border War
Part of the Ethiopian–Somali conflict and the Cold War

Somali solider stands between two captured Ethiopian BTR-60 armored carriers that were disabled in battle
DateJune–August 1982
Location
Result

Stalemate[1][2]

Territorial
changes
Ethiopian army and SSDF temporarily occupy the border towns of Galdogob and Balanbale[6]
Belligerents
Ethiopia
Puntland SSDF
Somalia Somalia
Commanders and leaders
Mengistu Haile Mariam
Puntland Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed
Somalia Siad Barre
Somalia Mohammad Ali Samatar
Somalia Mohamed Farrah Aidid
Strength
10,000-15,000[7] Ethiopian soldiers
2,000–5,000 SSDF militia[8][9]
2,500 Somali National Army soliders[10]
Casualties and losses
1,392 casualties[11] 3,506 casualties (Ethiopian claim)[12]

The 1982 Ethiopian–Somali Border War occurred between June and August 1982 when Ethiopia, sending a 10,000 man invasion force backed by warplanes and armored units, supported by thousands of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) rebels invaded central Somalia.

The Ethiopians and SSDF guerillas failed in their objective of advancing on the cities of Galkayo and Beledweyne, as the initial invasion was largely repulsed.[13][14] A military stalemate ensued at the border towns of Galdogob and Balanbale.[15][16]

Background[edit]

In 1977, Somalia attempted to regain control of the Ogaden region with the support of the Soviet Union. But by 1978 the Soviet Union had switched its allegiance to Ethiopia due to the potential political gain and potential resources.[5] In 1978, backed with Soviet weaponry and Cuban reinforcements, Ethiopia regained control of Ogaden. This resulted in the mass exodus of hundreds of thousands of Somali men and women immigrating from the Ogaden region to the Somali borders.[17] Somalia, despite losing the 1977-78 war, never recognized the international border that places the Ogaden, with its ethnic Somali population, in Ethiopia.[18]

Following the Soviet Union's change of allegiance from Somalia to Ethiopia in 1978, the United States became reluctant allies to Somalia. The United States came in at a very late stage when Somalia seemingly had no other allies left. The U.S. originally was aligned with Ethiopia, but stopped supplying and equipping the country with support and aid. The U.S. originally thought that in the long term Ethiopia would be a more valuable ally due to its geographical position, its size and influence.[6] Yet both Somalia and Ethiopia were in close proximity to western oil routes, which peaked both of the United States and the Soviet Union's stake in Africa.[6]

1978 coup and SSDF[edit]

After the failed 1978 coup attempt a leader of the putsch, Abdullahi Yusuf, had immediately fled to Ethiopia and setup base in the country for a new rebel organization called the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF).[19] The SSDF possessed little autonomy over Ethiopian security forces. The guerrillas were trained by Ethiopian officers. During the invasion operation planned for June 1982, the SSDF forces were integrated directly into much larger Ethiopian army units.[20]

Forces involved[edit]

In 1982, approximately 10,000 to 15,000 Ethiopian troops, equipped with Soviet-supplied MIG fighters and T-55 tanks, launched an invasion.[14][21] They were accompanied by 2,000 to 5,000 Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) rebels, who were similarly armed with tanks and received support from Ethiopian artillery and air forces.[21][22]

The Somali National Army (SNA) committed only 2,500 troops to the border battle.[21] However, Western diplomatic sources estimated the SNA's strength to be around 50,000 at the outset of the campaign. Despite this numerical advantage, the SNA was severely under-equipped and ill-prepared for conflict following serious losses in early 1978 at the end of the Ogaden War.[22]

Border war[edit]

In late June 1982, 15,000 Ethiopian army troops and thousands of SSDF rebels invaded across the border in the Mudug region. The offensive aimed for the cities of Galkayo in the north-east and Beledweyne in central Somalia. According to Gérard Prunier, "The plan was to cut Somalia into two by driving the troops all the way to the ocean, but the plan backfired."[14]

A field officer with the Somali National Army stops his Land Rover while carrying out a reconnaissance mission to observe advancing Ethiopian armor near Galdogob (1982)

