Talk:Enactivism/Archive 1

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Archive 1

Untitled

I'd like to include some more content from The Embodied Mind and also discuss the relationship of enactivism to embodiment and artificial intelligence.

Sjackisch (talk) 00:22, 21 July 2008 (UTC)


Why's Martin Heidegger not referenced, anyone? KTyson (talk) 01:26, 12 August 2008 (UTC)

Heidegger has focused a lot less on the body than Merleau-Ponty, who combined Heiggerian ideas with his focus on the body. That might be the reason. --Andreasvc (talk) 23:41, 27 October 2008 (UTC)

Psychology / Philosophy

Is there a way to change the page title for this article? I feel that "Enactivism" or "Enactivism (Philosophy)" would be much more accurate. I am going to try expanding this article with correct citations at some point, then adding it to the philosophy portal. (Epavlica (talk) 20:08, 21 May 2009 (UTC))

Not Clear - Needs a Re-write

Part of the point of an encyclopedia is to explain concepts to layman. This appears to be written by someone which does not have a good understanding of the topic and is therefore full of jargon and not explained with the clarity that one might hope.


Jim, July 2012 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 109.144.26.172 (talk) 15:28, 15 July 2012 (UTC)

Evan Thompson is not a psychogist, but a philosopher

As one of the trio named, it would make sense to have mention of Stuart Hampshire, who borrowed freely from Continental contemporaries without crediting them, as had Gilbert Ryle.

Notably missing are European contemporaries of Merleau-Ponty outside France.

Philosophers tend to point to Descartes, but historically there is also an important Christian heresy concerning embodiment which for centuries ran counter to Christian neo-Platonic thought and even now remains outside official theology of the mainstream of English-speaking Western religion. The doctrine that Jeshua, called The Nazarene, was simply a man has a parallel in the Japanese introduction of the Emperor as a god and the post-1945 withdrawal of this spiritual embuement as in Japan both assertion and retraction were social phenomena related to changes in power and social structure.

While not strictly in conflict with dualism, both the heresy and the retreat of supernaturalism undermine the requirement within a cultural context for a defense of dualism in a philosophical anthropology. In this regard, see Heidegger's borrowings from Japanese Buddhist thought and his wish to teach in or even to emmigrate to Japan (per Karl Jaspers.)

G. Robert Shiplett 11:23, 23 October 2013 (UTC)

Revision of introduction

The lead sentence of this article is:

"Enactivism is a theoretical approach to understanding the mind proposed by Francisco Varela, Evan Thompson, and Eleanor Rosch.[1]"

While this sentence is true, I'd suggest it is a poor first sentence for two reasons. The most important reason is that it is not clear from this sentence what 'enactivism' is, beyond being some kind of theory of mind (of which there are many). The second reason is that although the word 'enactivism' was proposed by these authors, the subject has moved on from their formulation, and making this source the first sentence seems to imply that their formulation is what is meant by the term today. However, Andy Clark and DiPaolo have suggested that the Varela approach stresses sensorimotor activities that are 'cognitively marginal', and both DiPaolo and Rohde have suggested the more important application of enactivism is to high-level cognitive processes, including even science itself.

If there is some consensus that this first sentence needs to be changed, I can offer some possible replacements. For example,

"Enactivism argues that cognition depends on a dynamic interaction between the cognitive agent and its environment: "Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world.1
[1] Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 33 ff. ISBN 978-0262526012. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Other possibilities are out there, of course. Brews ohare (talk) 04:34, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

I have made this change and added a paragraph on the recent views de-emphasizing sensorimotor activity by DiPaolo, Andy Clark, and Rohde. Brews ohare (talk) 13:40, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

Thank you Brews but for now please use the existing inline style per WP:CITEVAR.—Machine Elf 1735 14:38, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

"Enactivism argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment." So, who's this Enactivism fellow? Is it a person? No? What kind of -ism is it? I think this line is way less illuminating than the previous one.186.182.121.65 (talk) 14:45, 23 February 2016 (UTC) Pablo

Two year old discussion, If you want to propose a change to the article open a new section ----Snowded TALK 14:47, 23 February 2016 (UTC)

Merge discussion

I'd suggest that Snowded look at this article and make any deletions here before proceeding. --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:34, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

  • Merge premature: At this juncture, any attempt to merge this article with Enaction (philosophy) is premature, as that article and this one are in flux. In principle, Enaction (philosophy) ultimately will focus upon the philosophical aspects of Enactivism, while Enactivism will be a broader treatment including biology, psychology, sociology, machine interfacing, robotics, education, mental development, and so on. Brews ohare (talk) 16:10, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, For example, could you look at the sections Scholars with sympathetic ideas, Other related scholars, and Yet other authors of similar Natural Growth of Knowledge theories? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:08, 22 April 2014 (UTC)

Thanks Bob, I did look at this in assembling the list of topics for a new article. Some I left out (like autopoesis) as it really has not intruded on philosophy others were there under other names. But I may well have missed some. Basically I think this article is premature and we should (i) expand the Enactivism one then (ii) create the philosophical context in a new article but my proposal (or some variant thereof) ----Snowded TALK 16:28, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded, So I take it that you think there is no problem with WP:NOR, etc. regarding those three sections, or do you think they should be deleted? --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:39, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
Apologies I misunderstood the question. I am not too fussed about lists to be honest as long as there is a source to back each one up. Lists don't make statements in the way that content does. Others might be concerned however and if so I would not oppose their deletion ----Snowded TALK 16:59, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded, Re "I am not too fussed about lists to be honest as long as there is a source to back each one up." — AFAICT there is no source given, so what do you want to do? --Bob K31416 (talk) 18:08, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
I saw a note on the talk page to the effect that they had been validated so you may find something on the talk pages? Your other option is simply to delete any you think are not relevant and see if anyone defends them. Happy to back you up as needed ----Snowded TALK 18:12, 22 April 2014 (UTC)
Re "I saw a note on the talk page to the effect that they had been validated" — This talk page? Where is the note? --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:27, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
I have a strong memory of it in the header on the talk page but I can't find it, so its possible I confused it with one of the other articles I monitor. Either way go ahead and delete ----Snowded TALK 02:24, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
Actually, I wasn't looking to delete the material. I was interested in your position to get an idea of whether the material was stable with respect to the possibility of you deleting it. Anyhow, I'll leave it at that. --Bob K31416 (talk) 02:39, 23 April 2014 (UTC)
Then ask directly! When I said I was not too much fussed about lists I thought I had answered that possibility. If we merge the it makes sense to just get rid of it as it adds little but not worth an effort otherwise ----Snowded TALK 03:06, 23 April 2014 (UTC)

MachineElf has undertaken to merge the articles without any consensus. Brews ohare (talk) 00:04, 28 April 2014 (UTC)

Examination of sources

Snowded eliminated a list of sources added by Mormequill a year ago without any text to explain their presence. The list was presented as follows:

"The most important recent publications in the field are arguably Evan Thompson's (2007) Mind in Life,[1] Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin's (2013) Radicalizing Enactivism,[2] the edited volume Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science,[3] and Alva Noë's (2012) Varieties of Presence.[4]
  1. ^ Thompson, Evan (2007). Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. ISBN 0674057511. A follow-up on The Embodied Mind, apparently with a treatment of Husserl and departures from Cartesian dualism. Book review here.
  2. ^ Hutto, D., & Myin, E. (2013). Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds Without Content. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ISBN 0262018543.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) Review found here
  3. ^ Stewart, J., Gapenne, O., & Di Paolo, E., ed. (2010). Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. ISBN 9780262014601.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  4. ^ Noë, Alva (2012). Varieties of Presence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674062146. Review found here

I've filled in some links, and hope that a suitable discussion might recommend their reincorporation in the article in a more extensive discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 20:35, 18 April 2014 (UTC)

it's pretty patronising to assume editors can't follow a diff you know. Aside from that the text is one editor's opinion, and we need a source to make statements like that. I will make some other amendments later when I have a proper keypad not the iPad.----Snowded TALK 21:41, 18 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Humbug. I put these sources here so they would be handy. I pointed out your perfectly reasonable reason for their removal. You just like to gripe. Brews ohare (talk) 00:45, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

It might be useful to keep a list of reliable sources in a section of the talk page for editors to use for future edits. --Bob K31416 (talk) 01:10, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

Removal of Varela , Thompson & Rosch, the seminal work on enactivism

In this edit Snowded removed a citation to The Embodied Mind by Varela , Thompson & Rosch, the seminal work on enactivism. This work is almost universally cited as the source where the term 'enactivism' was coined. The removed footnote was:

Francisco J Varela, Evan Thompson, Eleanor Rosch (1992). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. MIT Press. p. 9. ISBN 978-0262261234. We propose as a name the term enactive to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Using a direct quote this footnote provides the historical introduction of this term.

The one-line edit summary used by Snowded to support removal of this reference is correct reference for statement, and the reference he substituted for The Embodied Mind was the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Embodied Cognition, namely:

Robert A Wilson, Lucia Foglia (July 25, 2011). Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). "Embodied Cognition: §2.2 Enactive cognition". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011 Edition). {{cite web}}: |editor= has generic name (help)

This derivative source actually cites The Embodied Mind as the seminal work:

"The book The Embodied Mind (Varela, Thompson and Rosch 1991) was an attempt to re-direct the cognitive sciences by infusing them with the phenomenological perspective developed in the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945)...Varela, Thompson, and Rosch introduced the concept of enaction to present and develop a framework that places strong emphasis on the idea that the experienced world is portrayed and determined by mutual interactions between the physiology of the organism, its sensorimotor circuit and the environment."

It is a detriment to the article Enactivism to avoid mention of The Embodied Mind, a work cited in this connection by virtually every other article on the subject.

I have therefore reverted Snowded's removal of this source, and entertain the hope that in the light of this careful explanation for this reversion that this action will be understood. Brews ohare (talk) 13:43, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

The reference supports a valid third party reverence to their use. There is no need to clutter up the text with primary sources already covered. It can be in additional reading if you want.----Snowded TALK 14:15, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
The existence of secondary references to a seminal source is no reason to avoid mention of that source. On that basis historically important work never would be cited on WP. A bogus argument. Brews ohare (talk) 14:27, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
A different explanation provided by Snowded for his second removal of the reference to The Embodied Mind in his one-line edit summary is references support the text they do not expand on it. The suggestion is that a footnote cannot contain a quote (even though the template provides for that option) but must stick to bibliographic information. That viewpoint has no basis in practice on WP or anywhere else. Footnotes that expand on text are to be found everywhere in books, papers and in WP articles. Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
You just removed a reference which supported the text and replaced it with a primary source. Please Brews try and think before you act. Its nothing to do with the text in the foot note and I made no reference to that. ----Snowded TALK 14:42, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
Anyone can read what you said. What matters is the primary source referred to by everybody that writes about Enactivism, The Embodied Mind, should be cited and linked so readers can go look at it if they want to. That is what all other articles on the subject do. There is no need to replace a seminal work with a secondary source, and anyway, the secondary source is cited at the end of the paragraph for those interested in a summary. Brews ohare (talk) 14:49, 19 April 2014 (UTC)
Then put it in further reading Brews, at the moment the statement that they originated the phrase is unsupported as you have removed the reference and the whole sentence could legitimately be deleted. All you have to do is put it in further reading. I'll attempt a compromise, but this refusal to you to understand the dangers of using primary sourcing compromises your ability to make any impact on wikipedia. ----Snowded TALK 14:56, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, glad to accept your 'compromise'. Brews ohare (talk) 17:22, 19 April 2014 (UTC)

Sociological

As far as I can see the references are all to cultural psychology not sociology and belong elsewhere, if significant. Before I hard edit on this, what test of significance was applied to selecting this text? Why is it classed as sociological? ----Snowded TALK 21:26, 23 April 2014 (UTC)

I believe the 'psychology' section is about individual matters, while the 'sociology' section is about cultural factors. It is probably not an aptly chosen title, but the subject matter doesn't depend on the header. As the Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology puts it: "Enactivism is an emerging perspective both in cognitive science and in cultural psychology. Whereas the enactive approach in general has focused on sense-making as an embodied and situated activity, enactive cultural psychology emphasizes the expressive and dynamically enacted nature of cultural meaning" Brews ohare (talk) 15:33, 24 April 2014 (UTC)
I renamed the subsection as "cultural aspects" and re-arranged the subsections. Brews ohare (talk) 15:55, 24 April 2014 (UTC)
In broad agreement but I don't think its a separate subject - see my edit summary on the changes I just made which are not major (I think) ----Snowded TALK 11:13, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

Cultural aspects

Snowded has reverted the following sourced material concerning enactivism in the field of cultural psychology. See this subsection on 'Cultural aspects'. Snowded's one-line edit summary is:

Minor changes, I don't think we need to define the purpose of cultural psychology here and its a part of the previous section. Cultural aspects would need to include anthropology

It is unlikely that Snowded's personal opinion about enaction in cultural psychology should trump an extended article in the Oxford Handbook:

"Whereas the enactive approach in general has focused on sense-making as an embodied and situated activity, enactive cultural psychology emphasizes the expressive and dynamically enacted nature of cultural meaning."1
[1] Cor Baerveldt and Theo Verheggen (May 2012). "Chapter 8: Enactivism". The Oxford Handbook of Culture and Psychology. pp. 165ff. doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195396430.013.0009. ISBN 9780195396430.

