Talk:Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution/Archive 7

More response to Brad C and Wixpositor

Dear Brad C and Wixpositor: I’ll respond to your comments about my response to the comments by Brad C here. The statement I made was: “Despite lots and lots of litigation by tax protesters to try to get a Federal court to rule that Congress does not have constitutional authority to tax income, including income in the form of wages, salaries and other compensation for personal services, over the years, the protesters have lost ‘every single case’.” In case you missed it, what I was saying was that in every case where a tax protester argued that Congress does not have constitutional authority to tax income, including income in the form of wages, salaries and other compensation for personal services, the tax protesters have lost that point. No court has ever ruled in favor of a tax protester on that argument.

The fact that direct taxes also include head taxes is most certainly relevant to defining a direct tax. Your statement that “It is what it is regardless of what it encompasses”, is of course a tautology and is of course a correct statement. You are also correct when you say that a direct tax includes (but is not limited to) taxes on real and personal property. None of this changes the fact that Brad C made an incorrect statement about a definition, and I provided a correction.

Wixpositor, your statement that “any tax, regardless of its name, must fall within the indirect class to be collectible within the States” is both legally incorrect and legally frivolous. Nothing in the text of Article I states -- and no Federal court has ever ruled -- that any tax, regardless of its name, must fall within the “indirect” class to be collectible within the States.

Now let’s talk about the Kuglin, Kellums, and Garland cases – using the example of Kuglin, a case which is erroneously cited by tax protesters over and over. We are going to have to talk about some of the basics of the U.S. legal system.

You readily admit that “These cases were won on the lack of willfulness, but they were won.” You – and Carl Worden, the author of the Sierra Times article you referenced – miss the importance of that statement. Let’s look at this Carl Worden verbiage from the material you cited regarding the Kuglin case:

Now pinch yourself and review this astonishing turn of events: A highly trained and educated federal prosecutor in Memphis was unable to convince 12 American citizens that Vernice Kuglin was required to pay federal income taxes. He was clearly unable to produce a single section of the Tax Code to that end, and the jury was unanimous in clearing Kuglin of all charges against her. If the foregoing was not so, Kuglin would have been convicted.

This is a tired, old tax protester argument. Every time a tax protester (or other taxpayer) is acquitted in a criminal case, the tax protesters try to argue that this is a ruling by a court of law that “wages are not taxable,” “there is no law making me liable for a tax,” etc., etc.

Under the U.S. legal system, the general rule is that two categories of issues (questions) are determined in court. These are called “questions of fact” and “questions of law.”

Let’s look at this question: Under the Internal Revenue Code, are wages, salaries, and other forms of compensation for personal services includible in gross income -- and taxable -- for Federal income tax purposes? That is a question of law. Questions of law are decided only by a judge, not by a jury.

Let’s look at this question: Is the willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat the assessment of any tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code (or the attempt to evade or defeat the payment of such a tax) a felony under Internal Revenue Code? That is another question of law, to be decided by a judge, not by a jury.

One example of a question of fact would be: Did this particular taxpayer engage in an affirmative act to evade or defeat either the assessment of a Federal tax or the payment of a Federal tax, in connection with wages he or she received (actus reus)?

Another example of a fact question would be: Was this particular taxpayer aware of the existence of a law that made wages taxable for Federal income tax purposes (mens rea)?

Still another example of a fact question would be: Was any portion of the aforementioned Federal tax (for this particular taxpayer) unpaid at the time of the aforementioned actus reus and the mens rea (i.e., was there an actual tax deficiency) (attendant circumstance)?

Notice that on the question of whether this particular taxpayer was aware of the existence of a law that made wages taxable for Federal income tax purposes, the question is not whether the taxpayer agreed with the law, or agreed that it should be the law, or even believed that it really was the law. The question is whether the taxpayer was aware of the existence of the law.

Think of the situation where you are standing on a railroad track. Someone standing off to the side yells, warning you that a train is coming. You look down the track and you see the train speeding at you, and you say “No, that’s not a train, it’s just a mirage.” The fact that you do not believe that what you see is “a real train” when in fact it is a real train does not change the fact that you are aware of its existence.

