User:Alaila/New sandbox

Internet censorship in Morocco

Censorship During the Arab Spring:

2011-2012: First Attempts in Morocco:

One of the main objectives of the Arab Spring in Morocco was democratization, primarily through liberation and privatization of media outlets. During the Arab Spring, protesters used social media to coordinate street riots. Unlike other Middle Eastern countries, Morocco remains a monarchy and has relatively more relaxed laws regarding street protests. The government had frequently allowed protests in order to allow civilians to blow off steam, and thus became more equipped to deal with riots. Rather than trying to censor the internet as other countries did, they used the internet as a a tool to watch and anticipate physical revolts, knowing it would be harder to control the revolts without it. Morocco adapted to a changing electronic era by creating and reforming state agencies with rather flexible rules on surveillance. Several commissions formed in late 1990 and early 2000 were altered in order to extend regulations to the online sphere. These commissions include: the National Agency of the Regulation of Telecommunications (ANRT) established in 1998, the High Authority of Audiovisual Com- munication (HACA) established by royal decree in 2002, the National Control Commission for the Protection of Per- sonal Data (CNDP) in 2009, and the DGST. While they appeared to uphold ideals of free media, the internal structure in which one appointed person holds power, translating into power polarized towards the king, provides a gateway for censorship, surveillance, and free speech violations. In the past the government had been exposed for using Eagle, a French Surveillance company to watch individual's internet activity and enable mass monitoring. Anyone who made an effort to expose internet surveillance was arrested. Most arrests were arrested under false pretenses of "adultery" and then published in headlines to ruin the reputation of the individual.

In 2012 a draft bill called the Code Numérique was introduced, which would restrict online rights and yield power to government with vague guidelines. In 2013 Maghreb Digital program's "Maroc Numeric" 2013 strategy was released to reinforce this legislation, but was abandoned soon after due to backlash primarily expressed on social media. According to the EEF, "the strategy of the Moroccan authorities has been to “watch” the internet, and often times intimidate and humiliate those who criticize the regime, rather than censor". As opposed to censorship of civilians through social media, the government took several measures to regulate the media coverage of what was happening on the ground by extorting journalists. One of the most prolific events entailed sentencing Rachid Nini, executive producer and founder of Al-Massae, an independent publication, to one year in jail for "compromising national security" in an opinion article.

The judiciary has also targeted several other newspapers. In 2009, Al-Jarida al-Oula, Al-Michaal, Le Journal Hebdomadaire, and Akhbar al-Youm were suppressed by the government. Editor Driss Chahtan was sentenced one year for “intentionally publishing false information”. In 2010 Akhbar al-Youm and Le Journal were targeted and Al-Massae in 2011. Moroccan law stipulates that surveillance can be utilized when the judiciary calls upon it, but does not define when that is necessary or applicable. The government utilizes the judiciary to authorize arrests by manipulating this weak branch:

“The judiciary is very weak and heavily influenced by the Ministry of Interior,” Taoufik Bouachrine, editor of the banned daily Akhbar al-Youm told CPJ. “The press freedom situation will keep deteriorating unless the king decides to turn this bleak page,”

The Moroccan constitution vows to protect the rights of free expression, but its spectrum is left vague. In several interviews, moroccan citizens claim that the constitution is not a reality; what is written is not actually adhered to, thereby giving the King more power. It also meant that the constitutional democratization promised by the King in 2011 had a very weak basis. This has allowed for the government to maintain a public facade that they are authorizing protests and free speech, while censoring individual opinions. Furthermore, there are no direct references in the constitution for how censorship should be handled online or virtually.

All have the right to express and to disseminate freely and within the sole limits expressly provided by the law, information, ideas and opinions. (Morocco’s Constitution 2011)

Civil society leaders found that state security services were noticeably more reluctant to move in on protesters precisely because most of the protesters had mobile phone cameras. It appears that most efforts are made to prevent international recognition of government activity.

Mamfakinch case:

Mamfakinch is a media collective established in early February of 2011, at the start of the Moroccan Spring. It marked the arrival of the first independent citizen media outlet in the country, which quickly gained notoriety through its coverage of the revolution. Unlike its predecessors such as Talk Morocco, this site was able to garner more attention by publishing in various languages and being the single citizen media outlet, or a voice for the people. The website was exposing to the international community what was happening in Morocco, the one thing the monarchy was attempting to hide the most. On March 10, after the King's speech promising constitutional reform, Mamfakinch posted a critical analysis along with an announcement that it was still protesting because they didn't believe real change can occur from the top. Mamfakinch played an especially important role in the international community by representing real Moroccan civilian's values, particularly while western commentators praised the King's response.The aforementioned government agencies responsible for internet surveillance directed its efforts towards targeting Mamfakinch. On July 13, 2012, at the hight of its international recognition, members of Mamfakinch unknowingly granted the government access to their computers via an encrypted email. This enabled access to microphone, webcam, and key board stroke. After Mamfakinch published this story, it garnered even more international attention. The story was covered by US and European media outlets and prompted an investigation of surveillance by the British company Privacy International The company was then sued by the Moroccan government, who simultaneously targeted individual Mamfakinch reporters.