It may well be a valuable addition to include enaction in anthropology as well, but omission of one topic hardly supports removal of a different topic. Brews ohare (talk) 15:51, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

To quote Andy Clark: "The single most important task for a science of the biotechnological mind" is the search for better understanding of "the range and variety of types of cognitive scaffolding and the different ways in which non-biological scaffoldings can augment (or impair) performance on a task." "A major part of our cognitive environment is other people, and their distinctive knowledge bases." "But understanding our peculiar profiles as reasoners, thinkers, and knowers of our worlds requires an even broader perspective: one that targets multiple brains and bodies operating in specially constructed environments replete with artifacts, external symbols, and the variegated scaffoldings of science, art, and culture." Brews ohare (talk) 16:43, 25 April 2014 (UTC)

I am not disputed the definition of cultural psychology but the inclusion of the definition with you extended commentaries. Clark mentions culture as one of several factors he does not lead with it so you cannot justify that title. Cultural psychology however defined does not encompass culture, that title would need anthropological use as I said. There was legitimate material which I left with some minor changes. But you have to assert your original ideas you cannot work with other editors. ----Snowded TALK 23:28, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded, you reverted a modified version of 'Cultural aspects' that sets the stage more carefully than the original. It's hard to understand that a quote from Andy Clark is "my original idea". And its hard to see why 'cultural aspects' don't merit their own sub-section when the psychology aspect is about perception and sensorimotor skills, and nothing about culture. And it is impossible to understand why having no material on enactivism in cultural anthropology should mean that enactivism in cultural psychology should be ignored in a subsection on 'cultural aspects'. Brews ohare (talk) 14:27, 27 April 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: It is gratifying to see that putting this material to a sub-subsection with a new source and titling it Participatory sense-making has got it past your editorial scrutiny. Brews ohare (talk) 14:06, 28 April 2014 (UTC)

Material transferred from Enaction

In this edit Snowded elected on his own recognizance to revert all the material transferred from Enaction in preparation for the deletion of that article as a result of a four-party consensus. His one-line edit summary is Sorry brews its cultural psychology and there is a lot of OR synthesis in that which has no relevance to these deletions.

I hope he will attempt to explain himself if he wishes to continue to insist. Brews ohare (talk) 22:19, 26 April 2014 (UTC)

You used the excuse of moving material to reinsert disputed material and titles Brews . I'll go through it later but if you revert then we go back to the position before you made the first edit per WP:BRD until there is agreement. If you had just brought across material I would not have had to do this. ----Snowded TALK 23:24, 26 April 2014 (UTC)
Baloney: you reverted everything, not just the additions about cultural aspects. And of course, you are wrong about that, and too nervous about justifying your actions to make any attempt at talk-page discussion. Brews ohare (talk) 14:16, 27 April 2014 (UTC)

Removal of explanation necessary to understand sentence on 4E′s

In this edit Snowded removed all but the first sentence of this paragraph:

Enactivism fits into a broader context for cognition sometimes called the 4E′s, a shorthand for embodied, embedded, extended, and the topic here, namely, enacted.[G 1][G 2] A brief sketch of the 4E′s can be based upon Rowlands.[G 3] The term 'embodied' signifies that mental processes make use of a physical plant, not just a brain but a wider set of structures. (p. 67) The term 'embedded' stresses the environment in which this plant is located. (p. 68) The term 'extended' points out the tools or apparatus employed by the physical plant in learning about, modifying, and adapting to its environment, that can sometimes be regarded as part of that plant, or may be simply extensions of that plant. (p. 59) And finally, enaction stresses the dynamic interaction between the environment and the physical plant, a back-and-forth feedback in which knowledge is constructed and the interactive mechanisms themselves are reshaped. (p. 74) Enactivism is focused upon this last aspect.
References
  1. ^ Special issue on 4E cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, Extended; Richard Menary (November 24, 2010). R Menary, ed (ed.). "Introduction to the special issue on 4E cognition" (PDF). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 9 (4). doi:10.1007/s11097-010-9187-6. {{cite journal}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
  2. ^ Dave Ward, Mog Stapleton (2012). "Es are good. Cognition as enacted, embodied, embedded, affective and extended". In Fabio Paglieri, ed (ed.). Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness. John Benjamins Publishing. pp. 89 ff. ISBN 978-9027213525. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help) On-line version here.
  3. ^ Mark Rowlands (2010). "Chapter 3: The mind embodied, embedded, enacted and extended". The new science of the mind: From extended mind to embodied phenomenology. MIT Press. pp. 51 ff. ISBN 0262014556.

As usual, Snowded avoided all talk-page explanation and provided only a one-line edit summary:

coatrack, this article is about enactivism the reference is enough.—Snowded

Why (please tell me why) does Snowded think that the general reader of this article should be forced to go read the cited academic sources of the first sentence in order to discover what is meant by the jargon the 4 E′s? Could it be a huge misuse of space to provide the brief summary of this term provided here, or (as seems likely) could it be a huge convenience to the reader to (i) have a simple explanation and (ii) a readable source (Rowlands) to explore further, if they wish?

And why is this a 'coatrack', when no other explanation of the 4E′s is available on WP? (It used to be in Enaction (philosophy), but it was yanked there too, and now that article is slated for deletion.)

And what about the use of the term 'embodied' and 'embedded' elsewhere? Might the reader like to know what they mean?

Maybe Snowded simply wants to prevent this material from appearing? He has said that 'one fine day' he will write a magnum opus on WP explaining the 4E′s and "post-Cartesian thinking". Maybe the thunder of that momentous and long-awaited ceremony will be diminished by this prior disclosure? Brews ohare (talk) 22:17, 29 April 2014 (UTC)

You are needlessly expanding the article Brews. I'm not bothering to respond otherwise to you until you stop throwing insults and silly speculation. Needless cluttering the talk page with material that can be linked is not helpful either by the way, but you already know that ----Snowded TALK 10:28, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
It is a useful addition Snowded. You have provided no reason at all for its reversion except this arbitrary opinion of your own. Brews ohare (talk) 14:51, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
I provided a reason Brews, you (i) didn't agree with it and (ii) can't keep a civil tongue in your head. Until you can cope with disagreement and follow WP:Civil I will keep interaction to a minimum. ----Snowded TALK 15:35, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
So now a valid WP policy for deletion is "Snowded doesn't agree" and need not even indicate his reason(s)? Brews ohare (talk) 17:51, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
No more than a valid reason for inclusion is "Brew's likes it". Try and pay attention to what you were told by several editors on the OR notice board in respect of consensus. ----Snowded TALK 18:01, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
The reason for the text here, as said, is to help the WP reader who might wonder what the 4E s are. It's unlikely that your whim constitutes 'consensus'. Brews ohare (talk) 19:07, 30 April 2014 (UTC)
See previous response. Pity really I thought you were starting to co-operate, putting material up accepting modifications. ----Snowded TALK 19:29, 30 April 2014 (UTC)

What we have here Snowded is one more example of your obstructive behavior removing useful well-sourced material from WP articles without talk-page discussion and only with your personal assertions of your personal preferences. Brews ohare (talk) 20:42, 30 April 2014 (UTC)

Wikipedia FIve Pillars

The frequent recriminations and insults between two editors here (and elsewhere) is in my view likely to alienate readers, prevent progress on articles, and to bring Wikipedia into disrepute. If we have disagreements then they should either be resolved publicly through mediation, or discussed privately in non-public emails. Resources should not be wasted on repeated public differences and accusations. See Wikipedia:Five_pillars: this says that we should treat each other with respect and civility, and that we should not engage in personal attacks. So cut it out, and behave like the adults you are. There are resources to help you deal with this situation rather than boring us all with endless accusation and personal stuff.

TonyClarke (talk) 07:21, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

Please link to an insult I've made Tony, I have pointed to repetitions of behaviour for which Brew's has been sanctioned but thats been the limit, as has Machine Elf and several other editors.----Snowded TALK 07:32, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
Tony: Snowded routinely deletes well-sourced and useful material I contribute to various articles. He refuses to provide any justification or analysis in support of his actions, and abuses the one-line edit summary with cryptic or erroneous comments that he refuses to elaborate upon. Here is a far-from-unique stupid example. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
Your admonition to 'cut it out' is a lot less useful than your joining the discussion and providing some useful commentary on content. That would force some responsibility here. Brews ohare (talk) 14:39, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
Tony, you are entirely familiar with the 4E's and the Ward-Stapleton paper. No doubt you could present a useful opinion regarding inclusion of this explanatory paragraph, or propose a contribution of your own. Brews ohare (talk) 14:44, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
You must be aware that the huge majority of philosophy articles were contributed around 2006 or 2007 and have seen nothing but minor edits since. The originating authors in many, maybe most, cases have not contributed to WP for years. The philosophy work project is moribund. As a result of this apathy a few editors like Snowded and MachineElf dominate the field and insist upon their own agendas. You could help a lot here to bring some balance to the situation. Brews ohare (talk) 14:49, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
Why not add a few more names Brews? Pfhorest finally lost patience with you on Free Will and I could name others. When has an editor supported you? Otherwise I agree that it would be better if Tony engaged with the content issues----Snowded TALK 14:58, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
I think that these are two very determined editors that have caused a lot of trouble that has hurt Wikipedia but they have also helped Wikipedia. Of the two, I think that Brews ohare has improved but Snowded hasn't, and that in the future there is more chance that Brews ohare will improve than Snowded. --Bob K31416 (talk) 15:52, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
P.S. If it were up to me I would ban both of them permanently, which may have the positive side effect of improving the quality of each of their lives and stop the squandering of their time on relentless arguments. --Bob K31416 (talk) 16:05, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
(ec)Agree on relative change and future potential for change Bob, not so sure if it is improvement or not. I'm just applying policy and have done so consistently and will continue to do so. With one minor exception on a diagram every RfC has backed me up as have all other editors with experience on Philosophy articles. Brew's does seem to have increased his tendency to throw around insults when he gets frustrated mind you. You also need to address facts rather than expressing judgements. You have a tendency to jump in on articles, possibly in sympathy with Brew's but then you withdraw if there is a disagreement. As I remember it the last time you tried and ask for Brew's to provide references to support something he couldn't. Some of us have been dealing with that for a year, you're new to it so you may be more optimistic. ----Snowded TALK 16:15, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
I agree Brews has a lot of room for improvement but, along the lines of what he suggested, can we please try to avoid personal opinions and fortune telling on this talk page and stay focused on the content here?—Dominar Machine Elf 1735 17:00, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
Well Bob, I am cheered by the faint praise of having made it as your favorite editor among those that should be permanently banned. My preferred position among those that you think should be banned may be assured in view of my having contributed scores of articles and diagrams to WP despite the ridiculous squabbling of detractors whose claim to contribution to WP is thousands of one-line edit summaries accompanying reversions. Brews ohare (talk) 17:27, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

And the response is ... more of the same, defensiveness and insinuations. Childish. I'm glad to see I'm not alone in my comments. I think you two should avoid each other, not edit the same articles? Your interactions have become habitual, and unhelpful all round.