In a criminal case, a “not guilty” verdict by the jury does not constitute a ruling by the court on any point of law. Again, juries determine what are called “questions of fact.” Juries do not determine questions of law, and juries render verdicts, not court judgments. No U.S. jury has ever ruled that wages are not taxable; indeed, no jury has the power to make such a ruling.

On a rare occasion, a jury may render a verdict that seems to a prosecutor or a news reporter, or maybe to you or me, to fly in the face of the facts and the law as presented to the jury. Legal scholars refer to this phenomenon as Jury nullification. Some commentators may even refer to this phenomenon as the jury “nullifying the law itself” – as applied in that particular case.

I’m sorry, but arguing that a “not guilty” verdict based on a finding of lack of willfulness in a criminal tax case is a ruling by the jury that wages are not taxable is like arguing that a “not guilty” verdict based on a finding of lack of willfulness in a murder case is a ruling by the jury that murder is not against the law.

Willfulness is one of the elements that the prosecution must prove in a criminal tax case – beyond a reasonable doubt. Under our legal system, proof in this context means PERSUASION. The jury may be persuaded that the defendant engaged in the conduct. The jury may be persuaded that a tax was owed. But if the jury is not persuaded that the defendant’s conduct was also WILLFUL, that jury is required, as instructed by the judge, to render a verdict of NOT GUILTY. Jury nullification in a particular case applies only to a verdict by a jury in that particular case. Jury nullification does not constitute a legal judgment by the court itself that the underlying law is somehow invalid, or non-existent, or wrongly applied, or wrongly interpreted, or wrongly anything else.

It is possible, but difficult, to empanel a jury of twelve people who will unanimously ignore the judge’s instructions on the law and render a “not guilty” verdict based on a belief by the members of the jury that wages are not taxable, or that wages should not be taxable. But even if that were to occur, or even if it has occurred in the Kuglin or other cases, that does not mean that wages are not taxable under the Internal Revenue Code, any more than a not guilty verdict in a murder case would mean that murder is not illegal. No Federal court has ever ruled that wages are not taxable for Federal income tax purposes.

Now, let’s look at this statement by Wixpositor:

I will agree with Famspear that the protesters have lost most of these cases, but I attribute that fact to the propensity of federal judges to not want to be blackballed by the U.S. Attorney’s office and to their lack of fealty to their oaths of office rather than to the accuracy of their decisions.

Now, let’s look at this statement by Wixpositor:

Additionally, many (most) of the arguments presented were either poorly framed or not on point at all, so of course they lost. (One can ascertain the contents of the arguments by reading the court decisions in these cases.)

And let’s look at this verbiage:

[ . . . ] wages are property (wages are money and money is property). The inferior courts use the common definition of income (“everything that comes in”) rather than its legal definition and then build decisions based on their faulty definition. The government has managed to cobble together a morass of conflicting lower court decisions based on poorly-framed arguments to keep the Constitution at bay [ . . . ]

This is another tired, old tax protester argument. Despite litigating hundreds and hundreds of these cases over the years since the mid-1970s (when tax protester arguments began showing up in reported court decisions in appreciable numbers), the tax protesters just haven’t quite gotten it right, we are led to believe. Every tax protester presumably thinks his argument, which just hasn’t been argued in just the right way, will be the one that finally breaks the spell and convinces the courts that 99.9999% of all legislators, lawyers, CPAs, judges, law professors, etc., etc., for the past umpteen years just didn’t know how to do this right, and that the tax protesters were right all along. The tax protester argument seems to be that the courts just somehow have it wrong, presumably either unintentionally (incompetence?) or intentionally (conspiracy?).

Let’s look at this statement by Wixpositor:

Wages are not income in the constitutional sense because a tax on them is not in the indirect class, which encompasses the only taxes that the federal government is allowed to collect from within the States.

Again, this statement is legally incorrect. Nothing in the text of the U.S. Constitution states that a tax on wages is “not in the indirect class.” No Federal court has ever upheld the argument that, under Article I or any other provision of the United States Constitution, a tax on wages is a direct tax. Nothing in the text of the U.S. Constitution states that taxes in the “indirect class” are “the only taxes that the federal government is allowed to collect from within the states” – and no court has ever upheld that argument. These arguments are legally frivolous.

