Talk:Argument from free will/Archive 1

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Untitled

The rebuttal to the argument was followed by the following counter-rebuttal, which I cut out:

The argument should have been presented not in terms of time but in terms of causality, for time could not be discerned in a causal system at equilibrium. Whatever is not causal is random, so omniscience cannot extend beyond a causal network. For God to be omniscient, It must know the entire causal network. Therefore either there can be no options or God cannot know which path is selected, which proves the Christian ideal of God cannot exist.

While I can sort of understand where this is coming from, this business about of "causal networks" and a "causal system at equilibrium" needs to be reworded or clarified; without an explanation of what the terms mean, it reads like a bunch of mumbo-jumbo. If anyone would like to reformulate this passage in a more coherent manner and put it back in the article, feel free to do so. -Didactohedron 01:40, Nov 19, 2004 (UTC)

"Typical" Formulation

Most of this article is spent criticizing what it calls the "typical" formulation of the AFFW. Is there any support for the assertion that Dan Barker's formulation is how the argument is "typically formulated"? Because if not, I see no reason to spend practically the entire article criticizing a straw man. 209.198.166.126 (talk) 14:03, 22 August 2009 (UTC)

Causality does not mix well with omniscience

A causal network can be understood as a tree, where the trunk represents a starting state (for God, the beginning of time), and the point at which a branch splits off represents a decision. The leaves represent all the possible outcomes.

A counter to the argument from free will is that it assumes God makes decisions at various times in history, while an omniscient God could have just as easily made all his plans at once. However, some scriptures describe people reasoning/arguing/bartering with God, in an apparent bid to get God to change his mind, with apparent success (e.g. Moses, Abraham @ Sodom). On the other hand, these do not prove that God did not know the outcome ahead of time. This line of reasoning implies that the debate with God was not of substance in his decision making, but held for the purpose of its effect on mankind.

As for the causal network problem posted previously, consider any node (decision). If God knows the outcome, then he knows his own decision before he has made it, and free will is meaningless, because he has no choices. This is a contradiction with the premise of a causal network, which assumes choices exist.

On the other hand, it is also possible that God's omniscience excludes his own choices, and in fact means knowing the entire causal network before choices have been made, allowing him to make the choices, determine a path through the causal network, and have free will.

Also, if one assumes that God created the universe, and that time is limited to the universe, then there is no before or after, or causality, or choice as we know it apart from the universe. God is then free to have planned the entirety of the universe from outside the universe, and set it in motion. Note that this does not imply that God leaves the universe alone after its inception, merely that he acts based on decisions he has already made.

--Dave Merillat

There were some logical flaws and reaches that were in the article. I cleaned it up reasonably. -Homagetocatalonia

before

Since many theists hold God to be timeless (i.e. existent beyond the scope of what we consider to be time) the word "before" in the statement "because God's omniscience demands that he would know events before they happen" means nothing from a God-point-of-view. If God exists beyond the scope of the space-time continuum, and therefore able to not only see all events, but to exist while all events are taking place, then God doesn't know any event "before" it happens but rather "while" it happens. Since we humans are also capable of knowing events while they happen without having any effect on the free-will of the agent causing the event, God can likewise know an event while it happens without effecting the free-will of the agent causing the event. Therefore the coexistence of an omniscient God and free-will isn't oxymoronic.

The concept of "timeless" is an ad hoc creation for the sake of debate, and it has no solid foundation based on human knowledge about the universe.
Additionally, according to the Bible, God apparently did/does things SEQUENTIALLY, and the Bible uses days, years, etc. to describe what God did first, and what God did later.
Most importantly, the Christians say the God PREDICTED the coming of Messiah in the Old Testament, and THEN came Jesus in New Testament.
If God is timeless, how did/does He PREDICT things, which tells what will happen in the FUTURE, and FUTURE is a concept of TIME. --Roland 04:52, 7 August 2006 (UTC)
The concept of "timeless" or "out side of time" does have solid foundation based on human knowledge about the universe. The generally accepted theory of how the universe started in mainstream science today involves the Big Bang. Following the idea of Big Bang, and also one of the concept in the theory of Relativity (that extreme mass can warp time), it is concluded that "time" begins at Big Bang. Steven Hawkings stated in his book that "...the question 'What's before the Big Bang' is meaningless, because there's no concept of time before Big Bang." If we are following the idea that God created the universe, obviously his existence would have to be independent of time. Thus the concept of "timeless" does exist in mainstream science today, and is generally accepted, we just don't (and probably can never) understand it. Time is a dimension, just like the other spatial dimensions we know. Beings can exist in all, some, or maybe even none in these dimensions that we know.
Further, things certainly happened sequentially and "prophecies" were made - in our prespective. Tell me, can anyone explain the interaction between a timeless being and time(-ful?) beings? If time exists for one side of the interaction but not the other side, how do we think about that? I certainly can't imagine; We don't even have the language or mental capability to consider that. Casuality or sequence of events exist only in time. If a timeless being acts on dimensions in time (or even the time dimension itself), we have no idea how we would observe that and conclude from that.
Our logic is based on causality, which, in term, requires time. If something transcends time, then it would, by definition, transcends logic as we know. The being might still adhere to logic in a time-less fashion, but logic as we know will not be able to speculate or analysis such being. Allan Lee 18:06, 21 August 2006 (UTC)
I agree that if something transcends time then it is outside of our understanding. However, in this particular case we are discussing the predetermination of human beings, who exist inside of time. Although it is conceivable that God exists outside of time, his knowledge of events that occur within time must also include knowledge of when that event will occur, as otherwise his knowledge is not complete and he cannot be declared to be omniscient. That God is timeless does not mean that his knowledge is also timeless, and as we are time-constrained beings that knowledge would predetermine us. Anria 22:08, 14 September 2006 (UTC)
Another problem with prophecy in regards to the possibility of a timeless god would not only be the occurance of that prophecy but the effect that giving that prophecy would have on the universe. If god timelessly created the universe then it must be in much the same way that an artist creates a work of art. To a painter, he is painting a moment in time and is not involved in that moment, however every brush stroke changes the reality in the painting. This is similar with god, only instead of 2-D it would be a 4-D representation (4th dimension being time). If he creates everything timelessly then he creates everything at every moment. Every moment is another part of his creation process, like one frame of a film. Thusly anything that ever happened happened because he would have created it to happen. He could not create the initial conditions and then sit back and watch. Therefore if one were to contend that god is timeless then they must also hold everything is exactly the way he created it to be, which denies free will in every sense of the word. HonestDiscussioner —Preceding undated comment added 16:52, 16 October 2009 (UTC).

By Definition

The following statement is incorrect: "By definition, no being can be all-knowing if there is free will (different possible futures). This shows that omniscience and free will are logically contradictory."