TonyClarke (talk) 22:38, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

Deal with the facts Tony. You need to address the content issues and review material over the whole of the last year including the multiple responses of other editors to Brew's edits. It really is not just me, in fact I've been thanked by other experienced editors for monitoring the problem. At the moment you are just making general accusations without supporting evidence, reacting making insinuations (to use your word). Until more editors engage in the content and objectively deal with the OR issues and the like the problem will continue. I've asked for an independent admin to review the interactions several times now as there is an issue here. More focus on content, more scrutiny of actual edits made and rejected is needed, not a moral lecture which however well intentioned is ill informed ----Snowded TALK 23:10, 1 May 2014 (UTC)
I hate to let Snowed have the last word here, but Tony you are correct. However, Tony, you really could be helpful here by contributing to content yourself. Brews ohare (talk) 00:02, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
Tony did.[1] --Bob K31416 (talk) 03:26, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

Intentionality

I'm not opposed to the subject heading per se, but the content has got to start with something that directly links Enactivism to intentionality. If that is in Thomson can we see the quote? ----Snowded TALK 23:15, 1 May 2014 (UTC)

We see here the problem of research based on key word searches. The Thomson quote uses 'enact' not in the context of' 'enactivism' but in its ordinary english language sense to explain various aspects of phenomenology and existentialism in the context of intention. That itself is a much bigger subject on which enactivism bears tangentially. I don't see anything in the citation which justifies the addition of that section. The quotation has been misunderstood, the link to this article is tangential at best. Its also bad practice to have a whole section based on snipits from one source. I'll sleep on it, but without some more support I don't think that can stand. ----Snowded TALK 00:14, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

This book synopsis of yours, Snowded, is so wide of the mark as to very clearly indicate you have no idea what the book is about. The provided material is from Part One of Mind in Life called The Enactive Approach and consisting of four chapters. The second paragraph of this section refers to Varela, Thompson and Rosch, the seminal work that introduced enactivism (the same Thompson, BTW), and Thompson says: "The term enactive approach and the associated concept of enaction were introduced into cognitive science by Varela, Thompson and Rosch in their book The Embodied Mind."
IMO it is perfectly clear from the provided text that Thompson is addressing the enactive approach to the intentionality of consciousness. On p. 13 he has a section called The Enactive Approach in which he explains how enaction comes in: "a cognitive being's world is not a prespecified, external realm, represented internally by its brain, but a relational domain enacted or brought forth by that being's autonomous agency and mode of coupling with the environment." "The enactive approach and phenomenology thus converge on the proposition that subjectivity and consciousness have to be explicated in relation to the autonomy and intentionality of life..." More could be quoted, but the entire section is along these lines, as is the provided material. Brews ohare (talk) 00:21, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
I know the book Brews and there is material in it which is relevant to this article. The issue is the material you have chosen, the title you have given the section and the use made. Its the explicit link to intentionality that concerns me herein. Your latter quote on the enactive approach and its linked to phenomenology is a potential addition. Autonomy maybe better than intentionality as expressed here. I'll look at it again on the morning and make some changes, a full revert may have been a bit harsh. I accept your intention was good here, I just think you are misinterpreting the context ----Snowded TALK 00:53, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
I agree, "A useful example of enactivism is its involvement..." doesn't capture the extent of the background Thompson's introducing. The distinction between a teleological intent and the actual content of perception and cognition also needs some clarification: "not referring to 'having a purpose in mind', but to an 'aiming toward' or 'intending', a 'pointing beyond'" is too vague... is Thompson even trying to bulls-eye here what "the enactive approach" would be in regard to the special relationship both perception and cognition enjoy with their object?—Machine Elf 1735 04:13, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
Well, here's a first: complaints that the treatment is too short! There is no doubt it could be longer. Brews ohare (talk) 04:27, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
Its more that putting in some quotes with terms that require more explanation is probably a mistake in a summary article. I've generally simplified things so that the section os balanced with the others. I suggest that the wider issues raised might justify an article on 'Intentionality of consciousness' which could then be referenced.----Snowded TALK 08:12, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

In a series of reversions, Snowded first removed a discussion of The Tree of Knowledge in an effort to remove excessive quotation, leaving an greatly less understandable residuum.

In this same reversion, Snowded also removed the header separating the discussion of evolutionary epistemology from the rest of the philosophy discussion, and reduced this discussion to an unintelligible and unmotivated dangling reference to the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. As the removed header indicated, the topic of evolutionary epistemology is an interactive view of knowledge alternative to that of enactivism, and should be identified as separate.

He also removed a very clear summary quotation by Evan Thompson, a widely known key architect of enactivism, on the basis that it was excessive quotation and we should not be using a promotional bulb [blurb] anyway, a confusion of thought seen before, that Snowded thinks every footnote is about shoring up the credentials for text, and completely ignoring the role for footnotes in lucidly augmenting the (doubtful) eloquence of WP editors.

In another of his string of 'simplifications' in a laudable but completely failed attempt toward the goal that we have to have something that is understandable at a summary level, Snowded boiled down the treatment of Thompson's discussion of the enactive approach to two sentences: "“The inactive approach and phenomenology thus converge on the proposition that subjectivity and consciousness have to be explicated in relation to the autonomy and intentionality of life...”. Mental acts of perceiving, imagining etc. involve both the object and subjective experience of that object, forming a unified structure". This 'understandable' version drops the explanation of 'intentionality' in the original text, a technical term few readers will understand. It also drops the whole explanation of the connection to enactivism. And uses inactive instead of enactive, a common problem in Snowded's edits.

Overall, this emasculation of the article Enactivism is misguided and poorly executed. It should not have been undertaken without the benefit of evaluation on the Talk page. Brews ohare (talk) 15:13, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

With the aim of introducing a discussion of Snowded's objectives and their implementation on this talk page, I have restored the version previous to Snowded's changes. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

Brews, you have to reach agreement with other editors on new material. You inserted the material, I modified it. If you had modified it in turn that would have been working with others. By simply reinstating your original version you indicate that you are not prepared to collaborate. That means we go back to the version before you created the section and wait for agreement before reinserting it. Its also not helpful for you to start a new section when I and Machine Elf both made comments on the material in the preceding one. Those comments stand and you have not responded to them. ----Snowded TALK 16:12, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

Intentionality of consciousness

To return to the content issue. The problem here is that we either write an essay or we summarise. The issues are more complex than implied by the original series of extracts (it was not more than that). This article needs to summarise material relevant to its subject, not expand into other related fields. I'm happy to believe my attempt at that was not the best summary, so I am open to other ideas. But an extended series of quotes, without context or direct relevance is not the way to go ----Snowded TALK 16:26, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

Here is the text to consider:

Intentionality of consciousness

A useful example of enactivism is its involvement in the intentionality of consciousness, a reference to certain mental acts, not referring to 'having a purpose in mind', but to an 'aiming toward' or 'intending', a 'pointing beyond', referring to an "intentional striving that aims toward and finds satisfaction in disclosure of the intentional object.".[T 1] Mental acts of perceiving, imagining, etc. involve both the subjective experience and the object of that experience, and the two are considered not as "the constant conjunction of two terms that could be imagined to exist apart" but as a unified structure. According to Thompson,[T 1] in opposition to the view that consciousness is self-enclosed, "Such systems bring forth or enact meaning in continuous reciprocal interaction with their environments...'Inner' and 'outer' are not pre-existing separate spheres, but mutually specifying domains enacted or brought forth by the structural coupling of the system and its environment."

References

  1. ^ a b Evan Thompson. "Intentionality". Mind in life (Paperback ed.). pp. 22–27. ISBN 978-0674057517.

In my mind the interest here is the idea that the separation of subjective and objective is erroneous and from the viewpoint of enactivism the two are inseparable, each interactively engaged in defining the other. I think the text gets this point across very clearly, and it is clearly Thompson's view, so it isn't OR. So, (i) do you see that as at least one point to be made, and (ii) do you have some different suggestions that work as well as the above text? I have objected to your first proposal as being too elliptic and failing to define philosophical jargon needed for its understanding. Brews ohare (talk) 16:45, 2 May 2014 (UTC)

I think the important thing for this article is that subjective experience land objects are co-evolutionary/unified(whatever). I think a new section is not warranted (or the earlier section for that matter) as we are providing an overview of the application of the idea in philosophy - and its still fairly new. Using intentionality of consciousness just opens up a whole can of worms that would require lots of elaboration beyond the scope of this article. It might justify an article in its own right although we have little third party material as of the moment so caution would be needed.----Snowded TALK 17:04, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: Perhaps the blurring of the subjective/objective separation introduced by their being 'mutually specifying' spheres, or 'co-evolutionary' might be added to the paragraph on Enactivism being opposed to dualism with a reference to Mind in Life ? Brews ohare (talk) 23:32, 2 May 2014 (UTC)
Brews: that sounds like a useful addition: why not put it in and see what we think? TonyClarke (talk) 06:30, 3 May 2014 (UTC)
I'm OK with that Brews. I also think the other section could usefully loose its heading then the whole article is more balanced ----Snowded TALK 07:22, 3 May 2014 (UTC)

I've added a few sentences along these lines for your assessment. Brews ohare (talk) 15:35, 3 May 2014 (UTC)

Perhaps we are not quite there yet, but I think we can congratulate ourselves on a very much improved article compared to what was there before this series of changes. Perhaps this experience will prove sufficiently rewarding to encourage such cooperation elsewhere? Brews ohare (talk) 16:57, 3 May 2014 (UTC)

I made some minor change, but I agree this is going in the right direction, thanks for responding ----Snowded TALK 07:14, 4 May 2014 (UTC)

Constructivism

It looks like some connection should be made to Constructivist epistemology. See also Riegler. Brews ohare (talk) 15:33, 4 May 2014 (UTC)

My feeling there is proceed with extreme caution. Constructivism is a broad church and one where a third party source is critical. Almost certainly not a source which comments on the field from a perspective. Constructivists might make use of enactivism, but it is not required to be an enactivist ----Snowded TALK 16:19, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
I did a search in the article Riegler with the keyword enact and got three hits. On looking at the text in those places, I had the impression that constructivism is not a topic that is a part of enactivism. --Bob K31416 (talk) 17:40, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
Hi Bob: You might notice the line in Riegler "von Glasersfeld’s heritage is taken beyond its original boundaries to include movements such as enactivism and neurophenomenology" Although not a suitable source for authenticating the matter, this article might prove motivational. Brews ohare (talk) 20:11, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
We have Encyclopedia of Communication Theory: "von Glaserfeld tended to agree with the lack of differentiation between subject and object...Maturana & Varela, both phenomenologists, not only contributed to von Glaserfeld's radical contructivism but..." and so on. You might recall Maturana & Varela are associated with enactivism. Brews ohare (talk) 20:20, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
Proulx accuses Riegler: The constructivist challenge of conflating enactivism with constructivism, and hopes to point out the differences in his paper. He then backs off a bit and says 'some' constructivists would disagree with Vareala's idea of "bringing forth a world". Brews ohare (talk) 20:48, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
A distinction is made by Froese, namely, two different takes upon the idea that 'we have no valid basis for describing an observer-independent reality', attributing to von Glaserfeld the view that our intellect is rationally isolated from what might be going on in such an independent world, and Maturana's view that 'the basis of our epistemic activity is not isolated conceptual construction but reciprocal embodied enaction' Of course, Glaserfeld did not really argue isolation from reality, but perhaps 'rational' isolation is something different. Brews ohare (talk) 21:04, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
I think Snowded's remarks are pertinent. However, it is unlikely that a definitive appraisal of the relationship is available. An alternative is simply to point out some different tacks upon the relationship and notify the reader that the connection exists but isn't black and white. Ignoring the connection altogether doesn't seem appropriate to me. Brews ohare (talk) 21:08, 4 May 2014 (UTC)
After reading your messages I have the same impression as before, although I came across something in your link "this article" in your first message that might help you with what you had in mind. What I came across was a reference at that link titled, Constructivism + Embodied Cognition = Enactivism: Theoretical and Practical Implications for Conceptual Change. I took a quick look at it and also the beginning of the Wikipedia articles on Constructivist epistemology, Constructivism (philosophy of education) and Embodied cognition, and the idea in the title of that reference didn't seem correct. In that regard, it might be useful to see if we are all on the same page with respect to our understanding of what enactivism means so I started a section below, Meaning of the term enactivism. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:28, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
Bob: Maybe we have to be a bit pedantic about this? So the issue is not whether "constructivism is a topic that is part of enactivism", nor the reverse of that. The issue of importance is whether constructivism is a useful part of the article Enactivism. In my opinion the sources cited discuss both with a view to pointing out their similarities and differences. One source suggests that Riegler fails to make a distinction. Others say the difference is a matter of emphasis - just what is the role of interactivity? In any event, it would seem a WP reader might come to Enactivism and come away with the view that Aristotle already dealt with the relation of 'knowing how' to 'knowing what'. That reader might miss the point of enactivism, while an alert to there being a difference between constructivism and enactivism might turn on a light. What are your thoughts on the value of this comparison? Brews ohare (talk) 03:33, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
In this connection, I would be the first to agree that the paragraph I have put in might be a very imperfect attempt at making the comparison illuminating. You might try yourself. Brews ohare (talk) 03:43, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
No thanks. Also, I don't have strong feelings about it. Just putting in my two cents, which actually exceeded my budget. : ) I think my present challenge is not to put too much time into Wikipedia. --Bob K31416 (talk) 03:52, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
I think the whole of the paragraph went a little too far, with a reference from Glasersfeld being used to justify a statement about Glaserfield rather than a third party source so I removed it. Regardless of the source it was an expansion of the article to describe an aspect of constructivism rather than a reference to how that has been impacted or is implicated in the main subject. The rest of the paragraph looks fine. Constructivists will use the "Es" to support their theory but that does not mean the two are the same; its rather like the related debate between essences and affordances within realist schools. This is bad enough in a traditional subject, but in one this new double and triple caution against original research of synthesis is necessary ----Snowded TALK 04:54, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
I can't say I was very impressed with my effort to summarize the significance of the comparison between enactivism and constructivism. However, I am convinced there is value in this comparison as signified by their being a variety sources involved with it, some of which seem to draw no distinction at all. So I think Snowded is correct that a better job is needed, but the present state of this discussion is inadequate. Brews ohare (talk) 14:47, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

Meaning of the term enactivism

I started this section to see if the editors here have the same understanding of what the meaning of enactivism is according to reliable sources. For understanding enactivism, I considered a situation where a person has always been alone in a room that contains nothing else but a ball that has always been still. As far as he knows, his environment is completely static. Now suppose he pushes the ball and it rolls. He has enacted a world that is no longer static but has an object that rolls. --Bob K31416 (talk) 00:28, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

I have no problem with this exploration, but with this caveat - it is of no concern what WP editors mean by Enaction. All that matters is what sources say. If there are a variety of meanings depending on the source, we have to accept and report what sources say. Brews ohare (talk) 00:49, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
I'll clarify what I meant in my first sentence by adding "according to reliable sources" to the end of it. --Bob K31416 (talk) 02:24, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

I'd guess that the term 'enactivism' has been stretched to cover a very wide swath. The section Enactivism#Psychological aspects has a discussion of the hand that suggests one interpretation, namely, that the use of the hand involves 'cognition' just as much as neural activity of the brain, and the hand's engagement in activity enacts learning by the hand and the brain during the same engagement in which the hand modifies its environment. A quote in the introduction to Enactivism suggests that science works the same way. To use an example of my own (possibly somewhat historically distorted), the invention of the telescope made Kepler's observations possible which led to Newton's theory of gravitation. The tool and the concepts act together in creating a world view. Without the telescope, the interaction and discovery of details of planetary motion might not have happened, and the whole experience missed. The situation is even clearer with the hadron collider where the cooperation of entire countries was needed to create the machine enabling the exposure of humankind to the Higgs boson. I'd guess that this symbiosis is what enactivism boils down to.