I, Famspear, have never “claimed” that the 16th Amendment “has powers which in fact it does not have.” The law is as follows: Congress has the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes – from whatever source derived – without apportionment among the several states, and without regard to any census or enumeration. There is no “exception” in the text of the Sixteenth Amendment that applies to “direct taxes” or “taxes that happen to be red” or “taxes that happen to be blue” or any other kind of taxes. If it’s an income tax, then Congress has the power to lay and collect it – without apportionment, etc. That’s not merely my personal “belief.” That’s not my original research. You can argue about what you personally believe the Constitution means from now until doom’s day, and you can argue about what you personally believe income means, but you cannot get around the central reality that the Constitution says what it says (to use another tautology), and that under the U.S. legal system the law is what the courts rule the law is.

Now, let’s look at this language from Wixpositor:

The Supreme Court (as opposed to the mistaken lower courts) has never held that the federal government has the authority to collect an unapportioned direct tax from within the States. (However, the federal government can collect an unapportioned direct tax from within territory which it owns, leading to further confusion.)

This verbiage illustrates again the wisdom of the Wikipedia policy against “original research.” By his own admission, Wixpositor pretty much “ignores” decisions of the “mistaken lower courts.” This is code language by Wixpositor which really means: I, Wixpositor, have come up with my own theory, and the courts are wrong.

The attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court toward tax protesters is summed up in the most recent tax protester case to be decided by the Court: the ‘’Cheek’’ case. In Cheek the Court stated:

Claims that some of the provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are submissions of a different order. They do not arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied conclusion, however wrong, that those provisions are invalid and unenforceable. Thus, in this case, Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars and based on his own study, he concluded that the income tax laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax. [ . . . ] We do not believe that Congress contemplated that such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms provided by Congress to present his claims of invalidity to the courts and to abide by their decisions. [ . . . ] As we see it, he is in no position to claim that his good-faith belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness or provides a defense to criminal prosecution under 7201 and 7203. Of course, Cheek was free in this very case to present his claims of invalidity and have them adjudicated, but, like defendants in criminal cases in other contexts who "willfully" refuse to comply with the duties placed upon them by the law, he must take the risk of being wrong. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 205-206 (footnote omitted).

In this case, Mr. Cheek’s first conviction was actually reversed by the Supreme Court on a non-tax protester argument regarding an incorrect instruction by the judge on “willfulness” (remember my explanation about questions of law and questions of fact?), and the case was remanded for a new trial. Cheek was convicted under the corrected instruction per the holdings of the Supreme Court. His conviction was upheld on appeal. He asked for a review by the Supreme Court and – guess what – the Supreme Court let his conviction stand, by declining his petition. Mr. Cheek went to prison.

Let’s look at this statement by Wixpositor:

If not, Brad C’s and my statement that the federal government does not have the authority to collect an unapportioned direct tax within the States remains in agreement with the law of the land. Sorry.

Wixpositor, the issue – properly framed -- is whether the federal government has the authority to impose and collect an unapportioned income tax within the States. The answer that every Federal court has given – every Federal court that has decided the issue – is yes. The courts have uniformly applied that rule to taxes on lots of different kinds of income – including, especially, wages, salaries, and other forms of compensation for personal services. And each court that has considered the argument that wages cannot be taxed because the tax is “direct” has rejected that argument.

Sorry.

Verifiability, Neutral Point of View, and No Original Research. Yours, Famspear 22:05, 13 January 2007 (UTC)

Please stop making personal attacks; let us discuss substance

Dear anonymous editor at IP 129.137.3.208: Because you have made multiple personal attacks on me, even continuing your attacks after having been cautioned on your own talk page, and because you have failed to discuss your edits to the article here on the talk page for the article, I am reluctantly bringing your personal attacks to the attention of the readers of this talk page.

Your attacks began in your descriptions of your edits to the article, as follows:

“remove historical inaccuracies & anachronsims by an incompetent author”[1]

and here:

“remove historical inaccuracy by an author too incompetent to gain tenure at any university”[2].