It is certainly not "by definition" true that no being can be omniscient while free-will exists. I'm not saying that this is the case, but if there are different possible futures what would prevent an omniscient being from knowing all of them. And I did read the statements that were already on the page, and the ideas I presented were not all on the page. The fact that some hold that God exists outside of time was quickly presented, but the contention of His existence at all points in time simultaneously was certainly not addressed, and is not properly addressed now that most of my comments have been cut away. I presented the information at the end instead of chopping-up the already existing info that was previously posted. But I guess I could have integrated it into the pre-existing post. This was my 1st post and I wasn't aware of the ettiquette.

I believe the logic breaks down at #3: "By the definitions of "knowledge" and "choice", if one knows for certain what choice one will make in the future, one will not be able to make the opposite choice." Using the word "future" is another case of trying to shoe-horn an atemporal being/idea into a temporal framework. If the omniscient being is simply existing and observing the choice as it is being made, said being is not effecting the outcome of the choice any more that us temporal beings would effect it by our observation.

You're forgetting that abrahamic God is said to have given the beginning to the Universe, thus effecting the outcome of events ultimately. And as said before, omniscience requires the knowledge of "when" to be complete. So apparently God could determine what would happen "after". MaybeNextTime —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 83.27.30.185 (talk) 17:36, 8 December 2006 (UTC).

I believe this entry, as it is currently written, is not neutral point-of-view, but is baised toward an unbelief in the possibility that an omniscient being can co-exist with free-will, by entering in to the discussion with the aforementioned pre-supposition. Unfortunately, I won't have the time after today (since I'm on vacation today only) to continue with this discussion and keep reposting rebuttals.

I do, however, appreciate that some of my comments were kept, and that the site's maintainer did at least consider my statements.

One more point to consider... just because I know something is going to happen doesn't mean I'm affecting that event. i.e. when my wife and I go to dinner I know whe's going to choose to get turkey because she always does. I'm not forceing her to get turkey, she's exercising her free-will and getting what she wants, and what I know she will get beforehand. So since I can know something will happen without negating the free-will of the agent making the choice, an omniscient being can similarly know something will happen without negating free-will.

There's no problem with you knowing what your wife is going to do before she does it, because there is no contradiction inherent in the possibility of you being wrong. For an omniscient being, however, their knowledge is necessary and thus cannot be wrong. If that knowledge cannot be wrong, then your wife is not free to change her mind. Anria 07:48, 15 September 2006 (UTC)

The point here shouldn't be to try to prove that free-will and omniscience do or do not co-exist, but rather to present both sides of the argument (i.e. non-biased point-of-view) and allow the reader to determine the truth for themselves.

Using the word "future" is another case of trying to shoe-horn an atemporal being/idea into a temporal framework. - no, because WE live IN time. God's omniscience affects US too, (we apparently have free will), not only himself.
just because I know something is going to happen doesn't mean I'm affecting that event. - but you don't know FOR SURE. God DOES know for sure, though. Infinity0 talk 16:39, 14 December 2005 (UTC)
These points are already in the paragraph directly below the argument; you should try to extend that, instead of adding stuff at the bottom. Infinity0 talk 16:40, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

I'm pretty good with the wording now as it stands. I believe that it represents both sides without trying to force a view on the reader. I'm willing to go with what we have now if you are.

Yeah, I'm fine with the general structure of the article as it stands. I think it should be extended to something like the format of Problem of Evil, with sources and famous philosophers' views of this argument, but I don't know enough about this to do anything substantial. Infinity0 talk 20:13, 14 December 2005 (UTC)

Organization

As it is now, this article starts out in a promising way, but decays into a repetitive around-and-around debate in the section below the numbered list, culminating in a sentence that bizarrely reiterates the whole point of the argument as if it were a new, additional point. I would like to edit the whole section, but since I am sure that that would open a can of worms, I'll post it here first. I suggest replacing everything after the numbered list with: 

Most monotheistic religions hold both that God is omniscient, and that humans have free will. (For
example, they often include a concept of reward and punishment -- Heaven and Hell -- which logically requires human
free will in order to be meaningful.) Many proponents of the argument from free will (AFFW) therefore hold that AFFW
is an effective refutation of such religions. AFFW has been used in support of atheism, and as a basis for Deism and
various other non-omniscient religious philosophies.

== Criticisms ==

A common criticism of AFFW argues that the apparent contradiction arises from an attempt to attribute temporal
attributes to an atemporal idea or being. In this view, God exists beyond the constraints of linear time, and
the temporal terminology used by AFFW is meaningless when applied to him: God doesn't need to know any
event "before" it happens but rather is capable of knowing/experiencing it "while" it happens.

AFFW proponents respond that the above criticism does not eliminate the contradiction. They claim that
omniscience by definition means that God has knowledge of all human events in all human times, even if
God's own relationship to time is entirely different from ours.

Any objections?

(By the way, the whole article is of course badly lacking references to reputable sources.) - Mglg 21:41, 14 June 2006 (UTC)

I'm going ahead with the edit. - Mglg 02:41, 16 June 2006 (UTC)


The only problem I still have is with point 3. It seems to say that it's not possible for a reasonable person to believe that omniscience to exist in addition to free will. I have to disagree with this and say that it is certainly not true "by definition." Many, including myself, contend that just because someone/something knows that an event is going to occur does not negate the free will of the person/thing choosing to act in a certain way. 

 I would like to add something to the article stating something to that effect to make it more NPOV, as it currently seems to slant heavily toward the viewpoint of those who adhere to an AFFW stance.
The thing is that abrahamic God is said to create the world. With omniscience He knew the outcome boforehand and thus affected it.

Ill-formed Strawman Logic

Under the criticims section, there is a serious strawman. This is the way steps 2 & 3 are formulated:

2) By the definition of free will, at any point in time, a person can choose to do any action A, where A is the set of all actions they are physically capable of (definition of free will).

3) At time T, person X will choose to do action A (i.e. a person can not logically choose to do both A and not A) (Law of the Excluded Middle).

In these two lines, "A" is presented in a way that it means both a particular action, and also a set of actions. Properly formulated,

2) By the definition of free will, at any point in time T a person X can choose to do any action a, such that a is a member of A(T), the set of all actions that he is physically capable of at time T. (Doing nothing is a possible value of a.)

3) At time T, person X will choose to do action a.

Then 6 must be changed as well 6) From 3 & 5, God knows that at time T, person X will choose to do action a.

and

7) Therefore, person X must do action a at time T.

However, with these corrections, it is no longer the case that step 7 follows logically if setps 4-6 are dropped, and this 7 step argument actually supports AFFW. Step 2 as presented in the article is a clear example of the fallacy of equivocation.

I have frequently seen the claim that modal logic is able to falsify AFFW, but I have never seen a formalized proof of this claim. I think that in order for the claim that AFFW commits a modal fallacy, either a properly formalized demonstration of this claim should be presented, or a reference to some place that has such a formalized demonstration. The text in the article does not suffice.