2013-present: Subsequent Attempts to Revolt:

In 2013 Ali Anouzla, editor of Lakome was jailed for reporting extremism. According to the Brookings Institute, many people "have been prosecuted and jailed over the past decade for expressing their views on Internet". A second wave of an uprising occurred in 2016 following Mouhcine Fikri's death, and after witnessing successful revolutions from neighboring countries, the government noticeably increased all forms of suppression; more restrictions were placed on expression via increased security and internet censorship. Censorship spread into television: channels were surveilled and extensibe debates on politics were orchestrated or prohibited all together

NOTES

• Mamfakinch media collective
  • In early Feb 11 it was the first independent citizen media outlet, and gained notoritey at the start of the uprisings.
  • March 10, after King's speech promising constitutional reform, posted a critical analysis and announced it was still protesting because they didn't believe real change can occur from the top.
  • By publishing in various languages and being the single citizen media outlet, or a voice for the people, the wesbite was exposing to the international community what was happening in Morocco, the one thing the monarchy was attempting to hide the most.
  • Several commissions formed in late 1990 and early 2000 were altered in order to extend regulations to the online sphere. While they appeared to uphold ideals of free media, the internal structure in which one appointed person holds power, which translates into power polarized towards the king, provides a gateway for censorship, surveillance, and free speech violations.
    • These commissions include: the National Agency of the Regulation of Telecommunications (ANRT) established in 1998, the High Authority of Audiovisual Com- munication (HACA) established by royal decree in 2002, and the National Control Commission for the Protection of Per- sonal Data (CNDP) in 2009.
  • 13 July 2012 at the hight of its international recognition, members of Mamfakinch unknowingly granted access to their computers to government via an encrypted email. This enabled access to microphone, webcam, and key board strokes.
    • After Mamfakinch published this story, it garnered even more international attention. The story was covered by US and European media outlets and prompted an investigation of surveillance by the British company Privacy International. The company was then sued by the Moroccan government, who also targeted Mamfakinch reporters.
  • In the past the government had been exposed for using Eagle, a French Surveillance company to watch individual's internet activity and enable mass monitoring.
    • Anyone who made an effort to expose internet surveillance was arrested. Most arrests were arrested under false pretenses of "adultery" and then published in headlines to ruin the reputation of the individual.

• https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/12/will-morocco-regulate-internet-interview-zineb-belmkaddem-and-ibn-kafka
  • "the strategy of the Moroccan authorities has been to “watch” the internet, and often times intimidate and humiliate those who criticize the regime, rather than censor."
  • used the internet as a a tool to watch and anticipate physical revolts; harder to prevent without it
  • after streets cleared up, internet censorship became more common.
  • jailed Ali Anouzla= editor of Lakome
  • The Code Numérique: draft bill that restricts online rights and yields power to gov with vague guidelines
    • Maghreb Digital program's "Maroc Numeric" 2013 strategy: reinforces legislation
    • Opposition expressed on twitter and fb lead to its withdrawal
  • TV is slightly censored: channels surveilled/not allowed extensive debate on politics
• https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/117564/Democracy's+Fourth+Wave.pdf?sequence=1
  • civil society leaders found that state security services were noticeably more reluctant to move in on protesters precisely because most of the protesters had mobile phone cameras
• https://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-the-press-in-2011-morocco.php
  • Rachid Nini, Executive producer of Al-Massae given one year sentence for compromising national security for opinion article
  • Morocco had the highest penetration of Internet users in North Africa, according to the International Telecommunication Union at 49%
  • Newspapers targeted by judiciary:
    • 2009 Al-Jarida al-Oula, Al-Michaal, Le Journal Hebdomadaire, and Akhbar al-Youm
      • Editor Driss Chahtan sentenced one year for “intentionally publishing false information” (https://cpj.org/2009/11/cpj-urges-morocco-end-campaign-against-independent.php)
      • “The judiciary is very weak and heavily influenced by the Ministry of Interior,” Taoufik Bouachrine, editor of the banned daily Akhbar al-Youm told CPJ. “The press freedom situation will keep deteriorating unless the king decides to turn this bleak page,”
    • 2010 Akhbar al-Youm, Le Journal
    • 2011 Al-Massae

2013-present

• https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/11/02/why-moroccos-protests-wont-usher-in-another-arab-spring/
  • Death of Mouhcine Fikri
  • Governments become far more aware of how political dissent begins--> they started placing more restrictions to expression via increased security and internet censorship
  • "Moroccan government had allowed regular protests activity as a pressure-release mechanism and was therefore seasoned in protest control" and bc its a monarchy
  • Many people "have been prosecuted and jailed over the past decade for expressing their views on Internet"
• https://maroc.mom-rsf.org/uploads/tx_lfrogmom/documents/9002-1120_import.pdf
  • Television and radio trends

Pre-2009: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/midintnt996.PDF

Moroccan protestors in 2011