After being cautioned in what I calculated was a reasonably diplomatic way on your own discussion page regarding your personal attacks, you posted a response on my talk page that included the following language:

“Now, if I come along and refine the entry to reflect the same language for the same issues that White considered, I shouldn't have to educate you people to overcome your ignorance, or convince you that you all are not graced with papal infallibility. Thus, it is quite appropriate to make personal attacks on those to arrogant to study the historical record, if only because a status quo based on ever laxer standards is good enough for a low-minded consensus.”[3]

You have so far declined to discuss your edits to this article here on the talk page for the article. Instead of engaging in personal attacks, please review the changes you want to make and my explanations of why, in my opinion, the changes are objectionable.

You keep changing from the following material:

This meant that, after Pollock, while income taxes on income from labor (as indirect taxes) were still not required to be apportioned by population, taxes on interest, dividends and rent income were required to be apportioned by population. The Pollock ruling made the source of the income (e.g., property versus labor, etc.) relevant in determining whether the tax imposed on that income was deemed to be "direct" (and thus required to be apportioned among the states according to population) or, alternatively, "indirect" (and thus required only to be imposed with geographical uniformity).

To this language:

This meant that, after Pollock, while taxes on the incomes of the self-employed (as indirect taxes) were still not required to be apportioned by population, taxes on interest, dividends and rental income were required to be apportioned by population. The Pollock ruling made the source of the income (e.g. who is transferring the taxable amount) relevant in determining whether the tax imposed on that income was deemed to be "direct" (upon the recipient and thereby required to be apportioned among the states according to population) or, alternatively, "indirect" (i.e. upon the originator and thereby required only to be imposed with geographical uniformity).

The term “self-employed” as used in this edit is enigmatic. In Federal tax law, the term “self-employed” has a particularized legal meaning. The term is used to describe people who work for themselves in businesses they themselves own, as opposed to “employees” (people who work for someone else in businesses someone else owns). I argue that the edit is objectionable because the cited rule applies to taxes on income from all labor, not merely self-employment labor.

The anonymous editor uses the phrase “who is transferring the taxable amount” as describing an example of the “source” of the income. That is incorrect. The term “source” as used in the Sixteenth Amendment refers to whether the income is wages, salaries, interest, dividend, rental income, and so on. It does not refer to who is paying (transferring) the income. While this may appear to be legal hair-splitting, it is legal hair-splitting that is important. I argue that there is no need to muddy the water with this kind of edit.

The anonymous user wants to change the text to say use the words “upon the recipient” in referring to the word “direct” (as in a “direct” tax). This appears to be a well-meaning but ill-advised edit -- for the following reason.

While the anonymous editor does not necessarily appear to be making blatant tax protester arguments, some tax protesters have tried to argue that a “direct tax” should be defined as a tax that falls ultimately on the taxpayer (which sounds perilously close to “the recipient” in the sense of the “recipient of the income”). The following is an example language that has been quoted in support of the tax protester argument:

The ordinary test of the difference between direct and indirect taxes, is whether the tax falls ultimately on the tax-payer, or whether, through the tax-payer, it falls ultimately on the consumer. If it falls ultimately on the tax-payer, then it is direct in its nature, as in the case of poll taxes and land taxes. If, on the contrary, it falls ultimately on the consumer, then it is an indirect tax.

Such is the test, as laid down by all writers on the subject. Adam Smith, who was the great and universally received authority on political economy, in the day when the Federal Constitution was framed, sets forth a tax on a person's revenue to be a direct tax. 5 Mill,6 Say,7 J. R. McCulloch,8 Lieber,9 among political economists, do the same in specific language. Mr. Justice Bouvier, in his learned Law Dictionary, defines a capitation tax, 'A poll tax; an imposition which is yearly laid on each person according to his estate and ability.'

The above-quoted language has been used right here on this talk page in this past few days to give the incorrect impression that this is from an opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court, when in fact it was a losing argument from a taxpayer in a Supreme Court case called Pacific Insurance Company v. Soule (see above).

Although the anonymous editor has not made a tax blatant protester argument and has not cited the Pacific Insurance case at all, I’m concerned that the kind of edit he/she proposes would, again, simply muddy the water.

The term “direct tax” as used in the Constitution (as interpreted by the courts) does not so much refer to its effect on the recipient as it simply refers to (1) property taxes imposed by reason of ownership and (2) capitations. Further, subsequent cases like Pollock reinforce this view.