Please sign your comments.
The modal fallacy is already explained in the article. Formally stated, the modal fallacy is as follows:
1. It is necessary that if A is true, then B is true.
2. A is true.
3. Therefore, it is necessary that B is true.
The modal fallacy occurs when someone takes a necessary truth (if A is true, then B is true), and then applies that necessity to one of the individual parts (B is true). Here is an example that illustrates this:
1. If Dave has two sons, then Dave has to have at least one son.
2. Dave has two sons.
3. Therefore, Dave has to have at least one son. (It is necessary that Dave has at least one son.)
This proof is incorrect, since it is not logically necessary that Dave has at least one son. He could have chosen to have no children, or he could have had all daughters. Just because something is true, that does not make it necessarily true. More properly stated, the proof goes like this:
1. It is necessary that (if Dave has two sons, then Dave has at least one son).
2. Dave has two sons.
3. Therefore, Dave has at least one son.
When the proof is phrased properly, and the modal fallacy does not occur, then the statement (Dave has at least one son) is shown to be true, but not necessarily true. So if you apply this to the argument from free will, the proof is as follows:
1. It is necessary that (if God knows that a person will do action A at time T, then that person will do action A at time T).
2. God knows that a person will do action A at time T.
3. Therefore, the person will do action A at time T.
The modal fallacy would be changing the last statement to, “Therefore, it is necessary that the person will do action A at time T.” Concluding that someone will do something is very different from concluding that they must do something. I really don’t know how to explain it any better. 75.17.113.113 08:31, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

Logical Flaws?

Where is the proper place to point out logical flaws in the main proof? I don’t think it makes sense to change the proof itself, since that proof as written is indeed used in an attempt to refute omniscience coincidental with free will. However, I think that the proof is logically unsound, and would like to propose a corrected, sound proof. So where would be the proper place for that correction? 17.201.116.248 20:14, 19 September 2006 (UTC)