The first attack was launched at the border town of Ferfer in an attempt to capture the high ground overlooking a vital highway connecting north and south Somalia. Initially the Somali army only had 1,800 troops in the region where the invasion occurred, but was soon reinforced. Despite heavy ground and air attacks, the Somali army garrison stationed nearby at the town of Beledweyne inflicted heavy losses on the invading forces and repulsed the Ethiopians. Soon after a stalemate ensued. The next incursion occurred further north at Balanbale. An Ethiopian armored column of 30 to 45 T-55 tanks backed by two artillery battalions overran the town and advanced 11km into Somalia. The Somali army commander at the town of El Dhere organized a counter-attack and pushed the offensive back to 3km outside Balanbale. The Ethiopians held and fortified the town.[15] To the surprise of many observers, the invasion was vigorously repulsed by the Somali National Army.[13] In spite of losses taken four years earlier during 1978 from the Ethiopian-Cuban counter offensive during the Ogaden War, the Somali army had regrouped and the invasion led to a large increase in volunteers joining the army. The Ethiopian/SSDF attack had played out to Barres advantage,[13] as his declining regime found a significant upsurge in support.[14] Limited confrontations took place at several other points further north, while the Ethiopian Air Force bombed and strafed Galkayo airport.[15]

The Ethiopian and SSDF forces never reached their objectives of Galkayo and Beledweyne, but were instead halted to a stalemate at border towns of Balanbale and Galdogob.[14] The SSDF denied the presence of Ethiopian troops in Somalia. This assertion was disputed by foreign diplomats who observed that the SSDF had given only 'token participation' to the operation.[23] It was persistently rumored the Barre had allowed the occupation of the two towns in order to drum up a case for further foreign military aid deliveries.[24] After the seizure of Balanbale and Galdogob, Siad Barre and his government declared a state of emergency.[22]

In front of SSDF personnel, including the groups chairman Abdullahi Yusuf, the Ethiopian army commander ordered his troops to raise the Ethiopian flag over the towns. Clashes began between the SSDF and Ethiopian forces, who consequently began eliminating SSDF officials.[25]

Foreign Support[edit]

Barre appealed for western military aid to repel the invasion,[22] but only received arms in the last month 1982. The arms included anti-tank and anti-air weaponry, along with some US Patton tanks.[15] The United States sped up the delivery of light arms which had been previously offered in 1980.[22] From 1979 to 1983, Somalia had imported US$30 million worth of American arms.[26] The US response was delayed as the conflict was overshadowed by the 1982 Israeli Invasion of Lebanon and the Iran–Iraq War. On the day Barre had informed Washington about the invasion (July 16), Iran had launched a major counteroffensive against Iraq.[26] In addition, the initially pledged US$45 million in economic and military aid was increased to US$80 million.[22] China delivered fighter jets at the end of 1982 to cover heavy losses taken during the Ogaden War.[15]

No foreign troops were known to be directly engaged in the fighting during 1982, though the Ethiopians saw Cuban and South Yemeni military assistance confined at the divisional level.[15]

Aftermath[edit]

Following the border war, President Siad Barre received some verbal support at the Arab League summit in 1982.[22] But ultimately year after year Somalia was challenged by war and economic trouble. Newly formed regional clan and guerilla groups revolted and challenged the Siad Barre government.[27]

During 1982, the Barre regime successfully split the SSDF and most its members surrendered to the government following an amnesty and payment offer.[28] Irritated by this development, the Ethiopian government put the head of the SSDF Abdullahi Yusuf in jail, where he remained until the Fall of the Derg regime in 1991.[29] During SSDF internal fighting during 1983 and 1984, Ethiopian security forces entered their camps and arrested the rebels central committee members.[20] After the rebels had no longer become useful to Mengistu, he had members of the organization killed, imprisoned or dispersed.[30]

Reprisals[edit]

The SSDF was primarily composed of the Majerteen clan, and following the invasion the Somali army carried out reprisals against civilians from the clan in Mudug, Nugaal and Bari regions. The reprisals included the raising of eighteen villages and the destruction of water reservoirs.[31]

References[edit]