I haven't succeeded here in pointing out the back-and-forth that is key to enactivism according to the sources. So we have a circular feedback loop Higgs theory -> idea for collider. -> international effort to build collider -> experimental observations -> modified theory -> modified international effort -> etc. Brews ohare (talk) 04:22, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

That example could be just about perception Bob, the point about enactivism is that the brain as a part of the body is in constant state of co-evolution with its environment, so its physical/mental not just mental from physical ----Snowded TALK 04:44, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
The word 'co-evolution' is excellent here. Brews ohare (talk) 15:10, 5 May 2014 (UTC)
Its a great concept, the other cool one which applies (but it has not yet been published) is that the relationship is exaptative so it produces punctuated change (to quote Gould). ----Snowded TALK 17:05, 5 May 2014 (UTC)

Tree of Knowledge

The article presently begins a paragraph on the Tree of Knowledge as follows:

"In The Tree of Knowledge Maturana & Varela proposed the term enactive[14] "to evoke the view of knowledge that what is known is brought forth, in contraposition to the more classical views of either cognitivism[Note 1] or connectionism.[Note 2]" They see see enactivism as providing a middle ground between the two extremes of representationalism and solipsism."

So far, so good. But there is then a long quote from Tree of Knowledge that strikes me as oblique:

"They seek to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[Tree of Knowledge, p. 241]

This quotation is, for me, an expression of a particular viewpoint that uses ordinary English as code for what could be much more straightforwardly expressed, but would then seem more clearly debatable. The issue raised more simply put is just the subject-object problem or more narrowly, the realism-idealism problem. These authors express this issue over and over again in rather clearer terms. For example, they state their aim as

"to negotiate a middle path between the Scylla of cognition as the recovery of a pregiven outer world (realism) and the Charybdis of cognition as the recovery of a pregiven inner world (idealism)." "These two extremes both take representation as their central notion: in the first case representation is used to recover what is outer; in the second case it is used to project which is inner." (Embodied Mind, p. 172 12)

What is more interesting than an obscure statement of the problem is the 'solution' proposed by the Embodied Mind:

" Our intention is to bypass entirely this logical geography of inner versus outer by studying cognition not as recovery or projection, but as embodied action" 3

Their 'explanation' is that the cognitive structures that guide perception and action "emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided",4, a bald assertion beyond demonstration.

Whether their approach holds water is now an obvious question. In my view, it is mysticism (much better explained by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty), and some critique of their views would be helpful. An obvious question is how their approach compares with that of Thompson (Life in Mind) or of Clark (Supersizing the Mind) and whether the difficulties of this position might be clarified by a comparison. Or maybe along the lines of Brooks? See section 5 Or Bermúdez? Does anybody share my view that this long quote achieves very little of what would be useful here? Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 8 May 2014 (UTC)

I agree the quote is too long and obscure, and I agree understanding has moved on. What do you propose? ----Snowded TALK 03:37, 9 May 2014 (UTC)
From Bermúdez I get a concrete idea of how structure can build in responses that involve minimal computation and exploit feedback. That is a much less muddy way to approach embodiment than philosophical mumbo-jumbo. One example used is the Watt governor for regulating flywheel speed of rotation. Another from biorobotics is morphological computation. (The page Morphological computation (robotics) was deleted in early 2012). Perhaps the quote could be replaced by a sentence and an independent subsection added, say 'Biorobotics aspects'? Can you assist? Brews ohare (talk) 13:18, 9 May 2014 (UTC)
Not so sure about that, its more of an engineering example and enaction includes the basis idea that without physical activity there is no consciousness (it hits the singularity people head on). I think the secret here is to take stuff from 3/4 sources that covers all aspects then agree a summary of that material rather than use quotes directly. I'm in the middle of four successive red eyes over four days (flying over you later today as it happens) but I can look at stuff in lounges between flights if you want to grab some material. ----Snowded TALK 13:29, 9 May 2014 (UTC)
Yes, these are engineering examples, which means they are simplifications. Bermúdez, however, is a philosopher, author of a half-dozen or so books like Philosophy of psychology, Thinking without words and so on.
It will take me some time to put something together. Brews ohare (talk) 14:14, 9 May 2014 (UTC)

Umwelt and Uexküll

Snowded: You raise the question of whether there is a connection between enactivism and the concept of Umwelt as coined by Uexküll and his other work. The subject of umwelt is described by: Dorion Sagan (2010). "Introduction: Umwelt after Uexküll". In Jakob von Uexküll, Marina von Uexküll, Joseph D. O’Neil (ed.). A Foray Into the Worlds of Animals and Humans: With a Theory of Meaning (Joseph D O'Neil, translation of 1940 ed.). University of Minnesota Press. p. 3. ISBN 9781452903798.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link) and WP has links to umwelt and to Uexküll.

There are a couple of things to resolve here: relevance and importance.

The importance of umweldt is partly historical. According to Sagan, Uexküll "is among the first cybernetic biologists, ethologists, and theoretical biologists, as well as being a forerunner to biosemiotics, and a neo-Kantian philosopher." As for relevance, Sagan says "Uexküll's notion of Umwelt and his work in general was popularized and developed by Thomas Sebeok who spoke of a 'semiotic web' - our understanding of our world being not just instinctive, or made up, but an intriguing mix, a spiderlike web partially of our own social and personal construction, whose strands, like those of a spider, while they may be invisible, can have real-world effects." Sagan provides numerous examples of these claims.

Now of course, having done his work in the days of the second world war, the 4E's are not part of Uexküll's vocabulary. But it seems to me that what he discusses is almost the definition of the 4Es. So for that reason I think mention is warranted on both the grounds of historical interest and as an interesting source of examples for the 4E's.

I am not about to engage in extensive proselytizing here, but I'd like some thoughtful discussion about pros and cons and also the how and where of including Uexküll. Brews ohare (talk) 14:11, 10 May 2014 (UTC)

I can see the argument for relevance and I am grateful to you for reminding me about umwelt, it helps unblock an essay I have to finish tomorrow. The issue here is two fold. First, Is it meaningful for someone writing at that time to be able to be seen as part of the enactivist school of thinking? Enactivism is heavily science based and is dependent on ideas and discoveries that have emerged in biology in the last two to three decades. Secondly I think you make the argument to include the reference in an essay about antecedents for enactivism. But to include it here a third party reliable source would have to make that connection and it would have to past the test for relevance. I think it fails on both grounds, but if there is a third party source I am very open to including something. ----Snowded TALK 15:42, 10 May 2014 (UTC)
It seems that some examples of umwelt could be presented that are as pertinent to the 4E's as Clark or Varela. However, you might argue that even if (as a hypothetical case) Uexküll's description of the honey-bee behavior in receiving a messenger bringing news about pollen sources being contingent upon hive resources at the time of arrival, whatever its similarities to circumstances described by a 4E philosopher, doesn't use any of the words 'embody', 'extend', 'embed' or 'enact' so it is OR to identify such an example as being an example. Likewise, unless a 4E philosopher references Uexküll, it is OR to claim relevance? Is that the conversation? Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 10 May 2014 (UTC)
It appears that semiotics and enactment have some connection. Maybe what we need is a subsection on Semiotic aspects? Brews ohare (talk) 16:19, 10 May 2014 (UTC)
Between third and fourth red eye, last was ten hours as is next. Need to have a brain active to engage here and the co-evolution of mine with the physical reality of flight and G&Ts will not help. Will get onto a proper response tomorrow ----Snowded TALK 16:47, 10 May 2014 (UTC)
Sounds good. Here is another review of the matter from a special issue on Jakob von Uexküll. "Thus, one must at least distinguish between these concepts: (1) the habitat of the organism as 'objectively' (or externally) described by a human scientific observer; (2) the niche of the organism in the traditional ecological sense as the species' ecological function within the ecosystem, (3) the Umwelt as the experienced self-world of the organism."... "If what it means to have an Umwelt is to be an active subject with some agency, we should keep in mind that the way such a thing as an Umwelt exists (according to the definition of the Umwelt given above) is ontologically different from the way the physical environment (as studied by ecology) exists, or the way the neural system as a complex dynamic biophysical network (as studied by neurobiology) exists, or the way the observable behaviour of the animal (as studied by ethology) exists. To say that it is subjective means exactly that it exists in the mode of an active experiencing subject, which is not something that can be seen or described from a purely external point of view (cf. T. von Uexküll 1982a, Nagel 1986, Searle 1992)." Brews ohare (talk) 00:19, 11 May 2014 (UTC)
An aspect of the umwelt to explore is the phenomenon of niche construction, an interesting example being the ability of tumors to control their neighborhoods to their advantage. A connection of niche construction to enactivism is suggested by Anthony Chimero. Brews ohare (talk) 05:02, 11 May 2014 (UTC)
Here is another description: "The Umwelt was fundamentally – if intermittently – an attempt to describe species-specific affordances of an environment,see this, the niche as both a place to live and a way of life." Brews ohare (talk) 14:38, 11 May 2014 (UTC)
OK I am semi-recovered and dealing with intermittent connectivity here in Jo'burg. I've thought about this and looked at it. The problem remains that this is a related field which it could be argued precedes enactivism, but it is not clear it informs it. Without a reference that specifically links it I think the material belongs elsewhere, not here. ----Snowded TALK 02:52, 13 May 2014 (UTC)

Ontogenic aspects

Here is a proposal for broaching the biological background of enactivism. Some help would be appreciated.

Ontogenic aspects

The ontogeny of a life form refers to its development or developmental history. This history takes place in an ecological niche, and can involve the organism and its habitat in niche construction.[S 1] The organism's behavior depends upon its perception of its niche, that is, its individual world view or umwelt, and its recognition (conscious or not) of opportunities for action or affordances. "[The meaning of] an affordance emerges in relation to beings who perceive it as an opportunity for action appropriate to their embodied actions and projects".[S 2] Enactivism viewed as "the manner in which a subject of perception creatively matches its actions to the requirements of its situation" naturally involves the organism's perception of its situation, and most particularly its awareness of the affordances of its situation.[S 3][S 4] The awareness of affordances occurs in a very particular back-and-forth engagement of an organism with its surroundings, a circular feedback process in which the organism probes its surroundings, recognizes push-back (either consciously or not), and produces an adaptive re-probing and re-fashioning of its situation.[S 5][S 6][S 7]

"Perception guides action in accord with the environmental supports or impediments presented, and action in turn yields information for further guidance, resulting in a continuous perception-action cycle."[S 8]

The relation of enactivism to affordances is discussed (among other places) in articles on situated cognition and ecological psychology.[S 9][S 10]