I've reverted your addition, as it reeks of POV to me. Your use of a numbered argument seems to be a straw man, as you state that the original argument assumes its conclusion but then reword the argument entirely in order to prove this and call that rewording a more accurate version. (If that wasn't what you meant, apologies, but in that case it would still need a rewording to make that clearer.) Certain phrases such as "clearly possible", "simply assumes" and "the original proof makes the mistake" indicate bias. Could you try rewording it with more neutral language? Also, can you demonstrate that this is not original research? Your phrasing here and in the amendment indicate to me that this is something you have come up with on your own - please forgive me if that is not the case, but if it isn't the case please cite your sources.
On a more general note, I believe your criticism stems from a misunderstanding of the original argument. To be omniscient means that you must know all factual information, have a perfect understanding of that information, and be infallible in that information. For God, this means that he must know everything that has ever happened, is happening, and will ever happen and must know everything about that situation. Thus he must know what choice we will make before we even contemplate making a choice, and his knowledge will contain every single factual piece of information about that choice such as what it involves and when we make it. As in order to be omniscient he cannot be wrong, this removes the possibility of choice from our future actions. In order to be able to make a choice, we must be able to pick more than one thing. As God cannot be wrong or else he is not omniscient, then in order for his omniscience to be maintained we can only ever have one option and he must know what that option will be ahead of time. The original argument does not assume its conclusion; if the explanation I just gave isn't clear enough, let me know. I'm trying to rewrite the article to make it clear to start off with, but I don't have much time on my hands at the moment. Anria 21:02, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
Edited my comment; parts of it were harsher on a reread than I intended them to be. Sorry about that. Anria 21:23, 25 September 2006 (UTC)
I disagree with your removal of my counter-proof. If the argument belongs here, then counter-arguments also belong here. Basically you’re saying that it’s okay to have an argument against the existence of free will, but a rebuttal to that argument is somehow POV? The only POV problem I see here is your removal of the counter-proof. As for numbering my points, that’s how proofs are written. I can’t really reword the counter-argument with “more neutral language,” since the whole point of the counter-argument is that it is disproving the original argument. Why is the original argument unbiased, but any argument against it is biased?
As for your comments that I don’t understand the proof, yes, I do understand it. Its essence boils down to the sentence you wrote above: “As in order to be omniscient he cannot be wrong, this removes the possibility of choice from our future actions.” That is the point to be proven by the argument, but instead it is assumed (specifically, in point 3). Thus, the logic of the argument is invalid. And again, what is the problem with pointing out flaws in logic?
“In order to be able to make a choice, we must be able to pick more than one thing.” No, you can’t pick more than one thing; you can only pick one thing from a set of choices. For example, you can not choose to go left and go right at the same time. You have a set of choices, but there is only one choice that you WILL make. So it is true that at a certain point in time, you will make a certain choice X. Again, this is true whether or not an omniscient being exists. So if you assume that an omniscient being exists, and you assume that you will make choice X at time T (gee, this would be a lot easier if I could number my points!), then logically, an omniscient being would know that you will make choice X at time T. This in no way limits your choices. X can be “go left” or “go right” or “eat a pizza” or “go see a movie” or “do nothing.” But whatever choice you make, coupled with the existence of an omniscient being, leads to the conclusion that said being will know the choice.
The mistake in the argument from free will is that correlation leads to causation. You might as well argue that since you have a picture of someone doing something, that means they had no other choice at that time, because if they did, your picture would be wrong. But in truth, if they did something different, then the picture would be different. The action leads to the picture, not the other way around.
I will be restoring the original edits, unless you can demonstrate how a counter-argument is POV. 17.201.116.236 20:52, 28 September 2006 (UTC)
I've taken your response paragraph by paragraph, as I felt that it was easier to respond in that manner. Sorry if it reads a bit oddly because of that.
In response to paragraph one - that was not what I said, and it is perfectly clear that that is not what I said. I feel that the argument you have presented is a potentially valid counter-argument, even though I disagree with it personally, but the specific wording you have chosen is not neutral. It states that this counter-argument is true, not that it is merely one possible objection. The distinction is that you have written "it is the case that", instead of "it can be argued that". The latter is neutral; the former is not. You have decided that your counter-argument is fact when it can and has been argued that that is not the case. Thus, I have once again reverted your edit. I am perfectly happy to leave the counter-argument in if you reword it to remove the implication that your counter-argument is the be-all and end-all proof that this argument does not work, as with philosophy in particular it has hardly, if ever, been the case that there is a be-all and end-all proof of anything.
In response to paragraph two - there is no problem, so long as the wording is neutral and you are prepared to admit that there is a possibility that you are wrong and that there are counter-arguments to your counter-argument. Thus far, you do not appear to be prepared to do that. Also, I still believe that you are missing a point, but I have addressed it below.
In response to paragraph three - apologies for the poor wording on that sentence; what I meant is precisely what you said, that we must be able to pick one thing from a set of choices.
Again, I feel that you're missing the point somewhat. You're assuming that the existence of an omniscient being does not limit your choices, and the only way that would be possible is if we were fully determined in the first place. I think where you're coming from (please correct me if I am wrong) is that we can only ever make one choice, and that choice can be about anything, and this means that an omniscient being must know that we will make one choice but would not know what that choice would be. And in that case, that being is not omniscient. Omniscience, as I said before, is knowing all factual information, having a perfect understanding of that information, and being utterly incapable of being wrong. If an omniscient being does not know precisely which action I am going to take at time T - be it "go left", "go right", "eat a pizza", etc. - then that being's knowledge is not complete and they cannot be said to be omniscient. It's merely a redundant truth (except in quantum physics, granted) that only one action can occur at time T in place Y. To then say that an omniscient being does not know what that action is is to not have understood what "omniscient" means, and to have defeated your own argument.
The only way that I can see your argument working is if it includes a particular concept of time and God's place in it, which is that the future is something which has not been written and that God is constrained by time. That particular view has been rejected by most academic theists over the years, as it means that God is changeable (don't ask me why that's a bad thing; I only know the cynic's reason) as his knowledge changes as time progresses, and as he must change as time progresses he must also be constrained by time which means that God had a beginning and will have an end. Granted, those specific attributes go above and beyond what is specified in "omniscient God", but the fact that the word "God" is used instead of "being" indicates that certain background assumptions have been brought in to the argument.
In response to paragraph four - I see your point, particularly on the correlation/causation thing, but it's missing a crucial distinction. A picture does not depict the future. It cannot, as a picture of an event occurs after that event. An omniscient being, however, particularly if they are held to be outside time in the manner that God is, must "depict" the future, as its knowledge of an event occurs before that event. I realise that that is merely a repetition of what has already been said, but hopefully now you can see why I believe your argument to be incorrect.
Finally, you have not made any mention of whether or not this was original research. If it is not, please cite your sources. If it is, find some sources. I am perfectly happy to leave your counter-argument in so long as it is worded neutrally and so long as you have sources you can reference, although whether you reference them at this particular point in time is not as important as getting neutral wording. To make this as clear as I can, my objections to your counter-argument are also a side-issue to getting neutral wording. I don't want to get (further) into a revert war, so I hope that you now understand my position. Anria 12:35, 30 September 2006 (UTC)
Thank you for specifically noting which parts of the counter-argument you believe are not neutral. I will make the necessary corrections and re-submit that section (although I am curious why you chose to revert the entire section, instead of just making the necessary edits yourself).
As for the argument, I think you misunderstand the point I was making, and I think your misunderstanding stems from assuming the conclusion. My argument is not “that we can only ever make one choice.” I am trying to put my argument in the simplest possible terms to make the proof easier, so I am limiting it to one specific choice at one particular point in time. Instead of discussing all events, I am simply discussing one choice X made at time T. From the conclusions of that event, you can extrapolate the existence or non-existence of free will for all events at all points in time.
Oh, and as for your statement, “the fact that the word ‘God’ is used instead of ‘being’ indicates that certain background assumptions have been brought in to the argument,” you will notice that you were the first person to use the term “God,” not me. But since you started with it, I will continue for simplicity’s sake.
So the problem with the proof is that it takes the statement “God knows I will do X at time T” and then uses that to disprove free will. The problem is, you can’t start with “God knows I will do X at time T,” because that is actually the logical conclusion of two previous assumptions: “An omniscient God exists” and “I will do X at time T.” The proof then claims that since you can’t choose to do Y at time T, then the existence of an omniscient God must force you to do X. But it’s not the existence of God that keeps you from doing Y; it is the fact that we have already assumed “I will do X at time T” as part of the proof.
As for the difference between an omniscient being’s knowledge of an event, and a picture of an event, I submit to you that they are essentially the same thing. Using the argument from free will, you could say, “I have a camera that perfectly captures an image of an event. The images that I take with this camera are always completely accurate. Now I have a picture of you doing X at time T. Therefore, I have proven that you did not have free will at that time, because if you did Y instead, then my picture of you doing X would not be perfectly accurate. Therefore, the existence of my perfect camera is incompatible with free will.” Now of course, any logical person would realize that that proof is not correct, because if you did Y, then the perfect camera would end up with a picture of Y instead of a picture of X. It’s the same thing with omniscience. Omniscience is the perfect knowledge of all events. The camera is perfect picture of all events. If I have a picture of you doing X, that doesn’t prove that you had to choose to do X. So if God knows you will choose X, how does that prove you can only do X? If you instead choose to do Y, then God knows (and always has known) that you will choose to do Y. God’s knowledge is a result of your choice, not the cause of it. 17.201.116.248 18:23, 2 October 2006 (UTC)
Anria did not use it in the first place - the article does use it first (the very beginning).
The correct way to say this is:
We assume that:
1. Abrahamic God exists (He is omniscient, omnipotent, atemporal).
2. He creates the Universe and for He is omniscient and atemporal He depicts the future, the outcome of the Act of Creation before it happens.
3. By the definitions of "knowledge" and "choice", if one knows for certain what choice one will make in the future, one will not be able to make the opposite choice.
4. Omniscience and free will are logically contradictory.
5. Either nobody has free will, or nobody is omniscient.
As you see we do not assume that "one will do X", we assume that God is bound to see what will happen after He creates the Universe.
Your methaphor is flawed because you did not take the picture in advance which is the case with God.
Your whole argument is based on the false assumption that either God did not create the Universe (on purpose) or that He was not omniscient before He did so - we're arguing abrahamic God, remember? He is said to know the event "while" they happen but also which happen in what order, how else could He predict certain things? MaybeNextTime
Yes, I am aware that the article used it from the very beginning. However, in the discussions here, Anria used "God," I followed suit, and then Anria claimed that my use of the word "God" showed that I was bringing "certain background assumptions" into the argument. I was simply pointing out that Anria used the term before I did.
As for your "correct way" example, there is no reason to talk about Abrahamic God here. This is a philosophical argument about an omniscient being and free will, not a discussion of one specific god in particular.
Oh, and my camera metaphor is perfectly apt. You need to explain how something happening "in advance" changes the chain of causation. In both cases, the cause (the action) leads to the effect (the knowledge or the picture). There is no reason to assume that just because something happens in advance, the chain of causation is fundamentally different. 75.30.224.102 07:15, 20 December 2006 (UTC)
I guess the expression seems a bit ambiguous to you. It's meant to mean "we must be able to pick from more than one thing", in other words - have an alternative, which is not the case if God is omniscient and creates the Universe. MaybeNextTime
This is in response to my paragraph where I say, "you can’t pick more than one thing; you can only pick one thing from a set of choices." Yes, I understand completely that you must be able to pick from more than one thing. And again, the existence of an omniscient God does not limit our choice in this regard. God knows what you will pick, but does not force you to pick it.
Yes He does as far as we assume He created the universe. Did He gain His omniscience after the act of creation or is it His permanent atribute? If it is (which I believe out argument assumes) then we can assume that He knew to what results the way He made this universe will lead beforehand, which determined the course of events at the very beginning. 83.27.13.45 16:43, 15 January 2007 (UTC)MaybeNextTime
This discussion about Argument From Free Will is specifically about an omniscient being, often called “God” for the sake of simplicity. For the purpose of this discussion, the only relevant attribute is omniscience; any other discussions about whether God created the universe or whether the universe is deterministic are totally irrelevant and tangential to the discussion. You are posing other arguments which, frankly, should be discussed in other places. But I will say this: It has been argued that just because you know what will happen, that does not mean that you caused that event to happen.
So please, for future discussions, think of God as “that omniscient being who knows everything,” not “God who created the universe forever and ever Amen.” It will make discussions a lot simpler, and much more relevant. 17.201.38.216 19:12, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

proper place

That was an issue I though about too, I didn't agree with the "proof" but it is what it is. The best place is to put it in the criticisms portion as you did. I like how you simplified it into a more mathematical looking proof to enhance its understandability (is that a word?).