  1. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12.
  2. ^ Cowell, Alan; Times, Special To the New York (8 October 1982). "ETHIOPIAN DRIVE AGAINST SOMALIA BOGS DOWN". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  3. ^ Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (1987). Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Profiles. Avalon Publishing. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6. Yet Siyaad surprised friends and foes alike by turning both events to advantage. His army vigorously repulsed the invaders...
  4. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  5. ^ a b "Somalia: Status of the Armed Forces" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. March 1982. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  6. ^ a b c "Recent Trends in the Horn of Africa" (PDF). Central Intelligence Agency. 15 December 1983. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  7. ^ Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9. In late June 1982, 15,000 regular Ethiopian army troops and 2,000 SSDF guerrillas attacked Somalia
  8. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12. On one side is a combined fighting force of between 6,000 and 10,000 men, most of whom are regular Ethiopian army troops backing up some 2,000 dissidents belonging to the Somali Democratic Salvation Front (SDSF).
  9. ^ Yuusuf (Dhegey), Sayid-Axmed M. (19 January 2015). Milicsiga Dagaalkii Dhexmaray Xukuumaddii Maxamed S. Barre iyo Jabhaddii SNM: Sababihii Dagaalka iyo Saamayntii uu ku yeeshay Jamhuuriyaddii Soomaalida. BoD - Books on Demand. ISBN 9789174635782.
  10. ^ Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12. On the other side, the Somali army has fielded only 2,500 men. Its artillery is so-so and it has no air support.
  11. ^ Tareke, Gebru (2009). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. p. 393.
  12. ^ Tareke, Gebru (2009). The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa. p. 393.
  13. ^ a b c Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (1987). Somalia: Nation in Search of a State. Profiles. Avalon Publishing. p. 159. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6. Yet Siyaad surprised friends and foes alike by turning both events to advantage. His army vigorously repulsed the invaders...
  14. ^ a b c d e Prunier, Gérard (2021). The Country that Does Not Exist: A History of Somaliland. Oxford University Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-78738-203-9.
  15. ^ a b c d e f Woodward, Peter; Forsyth, Murray Greensmith (1994). Conflict and Peace in the Horn of Africa: Federalism and Its Alternatives. Dartmouth Publishing Company. pp. 112–113. ISBN 978-1-85521-486-6.
  16. ^ Cowell, Alan; Times, Special To the New York (8 October 1982). "ETHIOPIAN DRIVE AGAINST SOMALIA BOGS DOWN". The New York Times. ISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  17. ^ "HISTORY OF SOMALIA". www.historyworld.net. Retrieved 23 October 2018.
  18. ^ Sheila Rule (5 April 1988). "Somalia and Ethiopia Resume Relations". The New York Times. Retrieved 23 October 2018.
  19. ^ Eritrea and Ethiopia : from conflict to cooperation. Internet Archive. Trenton, N.J. : Red Sea. 1994. p. 149. ISBN 978-0-932415-96-7.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: others (link)
  20. ^ a b Clapham, Christopher, ed. (1998). African guerrillas. Indiana University Press. pp. 75–77. ISBN 978-0-85255-816-4.
  21. ^ a b c Langellier, Jean-Pierre (14 November 1982). "Somalis and Ethiopians slog it out to stalemate". Le Monde. p. 12.
  22. ^ a b c d e f g Metz 1993, p. 47.
  23. ^ "Ethiopian-backed guerrillas claimed Thursday they routed Somali forces". UPI. 15 July 1982. Retrieved 8 May 2024.
  24. ^ Laitin, David D.; Samatar, Said S. (9 March 1987). Somalia: Nation In Search Of A State. Avalon Publishing. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-86531-555-6.
  25. ^ Dool, Abdullahi (1998). Failed States: When Governance Goes Wrong!. Horn Heritage. pp. 240–241. ISBN 978-0-9525241-9-9.
  26. ^ a b Lefebvre, Jeffrey Alan. Arms for the horn: U.S. Security Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia. University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 228–230.
  27. ^ Metz 1993, p. 48.
  28. ^ Dualeh, Hussein Ali (1994). From Barre to Aideed: Somalia : the Agony of a Nation. Stellagraphics Limited. p. 137. ISBN 978-9966-834-40-9.
  29. ^ Mukhtar, Mohamed Haji (25 February 2003). Historical Dictionary of Somalia. Scarecrow Press. p. 16. ISBN 978-0-8108-6604-1.
  30. ^ Clapham, Christopher, ed. (1998). African guerrillas. Indiana University Press. p. 80. ISBN 978-0-85255-816-4.
  31. ^ Ciisa-Salwe, Cabdisalaam M. (1994). The Collapse of the Somali State: The Impact of the Colonial Legacy. A.M. Issa-Salwe. p. 131. ISBN 978-1-912411-46-7.

Bibliography[edit]