Sources

  1. ^ Keven N Laland, John Odling-Smee, Marcus W Feldman (2003). "Chapter 10: Niche construction, ecological inheritance, and cycles of contingency in evolution". In Susan Oyama, Paul E Griffiths, Russell D Gray, eds (ed.). Cycles of Contingency: Developmental Systems and Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 117 ff. ISBN 9780262650632. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  2. ^ John T Sanders (1997). "An ontology of affordances" (PDF). Ecological Psychology. 9: 97–112. quoted by Traci Warkentin (2009). "Whale agency: Affordances and acts of resistance in captive environments". In Sarah E. McFarland, Ryan Hediger, eds (ed.). Animals and Agency: An Interdisciplinary Exploration. Koninklijke Brill. p. 27. ISBN 9789004175808. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  3. ^ For a discussion of affordances, see, for example, Thomas A. Stoffregen (2004). "Breadth and limits of the affordance concept" (PDF). Ecological Psychology. 16 (1). doi:10.1207/s15326969eco1601_11.
  4. ^ "Affordances and abilities are not just defined in terms of one another...but causally interact in real time and are causally dependent on one another" Anthony Chemero (2011). "§7.6: Affordances 2.0". Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 150 ff. ISBN 9780262258081.
  5. ^ Andy Clark (1998). "§8.6 Continuous reciprocal causation". Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again. MIT Press. p. 163 ff. ISBN 9780262260527. See also this on-line version.
  6. ^ "Affordance perception depends upon exploratory behavior..." Thomas A. Stoffregen, Chih-Mei Yang & Benoit G. Bardy (2005). "Affordance judgments and non-locomotor body movement" (PDF). Ecological Psychology. 17 (2). doi:10.1207/s15326969eco1702_2.
  7. ^ The perception of affordances is much discussed in enactive interface design. An example is David D. Woods, Erik Hollnagel (2006). "Affordances". Joint Cognitive Systems: Patterns in Cognitive Systems Engineering. CRC Press. pp. 63 ff. ISBN 9781420005684.
  8. ^ Eleanor Jack Gibson, Anne D. Pick (2000). An Ecological Approach to Perceptual Learning and Development. Oxford University Press. p. 16. ISBN 9780195118254.
  9. ^ "The model is based on insights from phenomenology, enactivism, and ecological psychology." Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof, and Damiaan Denys (2013). "The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model". Frontiers in human neuroscience. 7. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00653.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link) CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link) Notice particularly the later sections: "An enactive affordance-based model" and "World: a field of affordances".
  10. ^ "Musical experiences are enactive, multimodal processes involving the integration of perception and action" Joel Krueger (2013). "Affordances and the musically extended mind". Frontiers in Psychology. 4: 1003 ff. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.01003.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unflagged free DOI (link) Searchable version found here.
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "Midgley" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Comments

  • This paragraph is a prolegomena introducing some vocabulary, and requires references and elaboration. Brews ohare (talk) 16:08, 11 May 2014 (UTC)
I have begun fleshing this subsection out with an early discussion of the issues by Oyama. It remains to connect Oyama's ideas with enactivism. Brews ohare (talk) 18:10, 12 May 2014 (UTC)
You've got to find a way to make the connection Brews. Its the same issue as above, you need a modern author to make the link and establish that it is relevant. I'm a lot less confident that you will find anything. There is a whole body of related biology, for example John's work on cultural as an exaptive capacity on humans (you quote him as one of the authors on Niche construction). While of of these are related, they are tangential to the subject of the article itself. ----Snowded TALK 02:47, 13 May 2014 (UTC)
Sorry, just to add here. I think it would be useful if someone did write an article which did the historical stuff and linked all these things together. So I don't disagree that what you have found is part of a growing body of related knowledge in which enactivism and the other Es form a part, although I don't think enactivism is the integrative concept as would be implied if we added this material to the article. I was at a seminar a couple of years ago where we were making connections between the Es, micro-narrative, exaptation and the like in a an inter disciplinary forum sponsored by University of Milan where I represented Philosophy, Robin biology, Peter Allen complexity and so on. So you are not alone in making these connections. But although I work in the area I don't know of publications that nave put all of this together. Until those exist we can't really reflect them here. Our role as an encyclopedia is to reflect what is published, not to lead the field. ----Snowded TALK 02:59, 13 May 2014 (UTC)
I am unclear at this point whether 'enactivism' is an integrative concept (nicely put). I've some work to do here. Brews ohare (talk) 05:37, 13 May 2014 (UTC)

I think the added paragraph on Oyama's nature/nurture investigations is a diversion, so I am removing it. Brews ohare (talk) 13:11, 14 May 2014 (UTC)

A way to connect enactivism with these biology studies is via affordances. This approach needs more work. I have included three sources but better ones might be found. Brews ohare (talk) 13:48, 14 May 2014 (UTC)

The proposal is not perfect, but I think it adequate for inclusion at this point. Any further suggestions? Brews ohare (talk) 16:24, 14 May 2014 (UTC)

Which of those references makes an explicit reference to link ontogenetic to enactivism? it looks like synthesis to me unless I have missed something ----Snowded TALK 19:21, 14 May 2014 (UTC)
This is a question of just what you are looking for. Do you require a single source that uses the words 'enactivism' and 'ontogenic' in the same sentence or paragraph? What is provided here is not aimed at exactly that - the 'ontogenic' role is that of identifying the general subject of development and the notion of a niche. The niche is the organism's world, which includes its notion of its opportunities or affordances. It is the affordances that provide the connection to enaction.
So a question is whether you see the connection between affordances and enactivism? Do you think the quote from Gibson & Pick regarding a "continuous perception-action cycle" is somehow something other than enaction? Do you think the essay of Ref 9 entitled "an enactive-affordance based model" makes such a connection? The phrase "enacting an affordance" is quite common. Do you have a deep-seated unease over this connection? Brews ohare (talk) 20:59, 14 May 2014 (UTC)
From an academic and practitioner perspective I see some interesting connections between affordances and enactivism. I think that connection is easier if you start to look at assemblage theory (to provide agency) in this context and the wider 4Es. It's an area that informs my work in connection with the development sector in Africa and elsewhere. But that does not really apply in Wikipedia. Anyone can make that connection and seek to publish it. When published and properly refereed it, then we reflect it here. Reference 9 seems to be more about the subject enacting than enactivism. ----Snowded TALK 03:58, 15 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I'd say that a complete assessment of enactivism is indeed a project. So the question comes down to how ambitious is this paragraph about ontogenic aspects to be? If it is limited to just the meaning of words, there isn't much to talk about. One points out that (i) enactivism involves interaction between an agent and its ecological niche, and (ii) any possibility of such interaction is by definition an affordance, and so, (iii) enactivism involves the enacting or exercise of one or more affordances, by definition. That is simply a matter of what words mean.
Of course, one can try to go further to explore what enactivism has to say about what happens when an affordance is engaged. For example, one can argue about whether engagement with at least some affordances involves cerebral activity, while other engagements are basically instinctive and involve only subconscious programming of subliminal sensorimotor control. Or, whether exercising some affordances involves fuzzy boundaries between the agent and its niche, leading to the 4E's.
So, if we stop at just connecting definitions, I don't see a problem here. Maybe one could go a bit further in fleshing out how enactivism describes various occurrences during the exercise of an affordance, but I haven't intended to go far in that direction. Perhaps you could help with some specifics as to where to draw this boundary between what is established and what is nebulous? Has the boundary been crossed, and if it has, where? Brews ohare (talk) 07:26, 15 May 2014 (UTC)
Brews, I am more happy to discuss the content here as its a personal area of research. But that really is not the point. We can't flush out the connections between the two, we have to wait for a source which does that. Wikipedia does not lead the field, in reflects what is already published in third party sources. So I don't think we can add anything at this time. On the subject itself I think one of the major issues is if we are talking about individuals or social constructs (per affordances rather than social constructivism) in terms of what happens over time and shoe issue of embodied knowledge (which is not the same as enactvism) ----Snowded TALK 08:41, 15 May 2014 (UTC)
I'm sure that these topics would be of interest, but I also agree that they are more than this subsection can handle at this time. If we focus on the paragraph presented, though, it makes no effort to go into such matters. It is simply an exercise in vocabulary with some sources to provide further elaboration. I don't think it is ambitious, but a subsection introducing this biology terminology seems a reasonable heads-up to the reader. You are correct that more can be said, but can the little that is said be seen to be appropriate? Brews ohare (talk) 13:09, 15 May 2014 (UTC)

Snowded, I view the paragraph above as simply an introduction to some vocabulary used in discussing the ontogenic situation. If that is the case, I don't see any objection to the paragraph on the grounds of controversy, insofar as the definitions of terms are largely noncontroversial. Of course, if you think these terms have been inaccurately portrayed, that should be fixed. However, your very valid concern that the sub-section is not a complete description of how enactivism fits into ontogney remains, and I gather that you do not think the time is right to go into those those issues. So I think the proposed subsection should be incorporated as simply a signpost indicting that there is a topic where enactivism fits in, even though a full discussion is not provided. It does introduce the vocabulary for the reader who wishes to pursue the topic. What do you say? Brews ohare (talk) 00:07, 17 May 2014 (UTC)

My view is that without a third party source linking them directly we should do nothing. There is lots of vocabulary on lots of subjects that we could impute as being linked but that does not justify inclusion.
Snowded: I take it that you do think 'affordance' is unrelated to 'enactivism'. Here are the definitions from the intros to these articles:
Affordance: An affordance is a relation between an object, or an environment, and an organism that affords the opportunity for that organism to perform an action.
Enactivism: Enactivism argues that cognition depends on a dynamic interaction between a cognitive organism and its environment. It claims that our environment is one which we selectively create through our capacities to interact with the world.
Now, as a matter of meaning of words, can enactivism possibly exist in a world where affordance is impossible? Without affordance for a 'dynamic interaction between a cognitive organism and its environment', there is no place for enactivism.
I don't think you would disagree with this point. So I'd guess that your objection is more or less as follows: "Although enactivism is built around the idea of affordance, the literature on enactivism seldom uses the word 'affordance' and the ecology literature that uses the word 'affordance' seldom refers to enactivism. So the WP article on either of these two topics must avoid mentioning the other topic unless a third-party source makes the connection."
Now one could argue the failure of 'enactivists' to use the apt term 'affordance' (and vice versa) may be common, but it is neither desirable nor universal. See, for example, Sanders discussion of the connection between 'affordance' and enactivism and Palacios on An "enactive" approach to integrative and comparative biology. However, I don't want to mistake your views, so perhaps you could comment upon whether this is your objection? Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 17 May 2014 (UTC)
It might be more obviously related if the header of the subsection were changed, maybe to Ecological aspects? That might suggest a simpler organization. Brews ohare (talk) 23:48, 17 May 2014 (UTC)
Affordances are not dependent on accepting enactivism as far as I know, neither did they derive from that. Neither is enactivism built around affordances in the literature of those who originated the concept (again as far as I know). To make the connections you want to make here seems to me original research. If there is a paper which explicitly makes the connection (rather than just uses the words as they have common language use as well) then, and only then can we included it. ----Snowded TALK 15:01, 18 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded, I feel you are a bit disconnected here from the general thrust of the paragraph, which is an introduction ot terminology and is not making any historical assertions about origins of the ideas involved. So, for example, you say the following things that seem not pertinent to a criticism of the paragraph or its intended purpose:
"Affordances are not dependent on accepting enactivism as far as I know" — very true, and not pertinent. The contrary however is not true, simply as a matter of the meaning of words; while a discussion of 'enactivism' isn't forced to use the term 'affordance', it cannot avoid use of the idea identified by the word 'affordance'.
"neither did they [affordances] derive from that [enactivism]" — again, historically true, but neither a claim nor an objective of the proposal.
"Neither is enactivism built around affordances in the literature of those who originated the concept (again as far as I know)." This again seems to be an historical statement, and therefore not directed at the proposal.
You also mischaracterize the cited sources and the two articles written by Sanders & Palacios as "using only the common usage of the words" rather than their more technical usages, despite the various sources having extensive reference to the fundamental literature (e.g. Gibson, Varela, Merleau-Ponty and Thompson). Brews ohare (talk) 18:02, 18 May 2014 (UTC)
As far as I can see your first citation talks about affordances and your second about enactivism. Both then discuss some common aspects but I can't see (albeit on a quick read) that either article explicitly makes the connection. I could have missed it in which case point it out, but if it is so then its synthesis to put the two together. I have sympathy for your view that enactivism needs to use aspects of the concept of affordance, but that does not justify its inclusion, unless a third party source makes that explicit. ----Snowded TALK 18:12, 18 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I think I will rewrite the proposal to make things more obvious, maybe using the subheader Ecological aspects. I am unsure just how explicit the cross-referencing between 'affordance' and 'enactivism' has to be to warrant its mention. For instance, the connection of enactivism to evolution is obvious, although I am not sure there is a very close common usage of terms. An cognitive ecology uses affordance all over the place, and is connected to the evolutionary aspects that are already pointed out in enactivism.
In my opinion, if the enactivists use the idea of 'affordance' by circumlocution, it is perfectly acceptable to point out that there is the word 'affordance' that neatly encapsulates their idea of "opportunity for interaction" and connects it to useful discussion of this term. Identification of a word with the appropriate meaning is not controversial unless you dispute that the meaning is correctly understood. I assume you agree that the term 'affordance' has exactly the enactivist meaning of "opportunity for interaction between an agent and their surroundings in an ecological niche"? Brews ohare (talk) 20:11, 18 May 2014 (UTC)
I don't agree that it is has the same meaning, the two strands of thought have different histories in different contexts. An opportunity for interaction with something, does not necessarily mean a co-evolutionary relationship in which the brain itself changes. You are making too many assumptions and in any event making the connection between two strands of thought is not something wikipedia editors can do in wikipedia articles. We have to wait for a reliable source to do that. Renaming it will make no difference. ----Snowded TALK 04:12, 19 May 2014 (UTC)
As for a "co-evolutionary relationship in which the brain changes", that idea has never been broached. Where did that come from? As for "connecting two strands of thought" — well I have provided sources that make the connection. The connection isn't my invention. But I have a more limited goal - simply to point out the applicability of the particular word 'affordance' in expressing the enactivist position.
It is unfortunate that we don't agree upon the meaning. The history of the term remains to be documented, but seems to be attributed rather widely as originating with the psychologist JJ Gibson by most authors. The meaning of affordance is provided from various sources quoted by van Lier for ecology and by Norman in the area of enactive interface design, who also credits the psychologist JJ Gibson. In all cases an affordance is "what is available to the person [agent] to do something with", quoting van Lier. Now, what are the different meanings you think make it impossible to apply 'affordance' to enactivism, and how do you support your view? Brews ohare (talk) 05:28, 19 May 2014 (UTC)
Its not an issue of a disagreement over the meaning. As far as I can see your references allow you to make the connection but they do not directly make the connection. Thus to link them here is synthesis at best, original research at worst. Now I may have missed something, if so point me to the point where there is a direct and substantive connection made in a source which would justify a paragraph here. ----Snowded TALK 18:05, 19 May 2014 (UTC)
An insistence that 'affordance' is not involved in enaction unless the word itself is in general use by enactivists is like suggesting a carpenter doesn't employ a Pythagorean triangle in laying out a right angle because he never heard of a Pythagorean triangle. The enactivist would say the carpenter has an enactive knowledge of how to lay out a right angle, and he doesn't need the Pythagorean symbolism, eh? Maybe you are being likewise enactivist in saying enactivists don't need the word 'affordance'? Brews ohare (talk) 08:59, 20 May 2014 (UTC)
Its not just word use Brews, but even if your metaphor was correct an encyclopaedia reflects knowledge it does not create it. Until someone makes the connection specifically in a reliable third party source we can't use it.----Snowded TALK 12:08, 20 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: "Knowledge" for WP readers is not at issue. Terminology is at issue. If knowledge were at stake it would take the form of debunking the erroneous aspects of enactivism present since its early mistaken ideas of perception disproven by biology. The introduction of 'affordance' into this discussion is very least of what should be WP's concerns with this article, actually introducing a verified concept into the muck. Brews ohare (talk) 13:20, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