Why the change?

I'm not sure why the previous mathematical-like proof was changed. I prefered the previous version as it seemed to be much clearer in describing the refutation of AFFW. Also I'm wondering why it was moved up from the bottom of the page to above the "timeless" argument?

Added counter

I went ahead and added the counter argument to the AFFW counter argument of "timelessness". Although I believe the statment can apply to both lines of thought presented. The statement added was: "God’s knowledge is a result of the free-will agent's choice, not the cause of it, and therefore no contradiction exists (whether God is temporal or atemporal)." Which I basically took from the other poster on here, and slightly modified. I tried to just state the counter-argument itself and to keep it NPOV, please let me know if it appears to slant either direction and I will try to modify.

For the nameless poster, do you still have a copy of your original post using the mathematical-style proof? I would like to get a copy of the original as I think it was more elegant than the current version. But perhaps the current version is necessary to keep it from appearing anti-NPOV?

You should be able to look at the page history to find the previous version. Yes, I changed it to make it more NPOV, and just to clarify it a bit. Oh, and I also moved it up above the timelessness argument because I think a more rigorous proof should be a little higher priority. I think the timelessness one is worded a little weakly. 75.18.166.193 05:49, 9 October 2006 (UTC)

What do you think 'necessary' means? Or 'must' for that matter? It's completely arbitrary what you define as 'must-have-been' or 'could-be-otherwise'. Terms like 'must', 'can', 'want', 'responsible', 'free' are all metaphysical. They base upon drawing a border line between man's "interior" and "external world", but this border is very arbitrary: which means different people will treat these things differently, and actually they will let others use such terms interchangeably.

Reason for removal of "Another version of the argument"

As I noted in the edit notes, I removed the section titled "Another version of the argument" because it was redundant, made unnecessary assumptions, and made the same logical errors as the original argument. Simply restating those points does not somehow "re-prove" them. For the sake of clarity, I will explain what flaws I found in the section.

"Assume the existence of omnipotent, omniscient God."

The original argument relates to whether or not omniscience is compatible with free will; omnipotence is not a part of the argument, and in fact was not present on the page until you added it here. Omnipotence is an unnecessary additional component, and does not belong in the argument.

"By the definition of choice, our choices depend on the available possibilities, and the latter are the part of how the world is organized."

Correct. Of course, that is no way implies that we only have one choice if the world is organized a certain way; it just means that our range of choices varies.

"This means that for each possible universe there is a 'destiny', which people just follow."

That is called "assuming your conclusion." In a roundabout way, you basically say that people don’t have free will, because their choices depend on how the world is organized. So you haven’t really proven that omniscience precludes free will; you’ve just stated that people don’t have free will because they have a "destiny" based on the way the world is organized. You’re basically saying that the universe is deterministic, which might be a good argument, but it says nothing about free will. (In fact, the world could be deterministic even in the absence of an omniscient God.)

And then you go on to make some tangential (and very strange) points, such as:

"simpliest example: if men were constructed like women, which we know commit very few crimes"

In short, your version is redundant and does nothing to further the original article.

17.201.38.216 01:04, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

Talk Format

Just a reminder to people adding comments to the Talk page (e.g. MaybeNextTime): If you are going to respond to someone's comment, please put your comments AFTER their complete comments, not in the middle of them. Specifically, in the "Logical Flaws?" section, MaybeNextTime added a response right in the middle of my response, instead of at the end of mine. By doing this, it makes it looks like I did not sign my original response, and it breaks my comment up into two separate parts which are supposed to go together. I will be moving your comment out of the middle of mine, and somewhere where it does not interrupt my response.

Also, please sign all comments. It looks like you responded in several places, but did not sign all of them. And just typing a name is not signing it; you need to either have an account, or use your IP address. Either way, four tildes at the end of your comment will sign it. 75.30.224.102 07:04, 20 December 2006 (UTC)

Contradiction Between Modal Logic and AFFW

In response to the section about modal logic disproving AFFW, a paragraph was added saying that it might be possible that modal logic is invalid in the presence of omniscience. Since this paragraph is basically presented as a question for discussion rather than an argument, I think it should be discussed here before any conclusions are added to the main page.

Here is the paragraph in question, and my comments on it:

“If there is a contradiction between modal logic and AFFW, however, that is not sufficient to invalidate AFFW. It is also possible that the contradiction is due to the invalidity of one or more of the premises of model logic itself in the presence of omniscience.”

If modal logic is invalid in the presence of omniscience, then that argument should be presented here. However, the argument that follows suffers from the same flaws as AFFW, and is basically a circular proof of AFFW.

“For example, it can be argued that the existence of omniscence renders every statement as either necessarily true or necessarily false.”

It could be argued, but that argument would be wrong. By definition, a proposition is necessarily true if it is true in all possible circumstances and all possible worlds. If you were to argue that the existence of omniscience makes every statement either necessarily true or necessarily false, then you would be assuming the conclusion of AFFW. So basically, your argument to disprove modal logic is as follows:

1. AFFW is contradicted by modal logic. 2. AFFW is true. 3. Therefore, modal logic is invalid when applied to AFFW.

“Using the example from above, if God knows that a person has two brothers, in what sense is it possible for the person to have three brothers?”

It is possible in the sense that it is logically conceivable for that person, in some alternate circumstance, to have had three brothers. This argument isn’t limited to omniscience; for years, philosophers have made logical argument that say, “If person A knows that X is true, then X is necessarily true.” And again, that argument is flawed, because it commits a modal fallacy. Saying “If God knows X is true, then X is necessarily true” violated modal logic, as does, “If a person knows X is true, then X is necessarily true,” or, “If X is true, then X is necessarily true.” They all violate modal logic.

“In order to use modal logic to disprove AFFW, it would be necessary to first prove that modal logic was valid in the presence of omniscience.”