The anonymous editor keeps changing from this language:

During this period from 1895 to 1913 when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, while Congress could have re-imposed taxes on income from labor and other non-property sources without apportionment by population, imposing taxes on interest, dividends and rent income would not have been practical (as the income from property in each state would virtually never correspond to the population of that state in relation to the population of the entire nation). The Congress was unwilling to impose an income tax on labor and other non-property sources without also imposing a tax on income from property -- and taxes on income from property were no longer realistic.

To this language:

During this period from 1895 to 1913 when the Sixteenth Amendment was ratified, while Congress could have re-imposed taxes on incomes of the self-employed and other non-property sources without apportionment by population, imposing taxes on interest, dividends and rental income would not have been practical (as the income from property in each state would virtually never correspond to the population of that state in relation to the population of the entire nation). The Congress was unwilling to impose an income tax on the self-employed and other non-property sources without also imposing a tax on income on property owners--and taxes on income from property were no longer realistic.

Again, the change to the term “self-employed” is incorrect in the sense that it is too limited. The phrases “income from labor” or “income realized in the performance of personal services” would be more accurate here.

The anonymous editor changes from this:

Until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, all direct taxes were required to be apportioned among the states according to each state's population

To this:

Until the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment, all taxes direct in substance but indirect in form were required to be apportioned among the states according to each state's population, per Article I, section 2, clause 3 and Article I, section 9, clause 4.

Again, while the amended language is correct as far as it goes, it does not go far enough. It would be more correct to say “all direct taxes were required to be apportioned,” or, if you like, “all direct taxes and all indirect taxes treated as direct taxes.”

It’s important to note that some of these edits by the anonymous user are not completely incorrect. I argue that the edits are just incorrect enough to be misleading.

I would appreciate any comments from anyone. Yours, Famspear 07:16, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

As a post-script, here is the entire message that was posted over the weekend on my own talk page. The material did not mention the Sixteenth Amendment article by name, but obviously was related to the article:

I'm a diff't anon user, one who is questioning the use of language that does not reflect the meaning at the time.

The article could be much more specific in terminology.

As it stands, it employs stereotypical usages which trivialise the issues.

The Pollock case is best explained in the Brushaber decision, which was written by Justice White who wrote the minority opinion in Pollock.

He explictly wrote that Congress had the income tax act collect the tax at source as required for any excise.

This requirement has been upheld by every revisit of the matter, such as Gurley v. Rhoden.

White knows better than anyone alive today. He did not mention wages as an item of taxable income.

The original 1040 for 1913 implemented exactly what Congress intended to achieve with the 16th.

You can read it at the irs.gov site, and see that it does not include wages as taxable income.

The 1040 spanning 3 decades until WWII did not tax wages, and so was not an issue in 1913.

The onus is on you to prove that Justice White did not consider 'substance' to be an issue.

Do you internet people have the intellectual honesty to admit that it was, or the diligence to study the decisions cited?

His decision explictly states that the Pollock court acted as if it was their duty to disregard form and consider substance alone:

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=240&invol=1#17

Thus, it was an issue whether the tax was indirect in form but direct in substance.

Now, if I come along and refine the entry to reflect the same language for the same issues that White considered, I shouldn't have to educate you people to overcome your ignorance, or convince you that you all are not graced with papal infallibility.

Thus, it is quite appropriate to make personal attacks on those too arrogant to study the historical record, if only because a status quo based on ever laxer standards is good enough for a low-minded consensus.

That is what keeps Newton's flawed theory of gravity as a Law, and prevents Einstein's theory from becoming one, despite repeated observations bearing out its most outlandish aspects.

More on all this later. Yours, Famspear 15:15, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

OK, to continue: The material copied from my user page is, unfortunately, legally frivolous tax protester rhetoric. When viewing the edits in light of this material, I argue that it is obvious that this anonymous editor is trying to insert his/her original research - original research which is both unverifiable and incorrect.

The incomplete citation to "Gurley v. Rhoden" apparently is meant to refer to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200 (1975). This case involved the issue of whether the denial of the deduction of the Mississippi and federal gasoline excise taxes in computing the gross proceeds of retail sales for purposes of the Mississippi sales tax was constitutional. The Court ruled that it was not unconstitutional. No issues involving the taxation of income of any kind whatsoever for Federal income tax purposes were presented to or decided by the Court. The words "wage," "wages," "salary," or "salaries, "employment," and "self-employment" do not even appear in the text.