And when that debunking is done in reliable sources we will report it, until then its not what we are about. You do not have a link between the concepts other than your (and possibly my) opinion. That isn't good enough----Snowded TALK 15:04, 20 May 2014 (UTC)

I think I have solved this problem by putting Gibson in the psychology section. It fits there, and the sourcing is straightforward. Brews ohare (talk) 17:26, 20 May 2014 (UTC)
The idea of that as a solution is a good one, but it still needs a explicit reference to make the link. It's very dubious to say that Gibson initiated enactivism in psychology as his was a different strand of thought albeit in a related field. Sorry to be difficult on this, but we can't draw connections between different fields unless and until those connections are explicitly made by a third party. I did a few searches and also asked a few people two days ago who know the field and no one could think of an explicit link between made between affordances and enactivism. There was also concern about making enactivism into a catch all summary of a broad range of theories relating to the physical and the mental, when it is one of those theories not an overriding one and one of the more controversial. ----Snowded TALK 03:54, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
I'll start a new section here tomorrow to point out that you are being stubborn on this issue, inasmuch as Gibson's role in all this is very well documented and he is sourced right and left. It's pretty much impossible to see any differences between Gibson's ideas about the role of interaction in cognition and Varela's, as is pointed out in Nöe's historical summary, as stressed in applications of enactivism to enactive interfaces, and as described in the field of cognitive ecology. Brews ohare (talk) 05:13, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
I'll happily look at sources that make the link Brews, but they have to be explicit, its not about your or my judgement. So far I haven't seen that in the references resulting from your searches. I could be wrong however so point me to specifics. Also remember that enaction is not confined to Varela. There is also a significant danger that we are starting to use enactivism as a bucket class to lump all sorts of partially related fields. The fences in open fields are wikipedia policy, and that has to be changed centrally not in an individual article. ----Snowded TALK 10:00, 21 May 2014 (UTC)

The enactive approach to perception

For convenience in discussion here, below is the disputed material removed by Snowded as irrelevant to the subject of enactivism that appeared in the subsection Enactivism#Psychological aspects:


Psychological aspects

The ideas behind enactivism in psychology began with the work of Gibson in what is now called ecological psychology. Gibson's goal was to stress what he called direct perception. "Direct perception is what one gets from seeing Niagara Falls, say, as distinguished from seeing a picture of it. The latter kind of perception is mediated. So when I assert that perception of the environment is direct, I mean that it is not mediated." [C 1] Direct perception of the environment does not rely upon symbolic representation and conscious inferential processes, but is intelligence 'built into' the interface that has evolved over the history of the interactions of the organism with its ecological niche, and continues to evolve as the organism seeks to maintain its existence and exhibit autopoiesis. This idea is found in cognitive ecology, and also has penetrated the psychology of design of enactive human-machine interfaces. "Gibson's intuitions about ...perception...and action...[anticipates] the key point that [it is] possible and desirable that the interface directly specifies the possibilities for action and the associated consequences." [parenthetic remarks omitted][C 2] Gibson called the possibilities for action affordances.[C 3] “An important aspect of Gibson’s description of the organism-environment world is the concept of ‘’affordances’’… affordances are the information that constitutes perception.”[C 4][C 5] Gibson's ecological approach with its emphasis upon action also was independently developed by Maturana and Varela,[C 6][C 7] 'know what' (theory and idealization) depends upon 'know how' (practice or praxis).[C 8] These last authors emphasize the transformative aspects of the organism-environment interaction that change both the organism and its environment, enact a niche, a topic known in ecology as niche construction. According to this enactivist view, it is this back-and-forth activity that constitutes 'know how', and brings the organism to understand its niche.[C 9]

Citations

  1. ^ James J. Gibson (1986). The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception. Psychology Press. p. 147. ISBN 978-0898599596. To be reprinted Oct.1, 2014 with isbn=978-1-84872-578-2
  2. ^ Kevin B. Bennett, John M. Flach (2011). "§4.4.3 Implications for interface design". Display and Interface Design: Subtle Science, Exact Art. CRC Press, division of Taylor & Francis. pp. 84 ff. ISBN 9781420064384.
  3. ^ James J. Gibson (1986). "Chapter 8: The theory of affordances". The Ecological Approach To Visual Perception. Psychology Press. pp. 127 ff. ISBN 978-0898599596.
  4. ^ Eleanor Rosch (1996). "The environment of minds". In Morton P. Friedman, Edward C. Carterette, eds (ed.). Cognitive ecology. Academic Press. p. 9. ISBN 9780080529271. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: editors list (link)
  5. ^ An overview of Gibson's ideas is found in E Bruce Goldstein (1981). "The ecology of JJ Gibson's perception" (PDF). Leonardo. 14 (3): 191–195.
  6. ^ Humberto R Maturana & Francisco J Varela (1992). "Afterword". The tree of knowledge: the biological roots of human understanding (Revised ed.). Shambhala Publications Inc. p. 255. ISBN 978-0877736424.
  7. ^ An historical run-down is provided by Alva Noë (2004). "§1.5 Action in perception in cognitive science". Action in Perception. MIT Press. p. 17. ISBN 9780262140881.
  8. ^ Casey Walker, interviewer (2000). "An interview with Francisco Varela: Cognition: The substance of experience" (PDF). Wild Duck Review: Literature, necessary mischief & news. VI (1). Nevada City, CA: 17. {{cite journal}}: |author= has generic name (help) Full issue found here.
  9. ^ Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2009). "§2.2.2 Sense-making". In John Robert Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. p. 39. ISBN 9780262014601. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)