No. If you want to claim that modal logic does not disprove AFFW, then you must first prove that modal logic is invalid in the presence of omniscience. As far as I know, logic (modal or otherwise) has not been proven to be invalid under any circumstances, but you are welcome to try. And please, present that argument here for discussion first, instead of posting it on the main page as if it had been proven.17.201.38.216 01:38, 12 January 2007 (UTC)

“If God knows X is true, then X is necessarily true” does indeed violate modal logic, but:
  • God is omniscient.
  • If an omniscient being knows that X is true then X is necessarily true,

does not. 83.27.13.45 16:53, 15 January 2007 (UTC)MaybeNextTime

The second statement is equivalent to the “If God knows…” statement, and yes, it does violate modal logic. If an omniscient being knows that X is true, that does not make X necessarily true; similarly, if I know that X is true (say, because I observed it), that also does not make it necessarily true. There is a specific logical difference between:
“It is necessary that (if an omniscient being knows that X is true, then X is true)”
and
“If an omniscient being knows that X is true, then X is necessarily true.”
The two statements are not logically equivalent. That is where the modal fallacy comes in: The relationship between the two statements (God knows X is true; X is true) is necessary, but the truth value of the second (X is true) is not. 17.201.38.216 19:05, 15 January 2007 (UTC)

Criticisms, Determinism, and Perfect Predictability

The additions at the beginning of Criticisms are out of place. The argument from free will has nothing to do with determinism, or even perfect predictability. By adding that argument in, you make it seem like determinism is a requirement for omniscience, and since determinism implies a lack of free will, that is used to imply that omniscience implies a lack of free will. However, omniscience can not be assumed to require determinism. You should discuss proposed changes here, before continuing in this revert war.24.6.226.213 03:04, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

If we're going to summarise the argument it should at least be logically valid

If we're going to summarise the argument it should at least be logically valid! Of the "original" one (actully with one of my slight amendments) which went: 

  1. By definition, if someone has free will, then at some point in time they are able either choose to do a certain thing or choose not to do it.
  2. By the definition of omniscience, an omniscient God knows all of the choices any being (including God) will make at any future point in time.
  3. By the definitions of "knowledge" and "choice", if A knows for certain what choice B will make in the future, B will not be able to make a different choice.
  4. Therefore either no one has free will, or no one is omniscient.

(1) I agree with but is not so on some definitions of freewill (2) I don't think any contemporary philosopher who seriously asserts the omniscience of God would agree with this implicit definition of omniscience. You might as well argue "an omnipotent God can do things that are logically impossible, nothing can do things that are logically impossibe, therefore God does not exist" (3) Which definitions of "knowledge" and "choice" has the author in mind. "The definition of knowledge" is one of the deepest problems in Philosophy, and of Choice is not much simpler! and even granting, for a moment, these three premises, (4) simply does not follow unless you also can show "if A knows what choice B will make in the future then A knows for certain what choice B will make in the future" which is highly debatable and certainly not true IRL. For example, I know that someone will read this post and post a comment disagreeing with it, but I certainly don't know this for certain NBeale 21:11, 28 January 2007 (UTC)

No, the summary of the argument does not need to be logically valid; it just has to be an accurate summary of the argument from free will, which may or may not have logical flaws. If there are flaws in that argument, then they will be pointed out in the Criticisms section. If you make changes to the argument to make it (as you see it) more logically valid, then this article is no longer about the argument from free will; It is now about your own attempted revision of the argument. So let’s take your corrections one by one:
“On some definitions…”: By the definition of free will, a person can choose one of a multitude of options at any point in time. I don’t know of any definition of free will that does not include a free choice of action, and if there is one, then it is not relevant to this argument. When you make a statement that says, “By definition…,” it is clear that we are only talking about definitions that match the statement being made. It is unnecessary to say, “On some definitions,” because those other definitions are not applicable to this argument.
Omniscience: There may very well be definitions of omniscience where the omniscient being in question does not know the actions of other individuals. However, those definitions are irrelevant to this argument. For the purposes of the argument from free will, an omniscient being knows what actions an individual will perform in the future. This definition of omniscience is at least commonly understood by modern philosophers, and is in fact believed by many religions, which is why the argument from free will uses it to disprove omniscience or free will.
Knowledge and choice: Yes, I know that the third premise is poorly worded and seems somewhat vague. However, that is the third premise in the argument from free will. You can choose to reword it, but if you think the premise itself is logically incorrect, that should be noted in the Criticisms section, not by correcting the original premise itself. When you change the premise, then this article is no longer about the argument from free will.
“For certain”: Logically, there is no need to differentiate between knowing something and knowing it “for certain.” If you know something is true, then by definition, you know it for certain. You may believe that someone will post a comment disagreeing with yours, but you don’t KNOW it. You hold a strong belief, and that belief may in fact be correct. However, since you are not omniscient, you can not know for certain what will happen in the future. That is the entire crux of the argument, and by changing the phrasing, you are changing the argument.
“An argument which assumes (not B)…”: You have posted this and reposted it again and again, and I still don’t know what you mean. What “not B” is assumed, and what “not (A and B)” is trying to be proven? Perhaps instead of stating these vague “this proves nothing” statements, you should just state explicitly what A and B are in this case.
I will revert the argument from free will back to something close to the original. Again, if you find logical flaws in the argument, then note them in the Criticisms section. Correcting them in the argument would be like correcting the statement, “Columbus believed he could sail around the world to India,” because Columbus’ belief turned out to be incorrect. Wrong or right, that is the belief he held. And wrong or right, that is the argument from free will. 75.17.113.113 00:13, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
It would be a good idea to (a) study some philosophy (b) create a user ID and (c) provide some evidence or references for your remarkable (!) assertions. Then we could have a meaningful discussion. As a start, you might want to read the wikipedia articles on the concepts that you discuss (or better the Stanford Encyclopedia) and try to understand the definitions of the terms and the issues involved. NBeale 07:12, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
Thanks, I have studied plenty of philosophy. It doesn’t take a philosophy major to realize that if the argument is “If A and B, then C,” then when you change it to “sometimes A might be true, and sometimes B is true, so I guess C,” it becomes a completely different argument. In a nutshell, the argument from free will says that if omniscience exists, people can not have free will. It does not say “some definitions of omniscience kind of say this, and some people think that free will kind of means that.” When you make each of the premises “on some definitions,” you hamstring the entire argument.
As for evidence, why don’t you provide evidence that your “on some definitions” changes are a more accurate version of the original argument? The argument from free will has been around for quite a while; why do you think your changes somehow make it better?
And by the way, it is blatantly obvious that “maybe you should read some philosophy” is a poor substitute for actually addressing the points I made. Trying to sound like my arguments are somehow beneath you just makes you look like you’re avoiding an actual debate. I realize that the concepts discussed are controversial, but that doesn’t change the fact that the argument from free will is based on the definition of free will meaning that people has free choice of their actions, and of omniscience meaning that someone knows all future choices by individuals. When you change it to say, “On some definitions…” that is no longer the argument from free will. Perhaps you should start a new article on “NBeale’s Modified Argument from Free Will,” then you wouldn’t have to change the argument from free will (an argument that has been around for years) into something completely different.
I am reverting the article once again to the way it has been previously. If you would like to change it, then please address the points I have brought up first. And note that “please read some philosophy” is not a valid refutation of them. If I have read so little, and your arguments are so superior to mine, then you should be able to refute me with little effort. 75.17.113.113 09:53, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

"The original argument" is unsourced and probably OR. I think the whole article should be deleted unless there are some refs put up. as for addressing your points, it is hard to know where to begin.

