User:Hturley
resources concerning the paradox of analysis: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/s6.html#4 and http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analysis/
R. G. Collingwood, working within the tradition of British idealism, which was still a powerful force prior to the Second World War. In his Essay on Philosophical Method (1933), for example, he criticizes Moorean philosophy, and develops his own response to what is essentially the paradox of analysis (concerning how an analysis can be both correct and informative), which he recognizes as having its root in Meno's paradox.
Searching Through UNC catalogs: keyword Paradox of Analysis yields 811 : "paradox of analysis" yields 5 (2 have chapters devoted to paradox of anaylsis) check out "Nature and Structure of Content" : "meno's paradox" yields 10 :
The Paradox of Analysis concerns how an analysis or definition can be both correct and informative. Although the problem spawned from the conflict in Plato's Meno, the term "Paradox of Analysis" was coined in reference to G. E. Moore's work.
The paradox occurs in an analysis such as giving a definition. In order to provide a definition, one must first have a definiendum (term to be defined) and a definiens (the definition itself). As would be expected, the definiendum and definiens have the same meaning or else there would be no analysis involved. However, if both terms mean the same, then they must be interchangeable, and if they are interchangeable, the definition is no longer helpful. Take the word bachelor for example. The definiendum is “bachelor” and its defiens is “unmarried man.” To be a proper definition, “bachelor” must mean the same as “unmarried man.” If this assumption were true, saying “bachelor” means “unmarried man” would be no different from saying “bachelor” means “bachelor” or “unmarried man” means “unmarried man.” It is obvious, however, that these three definitions are not all useful because only one is informative while the other two are not. Therefore, the meaning of “bachelor” must be different from the meaning of “unmarried man.”
To put it more bluntly: A definiens is correct when its meaning is the same as the definiendum. A definiens is informative when its meaning is not the same as the definiendum. A definiens’ meaning cannot simultaneously be the same yet not the same. Thus, a definiens cannot be both correct and informative.
References[edit]
"G.E. Moore (1873-1958)," by Aaron Preston, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://www.iep.utm.edu/>.
"Analysis," by Beaney Michael, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2008/entries/analysis/>.