Comments

  • Comment: Snowded has requested that sources be provided linking this paragraph on the psychology of perception to enactivism. A number of such references are already provided, but Snowded has suggested that are not specific enough. One of these sources is Reference 6: Noë. Following this link leads to a subsection of the chapter titled The enactive approach to perception. It begins:
"The enactive approach to perception draws on a number of distinct traditions...[a dozen or so authors] offer accounts ...that anticipate elements of the enactive approach. In cognitive science...Gibson's ecological approach to percpetion lays great emphasis on perception as an activity."
A few pages later:
"Gibson took these points further. He argued that the animal has access not only to the information contained in optic flow, but also..."
There follows some technical discussion of Gibson's ideas on vision. Then later:
"The claim rather is that the role of representations in perceptual theory needs to be reconsidered. It is a mistake to suppose vision is just a process whereby an internal world model is built up, and that the computational theory of vision should treat vision as a process whereby a unified internal model of the world is generated. This is compatible with there being all sorts of such representations being necessary for perception. Marr famously claimed of Gibson that he 'vastly underrated the sheer difficulty' of the information processing problem of vision."
Now there is no need to go into all the ups and downs of the discussion of vision, and every philosopher who has considered the matter so far has got the biology wrong. The point is that Noë finds a discussion of the enactivist approach to the subject should include kudos to Gibson as an originator of what might be called 'the attack upon representationalism' as constituting an incomplete account of perception and the animal's engagement in coping with its environment. This abbreviated recognition is all that is provided in the contested paragraph above.
I do not intend to suggest that Noë is the entire reason for the provided paragraph, nor even the only reason to mention Gibson, but I'm beginning at the beginning.
The contested paragraph also cites Gibson directly to establish how closely his views resemble those of enactivism. In fact, it is difficult to point to any definition of enactivism that doesn't espouse Gibson's views on the non-representational aspect of animal-environment interactions. In fact, the present introduction of Enactivism contains this quote to establish the reasons for the name enactivism':
"Organisms do not passively receive information from their environments, which they then translate into internal representations. Natural cognitive systems...participate in the generation of meaning ...engaging in transformational and not merely informational interactions: they enact a world." Ezequiel A Di Paolo, Marieke Rhohde, Hanne De Jaegher (2014). "Horizons for the enactive mind: Values, social interaction, and play". In John Stewart, Oliver Gapenne, Ezequiel A Di Paolo, eds (ed.). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science. MIT Press. pp. 33 ff. ISBN 978-0262526012. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
and this book contains half a dozen references to Gibson. On p. 388 Benny Shanon says:
"This nonrepresentational view is in line with other, independent, non-orthodox lines of thought: the seminal critiques of computationalism by Dreyfus, Searle, Winograd & Flores; the ecological psychology of James Gibson and his followers (see Gibson 1966, 1979; Turvey and Shaw 1979; Turvey et al. 1981; as well as Michaels & Carello 1981; Vygotsky (1978) and his followers in the Soviet school of activity theory (see Wertch 1985 a, b); Maturana and Varela and the school of autopoieses...; as well as the earlier philosophical works of Merleau-Ponty (1962) and Wittgenstein (1953) etc etc. "
I think it is clear that Gibson is very pertinent to enactivism, and covers a lot of the same territory as Maturana and Varela who are often credited with 'enactivism' (and never refer to Gibson despite his prominence in this field).
The remainder of the contested paragraph provides still further sources crediting his importance to cognitive ecology and to the efforts of artificial intelligence, both struggling to grasp the activity of organisms and their interactions with their environments, and finding representationalism inadequate to the task. Brews ohare (talk) 15:15, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
In the interest of full disclosure, DiPaolo et al. claim "Enactivism thus differs from other nonrepresentational views such as Gibsonian ecological psychology on this point." The point being the 'transformational' aspect of interaction in which the organism changes its environment, an issue very well understood in ecology as niche construction, an area that also credits Gibson's idea of affordances as a key concept.1 Brews ohare (talk) 15:51, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
I added De Jaegher to the paragraph. Brews ohare (talk) 18:12, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
Obviously, the provided paragraph does not claim Gibson's ecological psychology is the same as enactivism, but only that it is relevant, and tells the reader in what way that is so. Brews ohare (talk) 17:06, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
And we have this: Evan Thompson, Alva Nöe, Luiz Pessoa (1999). "Perceptual completion: A case study in phenomenology and cognitive science". In Jean Petitot, ed (ed.). Naturalizing Phenomenology: Issues in Contemporary Phenomenology and Cognitive Science. Stanford University Press. p. 186. ISBN 9780804736107. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
"One does not have to agree with Gibson's specific hypotheses about how visual perception works to see the main point being made here: the proper subject of perception is not the brain, but rather the whole embodied animal interacting with its environment." Brews ohare (talk) 17:39, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
  • Comment: To say that something 'enacts' is not to say it is a part of 'enactivism', language gets use by philosophers and the meaning changes when it is used to ascribe a specific theory. . None of the references above support the proposed edits. You are arguing that there is a link, OK then publish an article and we can reference it. But we don't do original research here. This issue has been an ongoing one on the original research notice board and across multiple articles. I respect your wish to inform wikipedia readers, but we can only do that within the rules ----Snowded TALK 19:37, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I'm amazed. Where DiPaolo et al. use the italicized phrase they enact a world that is their attempt to explain how 'enact' got into 'enactivism'. When Varela says "This is what I call cognition as enaction since enaction connotes the bringing forth by concrete handling" 1 he is thinking about enactivism. Likewise where Varela, Rosch, and Thompson say: "We propose as a name the term 'enactive' to emphasize the growing conviction that cognition is not the representation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world performs." [The embodied mind p.9; quoted here], it is again about enactivism.
So your statement that "To say that something 'enacts' is not to say it is a part of 'enactivism'" could make some sense in a general water-cooler conversation, but is nonsense when applied as it is here, in context, by the very philosophers and scientists who are talking and writing about enactivism. Please think this through. Brews ohare (talk) 20:49, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
And please bear in mind where Gibson is concerned, it is the aspect of anti-representationalism and anti-computationalism that is referred to, not the transformational aspect, although the niche-creation implications may be there somewhere.See Withagen & Wermeskerken, for example. Brews ohare (talk) 20:54, 21 May 2014 (UTC)
OK Brews, not for the first time you think I am talking nonsense. While I am sorry about that I am pretty immune to it by now. The statement stands; bnot only that, I have thought it through and its a field I am familiar with. You seem to be working from key word searches and assuming common meaning or use when it is far from clear that such is taking place. I will repeat what I have said before, wikipedia reflects the literature in a field it does not create linkages based on flimsy evidence or the opinion of editors. If the enact's quote you use referenced the enactivism literature as a reference or footnote, then you might have a case but as far as I can see it does not. ----Snowded TALK 03:32, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: I agree with your generalities about what WP does and doesn't do and what WP is and is not. However, you have not made clear why these homilies apply here. To do that requires more than your opinion, although I'm sure you think you are correct. What is needed is particulars. What is needed are specifics tied to this proposed text. Brews ohare (talk) 04:53, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
I've been very specific. You need a reference that makes the link between the theories to permit any of the text to be considered. Unless and until that exists there is no valid inclusion of any material. To add to that, I've done my best to support recent changes and I think the atmosphere has improved. But the original research/synthesis issue is an absolute. You have to show proper sourcing to make progress here and your views on what should be allowed have been rejected on notice boards and other articles. Lets keep the positive aspects going forwards if we can ----Snowded TALK 06:48, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: You have not identified what exactly you object to. For example, you have said that Varela and Thompson and Di Paolo use 'enact' in a sense different from 'enaction' or 'enactivism', a point of view demolished above by direct quotes from these authors and now seemingly abandoned by you without further comment. You have said that Gibson's ecological psychology is irrelevant to 'enactivism', a point of view again demolished by showing several of the main architects of enactivism credit Gibson with the portion of enactivism that opposes the computational view of mind and the Cartesian mind-body division. Again, you have seemingly abandoned your views without further comment.
Let's go back to this text and try to come up with an acceptable presentation of the background and application of enactivism to psychology, and avoid a return to the past. Brews ohare (talk) 14:32, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
As a thumbnail sketch, the paragraph points out that Gibson is a well-known early proponent of a view of the mind as not simply a computational engine creating and manipulating symbols representing sensory input. Varela et al. adopted this nonrepresentational view of mind, and stressed the role of transformative interaction in an organism's understanding of its environment. These ideas have found expression in human-machine interface design and in the interpretations of cognitive ecology and evolutionary epistemology. These latter fields extensively refer to Gibson. Do you really object to presenting these facts? Can we engage in their presentation? Brews ohare (talk) 15:00, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
As long as you make the connection not a reliable third party source my objections stand. It's synthesis and it's not allowed----Snowded TALK 15:06, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: To establish, for example, that Gibson championed a non-representational view of mind, can be done both by direct reference to Gibson's work, and by reference to, for example, DiPaolo et al.. Requiring a "third-party" source is unnecessary. However, we have Wilson & Foglia and Pitt in the Stanford Encyclopedia. I do not understand if your doubts are about what did Gibson say, or about what impact he has had, or just a bias against including more than the absolute minimum of material in a WP article. Brews ohare (talk) 15:46, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Your first Standford reference is about embodiment, which is related to enactivism but is not the same thing. The second is representational theory. You are using sources to impute a connection. This is nothing what so ever to do with Gibson's impact or for that matter any bias you wish to attribute to me. It is, to repeat again, that we cannot create knowledge here, we reflect it.----Snowded TALK 16:13, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: You aren't trying too hard to engage in a discussion here, taking a confrontational and not a cooperative stance. Personally, I think that Gibson is rubbish. However, that is not the published view. I am not synthesizing a connection. The connection of Gibson to a non-representational theory of mind is everywhere, and there are at least a dozen sources illustrating this fact in this Talk page thread. If you wish to argue that enactivism has nothing to do with a nonrepresentational theory of mind, you are (simply put) nuts. It is not everything in enactivism, but without it enactivism is nothing. I think you mistake the point that "Gibson had an historical role in framing a nonrepresentational approach to mind" for a claim neither made nor intended in any way that "Gibson is the father of enactivism". Brews ohare (talk) 16:52, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Gibson presented his views both in the abstract and as a theory of vision. This last is gibberish. The first is speculation. One valid point here is that vision is not entirely a conscious cerebral process, and the perceptions received by the eye are very significantly processed by the visual system long before they reach consciousness. It also is a good point that by engaging with the perceived object, touching it, walking around it, and so forth, additional input is obtained that fleshes out what the organism thinks it is dealing with, and there is a lot of subconscious processing with all of this data too. It all boils down to what you might call a Freudian version of perception - to be cute, there is more to perception than meets the eye. These are the basic facts to be understood and presented. Brews ohare (talk) 17:11, 22 May 2014 (UTC).

Sigh, look at what you say "If you wish to argue that enactivism has nothing to do with a nonrepresentational theory of mind, you are (simply put) nuts". Aside from the unhelpful nature of the ending you miss the point entirely. Your sources do not make an explicit connection that I can see and whether I (or you) wish to argue the connection or not is irrelevant. Show me an explicit source and we can discus this, otherwise enough is enough ----Snowded TALK 17:37, 22 May 2014 (UTC)

Sorry, I just don't understand what you are driving at. What is this mysterious "connection" you are looking for? I thought it was a connection between 'enactivism' and the non-representational theory of mind. That connection is obvious and well-sourced. And the connection of the non-representational theory of mind to Gibson is likewise obvious and well-sourced. So what is the problem? What is the missing connection? Please explain in detail. Brews ohare (talk) 17:45, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Read up WP:SYNTHESIS its pretty straight forward and check out in WP:Civil at the same time, edit summaries telling other editors to "sober up' are generally deprecated. To include the material and make the connections you want you have to find a source that explicitly makes a connection between the theories which is relevant to the content of this article. You have not done that. ----Snowded TALK 17:49, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: We are really not on the same page at all. There are no theories to connect. The only connection to be made is to the non-representational nature of mind - a concept. Do you agree that sources see that as one aspect of enactvism? And, given that inclusion, do you agree that Gibson helped to support that concept. If the answers are 'yes', we agree. Brews ohare (talk) 19:58, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
No they don't ----Snowded TALK 19:59, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Now, DiPaolo et al. say ""Enactivism thus differs from other nonrepresentational views such as Gibsonian ecological psychology on this point (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, 1991 203-204)." indicating in this context that enactivism is one of several nonrepresentational views, and that Gibson also has a nonrepresentational view, but one that differs in laying less emphasis upon transformative interactions. So, how do you reconcile this remark with your personal position that (i) Gibson did not have a nonrepresentational view, and (ii) that enactivism has nothing to do with a nonrepresentational view? Brews ohare (talk) 22:03, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
As for enactivism involving a nonrepresentational approach, see Enactive cognition. As for Gibson using a nonrepresentational approach see Mather: "An influential early theory of perception known as 'direct' or 'ecological' perception (Gibson, 1950) emphasized the richness of information available in natural stimuli. and also rejected the need of internal representations in the brain." Brews ohare (talk) 22:28, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
O'Neill "Therefore mental representation and computation has to be performed on the information in the mind in order to understand it. This is essentially representational cognition or thinking, which is in stark contrast to Gibson's ideas..." Brews ohare (talk) 22:36, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
Evan Thompson "The term the enactive approach...aimed to unify under one heading several related ideas...The fourth idea is that a cognitive being's world is not a prespecified external realm, represented internally by its brain..." Brews ohare (talk) 22:50, 22 May 2014 (UTC)
So your first quote establishes that enactivism is not a generic heading to cover other theories, that in itself denies the edits you wanted to make. There is no direct link to affordances, except very indirectly through non-representational theories. You are again trying to develop and article on one thing into a general essay covering any material you can find that maybe in some way related. That is nt what wikipedia is about. Now please, learn to give up on things when you don't have agreement and move on. You've made a lot of useful changes here, this one does not have agreement. ----Snowded TALK 02:58, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded : You are avoiding the topic immediately at hand. You are worried that enactivism is in danger of being used as a catch-all, a worry shared by some sources that think that is indeed the case with this term. However that may be, it has a history and didn't spring from nowhere. Gibson is part of that history. His nonrepresentational approach is very close to that of enactivism, and that is why DiPaolo is troubled to distinguish how enactivism differs from Gibson. The difference is enactivism's emphasis on transformational interactions, but it agrees completely with Gibson that mind straddles the subject- object division. Accepting this historical point does not endanger the presentation of enactivism, nor does it extend it into peripheral issues. Brews ohare (talk) 04:05, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
I am avoiding a discussion about the subject that would comprise original research and/or synthesis Brews. You continue as if you were writing an article about the subject rather than creating an encyclopaedia entry. We've been here before, please accept that people generally disagree with you on this approach (in multiple articles) and move on. ----Snowded TALK 08:38, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: All that is smoke and mirrors. Your concern about original research and/or synthesis is not backed up by pointing out any inaccuracy nor any statement going beyond the sources. Your remark about general disagreement is just some sense of déjà vu and has nothing to do with this discussion. Let's face it: you have no basis for objection, and are wandering off into generalities to avoid coming to grip with the sources, which do not agree with your objectives.

If you care to counter these remarks by discussing what sources say, rather than what Snowded wants to say, progress can be made. Brews ohare (talk) 11:31, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

If we look back at the proposed text, it is not OR/SYN that concerned you, but that somehow reference to Gibson and especially affordances was a digression. Whatever the validity of that view, it has the merit of being content-specific. Snowded, your position has since shifted from this concern to much vaguer accusations.

As to your more specific concerns of relevance, it has been pointed out that DiPaolo et al., major players in enactivism literature, agree that Gibson had much in common, and have separated themselves from Gibson by stressing transformative interactions. I see no problem in making the same point here. As for affordances, this concept is central in the artificial intelligence field where enactivism is referred to. Also in the field of ecology and evolution where enactivism arises, affordances again arise. So your concern about affordances being a digression may be more general, extending to the notion that these applications of enactivism are themselves a digression. I don't think that they can be omitted here as they are undoubtedly part of the literature on enactivism. However, perhaps mention of affordances could be left to those articles.

So I propose this quarreling over Gibson be replaced by mentioning his historical role and dropping affordances. Mention of enactive interfaces and ecology should be made. The point about autopoiesis is important because it is the affect initiating action in enactivism.