  1. Omiscience - simply does not mean God knows X whether or not it is logically possible to know X. No theist or serious philosopher alleges this. Read the article on Omniscience
  2. The "compatabilist" view of free will is that you can have freewill even if your actions are deterministic. I think this view is profoundly mistaken - but if you do not know of it you really haven't studied the subject at all. Try reading the Free will article.
  3. The definition of "knowledge" and the relationship between "knowing" and "knowing for certain" are huge philosophical topics! If you haven't studied the issues at all it is hard to know where to begin. Surely you can see that "I know you will respond to this" and "I know for certain that you will respond to this" are different statements: the first is (in my case) true and the second false (you might be indisposed, loose interest, hit by a thunderbolt etc...)

Please get yourself wikipedia ID so that we can debate offline if necessary. it will also add to the credibility of your edits. NBeale 15:48, 29 January 2007 (UTC)

You’re right, it is hard to know where to begin. Wikipedia is improved by making improvements to articles, not by deleting articles that you feel are not sufficiently sourced. That said, I will try to dig up some sources and link them to the article.
As for the other points, again, you are putting unnecessary qualifications on the original argument. I agree that some of the premises of the argument are the subject of much debate; however, that does not mean that the argument itself should be changed to reflect this. As soon as you start qualifying each premise with “some definitions,” you completely ruin the entire argument, because you can not reach a logical, definitive conclusion based on premises that are not stated as true. In other words, the argument “If A and B, then C” is a valid form, but if you start with, “Some people believe that A, and others say that maybe B is true,” then you can not draw any conclusions from that, because you do not start with premises that are stated is true. So in that sense, all of your qualifications of the definitions of omniscience and free will, while pertinent to determining whether the argument is valid or not, should not be included in the argument itself.
And by the way, you did not know that I would respond to this topic. You may have had a strong belief that I would, and your belief has turned out to be true, but you did not KNOW it. Again, just because you think that there is a difference between “knows” and “knows for certain,” that does not mean that other people are similarly confused. You have to explain the difference between the two only because you are using “knows” where you should be using “believes” or “strongly believes.” From the article on epistemology:
“Knowledge is a distinct category of belief. If someone believes something, he or she thinks that it is the truth. Of course, it might turn out that he or she was mistaken, and that what was thought to be true was actually false. This is not the case with knowledge. For example, suppose that Jeff thinks that a particular bridge is safe, and attempts to cross it; unfortunately, the bridge collapses under his weight. We might say that Jeff believed that the bridge was safe, but that his belief was mistaken. We would not accurately say that he knew that the bridge was safe, because plainly it was not. For something to count as knowledge, it must actually be true.”
As for having a Wikipedia ID, I feel that my edits are credible whether I have an ID or not. 17.201.38.216 17:38, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
I can't see a way of having a sensible debate with you on this. In any case the whole article is unsourced WP:OR and should be adequately sourced or deleted. If you are going to make serious contributions to Wkikipedia please (a) study the topics a bit better and (b) get yourself and ID and log in. NBeale 22:45, 29 January 2007 (UTC)
No, we can’t have a sensible debate like this, because when I bring up a point, you respond with “It would be a good idea to study some philosophy,” or “please get yourself a Wikipedia ID,” or “I can’t see a way of having a sensible debate with you on this.” Note that none of these are adequate substitutes for actually responding to my arguments. You seem to be hung up on the fact that I am anonymous. Get over it. Respond to my statements directly, but don’t waste time with this “I can’t respond to you because you’re anonymous” nonsense.
As I already stated, I will do my best to provide sources for the article. However, the issue of the article being sourced is completely separate from your changes, which are not part of the original argument. It seems like you are fine with making unsourced changes to the argument, but once your changes are contested, you respond by marking the entire article for deletion.
And once again, studying the topics related to the argument from free will is relevant to a discussion about whether or not the argument is valid, but it is not relevant to changing the content of the argument itself. Debates about the relevant concepts do not change the argument, any more than modern scientific evidence changes the fact that astronomers used to believe that the Sun revolved around the Earth. New information or theories can change ideas about whether an argument is right or wrong (as already laid out in the Criticisms section), but they should not change the substance of the argument itself.
Since I am tired of the soft bias against anonymous edits, I will continue to work anonymously as much as possible. 17.201.38.216 00:23, 30 January 2007 (UTC)
If I know everything about somebody, then that person can't act freely anymore? On the small scale the argument seems nonsense, so I suppose on the large scale it must be nonsense as well. Or at least prove the argument on the small scale, before bothering God with your argument. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Syamsu (talk • contribs) 19:12, 18 February 2009 (UTC)

Argument From Free Will Has Been Changed

From the most recent edits, the argument from free will has been changed to “If an omniscient being exists, then individuals can not have free will” to “If an omniscient being exists, then he can not have free will; therefore, God does not exist.” To me, these seem like very different arguments. From most of the references I have seen (including Maimonides), the argument is stated in terms of omniscience (or specifically, foreknowledge) eliminating the possibility of free will in others, not in terms of omniscience proving the non-existence of God. If the new definition is more accurate, then I would like to see references to that effect. But from what I can tell, they are two different arguments, and I am not sure that the new version is more accurate. 17.201.38.216 17:28, 31 January 2007 (UTC)

This article is about a (supposed) argument for the non-existence of God. The only ref quoted that has such an "Argument from Freewill" is ref 1 which has the argument as stated. Obviously Maimonides firmly believd in God and was not making an argument against God's existence. The problem with the old article was that there were no refs so it was impossible to see what the notable argument was NBeale 07:40, 2 February 2007 (UTC)

