Talk:Argument from illusion

Philosophy: Epistemology / Logic Mid‑importance

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So is this argument a fallacy or not? Vasu619 (talk) 18:19, 13 April 2009 (UTC)[reply]

It's not a fallacy, but it is unsound. Take the Stanford Encyclopedia version from the article on sense-data:

1. When viewing a straight stick half-submerged in water, one is directly aware of something bent.

2. No relevant physical thing is bent in this situation.

3. Therefore, in this situation, one is directly aware of something non-physical.

4. What one is directly aware of in this situation is the same kind of thing that one is directly aware of in normal, non-illusory perception.

5. Therefore, in normal perception, one is directly aware of non-physical things.

That argument is valid but unsound, since premise 1 is incorrect, ie. our perception does not consist in being "aware of something bent", but in observing something that APPEARS to be bent. 129.215.149.97 (talk) 14:17, 18 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

The stick in the water is not a good example[edit]

I think optical illusions and hallucinations would be better, in those cases, things do appear to be real when certainly they aren't. --TiagoTiago (talk) 04:31, 29 October 2011 (UTC)[reply]