Can we engage in such modifications? Brews ohare (talk) 12:42, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

Brews I have already responded to the points above. Find explicit sources that do not rely on you making the connections and we can look at it. ----Snowded TALK 13:09, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

AI

It was previously agreed that enactive interfaces are a different subject and use of the word than enactivism. The recent entry on this also seems to be a Trojan horse for 'affordances' on which this is no agreement. I have therefore reverted the edit----Snowded TALK 15:51, 23 May 2014 (UTC)

Snowded: As the sources provided show in great detail enaction is much discussed in robotics and HCI. To remove an entire area of discussion because it doesn't fit you philosophical preferences is arbitrary. This article is about the entire subject, not your perception of it. Brews ohare (talk) 16:13, 23 May 2014 (UTC)
It is about the subject Brews, not about anything you find via a google search that uses a common word. This was previously discussed and agreed, the use of the word in inactive interfaces does not belong here but in that article. Hence the disambiguation. This is not a matter of personal preference but wikipedia policy. We are not writing essays around a subject, let along a single word regardless of context. We are writing an encyclopaedia. You are also once again reverting to a practice of attempting to ignore WP:BRD if you don't like rejection of your personal preferences. ----Snowded TALK 05:45, 24 May 2014 (UTC)
Snowded: It is hardly contrary to WP policy for an article on Enactivism to contain a brief paragraph introducing each particular subtopic of enactivism, especially where another page (such as Enactive interfaces) provides the details. And to suggest that enactive interfaces contain the word 'enactive' somehow out of context or with another meaning than its use in enactivism is just ignorance: the literature on enactive interfaces is full of references to Mantana and Varela and enactivism just as they have used it. You cannot rely on your personal recollections of what the subject contains, as they are incorrect. Brews ohare (talk) 06:13, 24 May 2014 (UTC)
We discussed this before when the two articles were established and the philosophy one removed. Enactivism in the context of AI is being used in a very different way, hence two articles. Words get used in different disciplines and theorists in different ways. Finding the same word does not mean that it the two traditions means the same thing. For that we needs sources that explicitly link them. If enactive interfaces draws on references from Mantana & Varela then, if its appropriate build material there. We have a disambiguation link. The final paragraph of your more recent addition might, reduced in length, if a useful addition to the philosophy section. Now I am not closed on this, I'm open to discussion but please stop edit warring before there is agreement ----Snowded TALK 08:45, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
The idea that enactivism is being used in different ways is contrary to the sources cited. It is simply your mistaken impression that the AI community uses the term differently. If you have a real point here, please cite a source that uses the term differently and point out the difference in usage, IMO, there is no such difference, and the cited sources back me up. It isn't my opinion, it is theirs. Brews ohare (talk) 16:06, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

Snowded's recent wholesale deletions

In this major edit, Snowded removed all discussion of perception with the one-line edit summary This is not a general article on perception, but the concept of enactivism, However, in fact, theories of perception were the original starting point for enactivism and remain a principal example of its application. The deleted material includes discussions made by the key authors in the field such as Evan Thompson, Alva Noë, Andy Clark, and Daniel Hutto. No talk-page discussion of this massive deletion was attempted and this deletion could not survive any scrutiny.

In this edit Snowded restored some of his previous deletions with the erroneous one-line edit summary That level is OK, but its a separate section closer to philosophy not a sub section of psychology. Of course, perception is a field of psychology, but philosophy has entered into it, usually with a well-documented failure to understand the biology involved.

For some reason Snowded did not restore the discussion by Evan Thompson from Mind in Life, a seminal work in this area. From Snowded's earlier remarks, this deletion appears to be a response to Thompson's reference to affordances, a topic Snowded has steadfastly refused to allow in this article because it lacked "an explicit source". Apparently, now having an explicit source as one of the best known supporters of the enactivist position, the argument is now seen by Snowded as one of perception being an unwarranted digression, although Evan Thompson apparently doesn't agree with Snowded's evaluation.

In this edit Snowded removed a brief paragraph on enactivism as applied in AI on the erroneous basis that enactive interfaces was not a subtopic of enactivism. That erroneous view is discussed on this talk page in the thread #AI.

These changes being unwarranted and unsupported on this Talk page, I have replaced the original text. Brews ohare (talk) 14:57, 24 May 2014 (UTC)

You could equally head this section "Brew's wholescale additions'. The AI section was previously agreed as belonging in the other article. You were part of that agreement so until there is a consensus to change that it stays out.
I did not eliminate material on perception, I removed some of your additional material which was clear original research and also moved it to what I considered a better position. So you summary above is mistaken. I have once again removed the AI section, I think there might be a case for a sentence from your recent second paragraph but we need to agree that first unless you intend to persist in edit warring against WP:BRD. On the other material you are making general assertions about the history simply based on your own research. That is not acceptable. I have a very slow internet connection here in a holiday cottage (I am at a Festival on Philosophy and Science where a lot of this is being discussed). I will make changes to that (again ) to remove the original research, or I will revert to the last stable version pending agreement on the talk page. I need to think about that a bit and get to a faster connection before I decide.
And yes, I know Mind in Life is a seminal work, I read it some time ago. I don't think that his use of a word justifies a complete linkage between two different bodies of theory. Your making that link is synthesis. I realise that if you depend on key word searches of google scholar those sort of conclusions may seem self-evident but the field is a little more subtle than that. ----Snowded TALK 05:00, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
I've added some comments to the earlier section. Having thought about it I am going to revert to the last agreed version while we reach agreement. For a start I suggest a new section on perception, which is not encompassed by psychology in the literature. If we do that, without the original research on when things started we can get somewhere. It may also allow some reference to the AI stuff. Brews, we were getting somewhere with this article le. Y working together. If you want to go back to simply reverting any attempt to modify your material and accusing other editors of ignorance then so edit, but I think its a pity. ----Snowded TALK 08:49, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
An affordance is an affordance is an affordance. An affordance by any other name is still an opportunity for action. Evan's mention of the term 'affordance' and J. J. Gibson establishes the point of applicability of the term affordance in a discussion of enactivism. That is all that is needed here. Your might find amusing how often Evan's words have been quoted.
So your opposition to the word 'affordance' is only your parochial refusal to include a specific word in your vocabulary. The word itself is only a label, and has no profound implications beyond the indication that enactivists have not sprung forth fully formed from a void. Brews ohare (talk) 13:51, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
stop fixating on Affordance, you're habit of ascribing motivation says more about you than its does about those of us you criticise. The issue here is synthesis, relevance and the need to show specific links between theory. I've suggested a way forwards, legs try focusing on content ----Snowded TALK 14:19, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
It's not my fixation, Snowded. It is you who repeatedly deletes all reference to 'affordance' despite Thompson's indication of its utility as a label for what is defined as "a relationship that signals an opportunity for action".1. Brews ohare (talk) 14:39, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
no it illustrates a wider problem. Use of a word is not enough, you need to see the theories being linked to have confidence they mean the same thing. Also we need to realise that enactivism is not a catch all subject for all any any material which opposes Cartesian concepts of the mind----Snowded TALK 15:21, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
Your reply is beside the point and completely non-responsive to the issue raised of vocabulary. Brews ohare (talk) 15:28, 25 May 2014 (UTC)
Your reply also suggests that in his essay on enactivism Thompson, one of the key apologists for enactivism, is not discussing enactivism, and we have "to see the theories being linked to have confidence they mean the same thing" - that Thompson is referring to 'enactivism' in a novel sense different from his other writings on 'enactivism' is a stretch indeed. Brews ohare (talk) 20:54, 25 May 2014 (UTC)

Brews, until you pay attention to the argument and stop making false assumptions about my position we will make no progress. We areonthat ing a debate about the subject, where I may well agree with you. We need to look at sourcing and we need to stop the expansion of the articlebwyondits subject area to anything you think is related toit. Like the addition I found this morning that I had little choice but to revert----Snowded TALK 09:22, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

Of course, it is annoying to be misunderstood. As when you cannot understand that the use of a word (affordance) is not about a theory nor a digression, but about adding a word to your vocabulary that would be helpful in discussing enactivism, as was done by Evan Thompson, who uses this word this way. Brews ohare (talk) 15:54, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

Treatment of Evan Thompson

Perhaps it would be useful to discuss the role in this WP article for Evan Thompson's view of enactivism as described, for example, in Sensorimotor subjectivity and the enactive approach to experience. He traces the enactivist position back to Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger and Husserl. "The world is inseparable from the subject,...and the subject is inseparable from the world." According to Thompson, this means "our primary way of relating to things is neither purely sensory and reflexive, nor cognitive or intellectual, but rather bodily and skillful." "In picking up a teacup to drink from, for example, I identify it not by its objective location in space, but by its egocentric relation to my hands, and I grasp it in light of the goal of sipping from it. On the other hand, things in my surroundings, such as teacups, computer keys, stairways, and so on, have motor senses or meanings, what Gibson (1979) calls 'affordances'..."

Snowded has objected to including Thompson's enactivist view of perception. It is an attempt to recruit enactivism to become a way out of the subject-object problem and the explanatory gap by smearing the two together and elevating phenomenology to a primary position. "My aim has been to show that the dynamic sensorimotor approach to perceptual experience can be profitably combined with an enactive account of selfhood and a phenomenological account of bodily self-consciousness."

How is this viewpoint to be reported? Should the word 'affordance' be introduced? Why, or why not? Brews ohare (talk) 15:21, 25 May 2014 (UTC)

It might be useful to point out that in invoking Husserl's intentionality, as when Thompson says affordances "bring forth appropriate actions. Things in the world bring forth suitable intentional actions and motor projects from the subject..." he goes far beyond Gibson and the idea of 'affordance'. Affordance is about the 'potential' for action, not its initiation. He also appears to depart from Maturana (the pioneer of enactivism) who invokes autopoiesis ('homeostatic competence', a kind of enlargement of the selfish gene) as the source of action, although Thompson claims he does base things upon autopoiesis., although perhaps of a different sort. Brews ohare (talk) 15:45, 25 May 2014 (UTC)

Opening a new thread when you have not responded to the points raised in the previous section is a waste of everyone's time. Let's sort out sourcing and scope before we get into this level of detail----Snowded TALK 09:23, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
This thread is an attempt to move forward with specific content. Brews ohare (talk) 14:29, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
Looks to me more like an attempt to avoid dealing with the issue of scope creep and referencing ----Snowded TALK 15:42, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
Why not actually do something here and engage on the subject of how to handle this author.? Brews ohare (talk) 15:50, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
I made suggestions earlierBrews but you did not respond. If you want I'll go through the again tomorrow ----Snowded TALK 16:08, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
Great, let's hear your ideas. Brews ohare (talk) 16:14, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

Autopoiesis

In a recent edit Snowded reverted a sentence or two alerting readers to the work of Luhmann in applying Maturana and Varela's notion of autopoiesis to social systems. Apparently Snowded doesn't realize that autopoiesis is an essential part of enactivism according to Evan Thompson, Maturana and Varela, and of course, Luhmann.

The reason that autopoiesis is key for these authors is that autopoiesis is what instigates the actions that underlie enactivism, without which enaction will not take place. See Stewart. The word was coined by Maturana explicitly for use in his approach to enactivism. Snowded did not analyze his reversion on this talk page, but used a one-line edit summary Way beyond scope of article, indicating an unawareness of the role of autopoiesis in the enactivism literature. Brews ohare (talk) 14:54, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

OMG yet another talk page section. This is an article about enactivism it is not a forum for a general essay on all e possible implications of aspects of that theory. Autopoeisis is linked but not universally held. There is an article for that. ----Snowded TALK 15:40, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
There is no requirement that 'autopoiesis' be "universally held". The inclusion of Luhmann is a report on content of a reputable source, and Luhmann invokes Maturana and autopoiesis. If you wish to include other authors with other opinions, please do so. But also, please do not arbitrarily censure this article based upon the erroneous one-liner that autopoiesis is not pertinent to enactivism. Brews ohare (talk) 15:46, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
The whole of life is pertinent to enactivism. We are writing an encyclopaedia here not a general exposition on all related fields. Try and stop the insult as by the way. Disagreeing with Brews does not make me a censor, or if it does nearly every editor you have interacted with suffers from a blue pencil fetish----Snowded TALK 15:58, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
I hate to 'educate' on this point, but autopoiesis is not a digression into some unfocussed swamp of ideas. It is a topic so central to enactivism that Thompson has an entire chapter in Mind in Life about it. Your attempted justification by puffing this up as a wild digression is not a substitute for sourced opinion (which doesn't exist). Your removal of material without seeing any need to provide actual sources as a basis in place of pontification is attempted censorship. Brews ohare (talk) 16:12, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
Perhaps we need a section on autopoiesis and homeodynamics to make the connections? Brews ohare (talk) 16:35, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
back to the edit warring and insults that got you full topic again I see. If you self-revert I'll believe you are prepared to work with other editors. Maintain your current stance and it becomes behavioural issue not a content one. ----Snowded TALK 17:10, 26 May 2014 (UTC)
No, it's a content issue. Discuss sources, not your opinions and judgments, and all will be well. Brews ohare (talk) 17:24, 26 May 2014 (UTC)

Psychological aspects

The lead paragraph of this section is misplaced because it is about societal aspects of psychology, which is the last subsection of this section, and is unrelated to the first subsection of this section. Accordingly, this material should be moved to the second subsection on 'participatory sense-making' where it belongs.

That means an introductory paragraph for this section is missing. Previously this move was made and an introduction provided. Perhaps these changes should be restored, or some modification of them? Brews ohare (talk) 15:19, 30 May 2014 (UTC)

Moderate madness

As it stands this article would benefit from an overhaul but reading the comments on this Talk page that would seem to be an impossible task. The article seems to be or to have become the fiefdom of one editor who appears to believe and to act as if his/her opinion is law. It is a mockery that the editor's comments evidence precisely the faults s/he accuses others of and extraordinarily little else. There seeems to be no real debate. Those editors who wish to improve the article are simply subjected to ad hominen attacks for their seemingly well-argued points. So, what remedies does Wikipedia have for such situations? Is there any form of effective mediation available to enable this article to be improved? Or it really as easy as it looks to take ownership and dominate an article in this way? Seriously! LookingGlass (talk) 14:24, 4 August 2016 (UTC)