I looked at ref 1, and it never says, “Argument from free will.” And from my understanding, the argument from free will has always been an argument that omniscience and free will are incompatible, whether the free-will agent is the omniscient being, or just people in general. By contrast, theological fatalism is the argument that if God exists, then free will does not exist.
Now that the article has been referenced, you can see that the majority of the references talk about omniscience and free will in general. Can we agree to change the article back to that argument, instead of the more specific version that is only listed in one reference? 17.201.38.216 18:27, 2 February 2007 (UTC)
Ref 1 says it is "the freewill argument for the non-existence of God". It is the only source that anyone has yet found that tries to make this argument. Unless we can find another notable published source for the more general argument that was originally in the article we can't include it here. Of course the other refs talk about freewill in general, because that is a well explored and philosophically interesting topic. This "argument" by contrast is so weak that even Richard Dawkins doesn't think it worth mentioning. NBeale 20:23, 2 February 2007 (UTC)
In the other references cited, they present the argument as showing that omniscience and free will are incompatible. So while they don’t specifically conclude the non-existence of God, it is implicit in the other arguments. Personally, I think that references are more credible if they say, “Here is a philosophical conundrum that has plagued philosophers for years, so let’s explore it logically,” and less credible if they say, “Here is the argument that conclusively proves the non-existence of God.” In the other references, some believe that the argument is sound, while others say it is not valid. Given that most sources refer to the more general form of the argument, I don’t see why the article should be tailored to the form that even you concede has only been found in one source. 17.201.38.216 21:46, 2 February 2007 (UTC)
The debates about the relationship between freewill and omniscience have been going at least since Aristotle but as far as I know no serious philosopher has considered these debates as arguments against the existence of God, and pretty much all the pariticpants in the debates were theists. Only this barely-notable Martin has suggested that it is an argument against the existence of God - everyone else thinks it is a discussion about time, knowlegde, freewill and omniscience. Unfortunately or fortunately this article is about the "argument" against the existence of God. Another article, about freewill and omniscience in general, would be quite interesting but a different article (actually there is a rather poor article on Theological fatalism). To get the "more general form" in we need a well-sourced notable commentator that makes it. We are not allowed, in Wikipedia, to make such a big generalisation in the article. NBeale 08:07, 3 February 2007 (UTC)

A Relevant Quote?

Karen Ownens:

Can omniscient God, who Knows the future, find The omnipotence to Change His future mind?

This refers to god's free will rather than human free will, but might be relevant.

Criticism of "Criticism of Point 4"

One criticism of the Argument from Free Will is that point 4 of the proof it simply assumes that foreknowledge and free will are incompatible. It uses circular logic to “prove” this, by simply stating that “a being that knows its choices in advance has no potential to avoid its choices.” Point 4 is therefore saying, in essence, “A being that knows its choices in advance has no free will, and therefore has no free will.” By assuming what it is trying to prove, that point undermines the entire argument.

Point 4 - unless I grossly misinterpreted it - implies no such thing, but rather this "refutal" seems outright false. Through metaphor, "a being that knows its choices in advance has no potential to avoid its choices" is like a train that must stay on its tracks and due to its nature cannot stray from them. On the other hand, "a being that knows its choices in advance has no free will, and therefore has no free will" would translate to a train stays on its tracks because it stays on its tracks, excluding the essence of the matter. Hence, I think this flimsy counter-argument should be modified or even removed.

--Soly 08:05, 12 October 2007 (UTC)

The problem with point 4 is that it assumes that something that is known to be true is necessarily true. If I may continue the train metaphor, it is basically saying that a being with foreknowledge is a train on a track, forced into a fixed set of choices, while those without foreknowledge are like cars, able to choose any path they wish. However, foreknowledge does not imply a track, which makes point 4 logically incorrect. 17.224.37.172 (talk) 18:04, 26 November 2007 (UTC)
But that's simply not true. There is no modal fallacy is Point 4, and any claim for the existence of such fallacy is simply a misinterpretation of point 4 or the entire Argument from Free Will. Foreknowledge does necessarily simply a track, and the so called "fallacy" lies only in the fact that instead of claiming that foreknowledge doesn't exist, the right conclusion is that either foreknowledge doesn't exist, or free will doesn't exist.
This, of course, has nothing do to with the argument Soly mentioned, although in the article they both are refereed to as being the same. And the original "argument from free will" never claimed any such thing. Its simply irrelevant. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 79.177.237.147 (talk) 15:20, 28 June 2008 (UTC)
But how could it be considered foreknowledge if it isn't "on a track"? What you're going for, it seems, is to portray foreknowledge moreso as mere foreshadowing or a prediction. From what I can gather, the basis of all of the criticisms seems to boil down to the fair flexibility of the term "knowledge," which is, of course, just philosophical. One definition I see is "recognition of cause and effect," I also see "awareness" and "the circumstance of apprehending truth." Surely this should be mentioned in the criticism section, since all of them take liberties with the word?98.168.192.162 (talk) 16:12, 9 November 2009 (UTC)

WikiProject class rating

This article was automatically assessed because at least one WikiProject had rated the article as start, and the rating on other projects was brought up to start class. BetacommandBot 03:46, 10 November 2007 (UTC)

POV tag

This is about tag cleanup. As all of the tags are more than a year old, there is no current discussion relating to them, and there is a great deal of editing done since the tags were placed, or perhaps there is a consensus on the discussion page, they will be removed. This is not a judgement of content. If there is cause to re-tag, then that of course may be done, with the necessary posting of a discussion as to why, and what improvements could be made. This is only an effort to clean out old tags, and permit them to be updated with current issues if warranted.

That's my usual pasted statement. In this case I won't presume to remove the tag. I see no evidence of a POV dispute in the discussion page, though. I would suggest that if that is so, and editors have consensus regarding it, then remove the tag. Many tags are old, arbitrary to begin with, and just plain defunct.Jjdon (talk) 21:58, 30 April 2008 (UTC)

Criticism of Point 4 "unbalanced"

While the entire article has already been tagged as "POV", and I can only recommend to keep this healthy warning for the readers, I have decided to add a further "Unbalanced" warning at the top of the section Criticism of Point 4.

Here the article not only cites, but entirely relies (and is uncritically dependent) on the unbalanced POV of Prof. Norman Swartz, as though this was objective and undisputed. See in particular the following texts (cited in the References):

Personally, I consider the arguments of Prof. Norman Swartz pure sophistry, in particular his use and abuse of the s.c. "Modal Fallacy" in trying (IMHO with a sleight of hand) to disprove the validity of the statement by Moses Maimonides:

"Does God know or does He not know that a certain individual will be good or bad? If thou sayest 'He knows', then it necessarily follows that [that] man is compelled to act as God knew beforehand he would act, otherwise God's knowledge would be imperfect." -- The Eight Chapters of Maimonides on Ethics (Semonah Perak.im), edited, annotated, and translated with an Introduction by Joseph I. Gorfinkle, pp. 99-100. (New York: AMS Press), 1966.

I recommend therefore that:

  • The Argument For Free Will (AFFW) be presented for what it is: NOT a "proof" of the argument against the existence of an omniscient God, BUT only an argument for the incompatibility between, on one side, the full exercise by God of His Omniscience (Foreknowledge), and, on the other side, of human genuine free will.
  • The AFFW be not simply presented, but actually detailed, giving at least equal space to the "pros" as it is given to the "cons". At present the situation is totally unbalanced in favour of the criticism of the AFFW.

Miguel de Servet (talk) 10:24, 18 June 2008 (UTC)

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