Regarding Form 1040, the anonymous editor is quite wrong. At the expense of pointing out what is obvious to legal practitioners, but which is not obvious to the average reader, a tax form -- such as Form 1040 -- while certainly an official form, is not "the law." More importantly, the statement that the "1040 spanning 3 decades until WWII did not tax wages" is false. No Form 1040 for any year (1913 or otherwise) has ever provided a legal exclusion that would allow wage income to go untaxed.

This kind of material has been covered over and over again on the talk pages of Wikipedia. Rather than repeat the authorities already listed, I will add an excerpt from another case, just for some relief. The following is an excerpt from the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in a case called Parker v. Commissioner, where as usual a taxpayer argued unsuccessfully that wages were not taxable:

Parker [the taxpayer] maintains that "the IRS and the government in general, including the judiciary, mistakenly interpret the sixteenth amendment as allowing a direct tax on property (wages, salaries, commissions, etc.) without apportionment." As we observed in Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F. 2d 71 (5th Cir. 1981), the sixteenth amendment was enacted for the express purpose of providing for a direct income tax. The thirty words of this amendment are explicit: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." The Supreme Court promptly determined in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 36 S. Ct. 236, 60 L. Ed. 493 (1916), that the sixteenth amendment provided the needed constitutional muster for the imposition of a direct non-apportioned income tax.

Appellant cites Brushaber and Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 36 S. Ct. 278, 60 L. Ed. 546 (1916), for the proposition that the sixteenth amendment does not give Congress the power to levy an income tax. This proposition is only partially correct, and in its critical aspect, is incorrect. In its early consideration of the sixteenth amendment the Court recognized that the amendment does not bestow the taxing power. The bestowal of such authority is not necessary, for as the Court pointedly noted in Brushaber:

The authority conferred upon Congress by §8 of article 1 "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises" is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation has never been questioned, or, if it has, has been so often authoritatively declared as to render it necessary only to state the doctrine. And it has also never been questioned from the foundation . . . that there was authority given . . . to lay and collect income taxes.

240 U. S. at 12-13, 36 S. Ct. at 239-240.

The sixteenth amendment merely eliminates the requirement that the direct income tax be apportioned among the states. The immediate recognition of the validity of the sixteenth amendment continues in an unbroken line. See e.g. United States v. McCarty, 665 F. 2d 596 (5 Cir. 1982); Lonsdale v. CIR.

Appellant cites Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 389 (1911), in support of his contention that the income tax is an excise tax applicable only against special privileges, such as the privilege of conducting a business, and is not assessable against income in general. Appellant twice errs. Flint did not address personal income tax; it was concerned with corporate taxation. Furthermore, Flint is pre-sixteenth amendment and must be read in that light. At this late date, it seems incredible that we would again be required to hold that the Constitution, as amended, empowers the Congress to levy an income tax against any source of income, without the need to apportion the tax equally among the states, or to classify it as an excise tax applicable to specific categories of activities.

[ . . . ]

The absence of a semblance of merit in any issue raised in appellant's appeal mandates a repeat of the warning we gave in Lonsdale v. CIR, 661 F. 2d at 72, concerning the very claims raised in this case:

Appellants' contentions are stale ones, long settled against them. As such they are frivolous. Bending over backwards, in indulgence of appellants' pro se status, we today forbear the sanctions of Rule 38, Fed. R. App. P. We publish this opinion as notice to future litigants that the continued advancing of these long-defunct arguments invite such sanctions, however.

Our warning has been ignored. We now invoke the sanctions of Fed. R. App. P. 38 and assess appellant with double costs. This time we do not award damages but sound a cautionary note to those who would persistently raise arguments against the income tax which have been put to rest for years. The full range of sanctions in Rule 38 shall hereafter be summoned in response to a totally frivolous appeal.

--Parker v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 469, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) paragr. 9209 (5th Cir. 1984).

Neither the Pollock court, nor the Brushaber court, nor any other Federal court has ever ruled that wages are not taxable for Federal income tax purposes. This anonymous user's arguments constitute legally frivolous, repeatedly rejected, erroneous arguments. Verifiability, Neutral Point of View, No Original Research, and No Personal Attacks. Yours, Famspear 16:11, 15 January 2007 (UTC)