Talk:1999 Russian apartment bombings/Archive 7

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Biased article

This article is very biased, because it tells the conspiracy theories as the "truth." It is totally unbelievable that Wikipedia allows this article to be written by terrorist fans, who wish to whitewash them of all their crimes. Shame on you! This article is a disgrace of the memory of the victims! VictimsWife (talk) 02:49, 30 March 2010 (UTC)

Thanks. An user Offliner spent more than a year trying to not let the conspiracy theory being viewed as "truth". A few months ago he was banned from editing Wikipedia for unknown reasons. I think it was related.

P.S. Those who you are addressing do not believe in such thing as "shame". Be sure, they won't reply you now. They will just let it pass. ellol (talk) 14:13, 31 March 2010 (UTC)

Wikipedia is not supposed to take sides even if on one side you have terrorists and on the other you have saints. I cannot speak for Wikipedia as a whole, but my personal philosophy is that we seek the truth and we report sourced material even if it turns out that the saints are the real killers.

Also I understand that you may have a strong emotional attachment to the victims, but ultimately they are dead and they were killed by terrorists. Whether those terrorists were Chechen or FSB agents will not change the fact that they are dead, though it ought to bring some sense of justice to those who knew the victims. Theshibboleth (talk) 08:05, 22 May 2012 (UTC)

Who's been deleting info?

Previously this article had accounts of a member of the Duma referring to attacks in a Russian city before they had actually occurred. In addition there were accounts from the military calling into question whether this might have been a high-level military or FSB operation. Theshibboleth (talk) 08:01, 22 May 2012 (UTC)

Some of the materials regarding the conspiracy theory were removed because none of the more reliable sources (especially academic ones) take them seriously. Nanobear (talk) 08:35, 22 May 2012 (UTC)

Zhirinovsky Duma request about Volgodonsk bombings

Why there is nothing about this? Zhirinovsky Duma request about Volgodonsk bombings? It is very important, as well as other evidences in respective films about those events. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfQBM2z2a5A — Preceding unsigned comment added by Constantinehuk (talk • contribs) 00:53, 9 October 2014 (UTC)

Recent changes

I did not edit this page for a long time; now quickly looked and fixed the intro. Any comments and criticism are welcome. My very best wishes (talk) 02:43, 22 December 2014 (UTC)

what can be done with this page?

This wiki is a real mess. I understand its a controversial issue but the wiki is full of citations that have dead links, refer to other material, aren't relevant, and other issues. The wiki text itself has conflicting information and seems to have had too much bias injected from both sides to be salvageable. Is it possible to basically delete a wiki and restart it from scratch? I mean this wiki doesn't tell anyone anything definitive or useful, other controversial wikis seem to at least be able to separate view A and B better, this is so muddled and excessively long and repetitive. Can we do anything here to 'reboot' this? — Preceding unsigned comment added by Tunafizzle (talk • contribs)

Thanks for correcting the text. Why did the mention of Richard Sakwa's books go? --ilgiz (talk) 09:34, 31 January 2015 (UTC)

If I remember correctly, I tried to go through alot of Sakwa's work to verify that he was indeed in the "Russia didn't do it" side of the arguement and I could only find evidence to the contrary, that Sakwa suggested that Russia may have been involved. The orginal ref that someone had included completely took his words out of context to suggest Sakwa was on the "Russia didn't do it" side when all Sakwa was doing was mentioning the events themselves...Again, I would hesitate to put Sakwa in the "Russia did it side" though, at least a firm believer. His work, from what I could find suggested a leaning toward "russia did it" but, again, it was just passing mention that russia could have done it more than "russia did it because X Y and Z". Sorry it took me so long to respond, if you have more questions about it I can look back in the edit history to refresh my memory.

Tunafizzle (talk) 03:25, 14 April 2015 (UTC)

Name dropping in the lead

I don't know if there's a specific policy or something, but we can't just name drop like six or seven people in a row without actually saying anything about them. In other words, some kind of mention of their occupation or credentials to either assert or deny that it was a conspiracy. the reader shouldn't have to click through the article to find out more info about the person. So, like the last sentence features an academic, a "senior analyst" and a "research fellow" but their importance to their authority on these apartment bombings is (very) unclear. Can someone put in some work on this. hbdragon88 (talk) 04:33, 23 August 2015 (UTC)

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Tkachenko's Claims

The section regarding Yury Tkachenko and the analysis device is bizarre, contradictory and unhelpful. First, according to David Satter, he declares that the bomb found at Ryazan had to be the real thing. Then, according to a Russian publication, he reverses himself and announces that he never used the gas analyser, and that the bomb "would not have been able to detonate." Can any of this be substantiated? It's a minor point, but one worth fixing.

GeneralizationsAreBad (talk) 23:20, 17 April 2015 (UTC)

Quite possibly 'he changed his mind', just as the director of the Ryazan FSB also did, because 'he was leant on'. The accusation that he incorrectly used the explosives detector by washing it with water are nonesense. You would never wash such a detector or any gas analyser with water!

RAB3L (talk) 13:47, 22 November 2015 (UTC)

Doubt

The incident was declared to be a training exercise. -- training for whom? declared by who? --Anee jose (talk) 04:33, 17 October 2015 (UTC)

Declared an exercise by the then Director of the FSB, Patrushev but only after two or three FSB agents had been arrested. During the preceding 37 hours from the time when the bomb was discovered to the time of the arrests, Patrushev was apparently 'unaware' that an 'exercise' was taking place! The Prime Minister, one Vladimir Putin, who had been Director of the FSB a few weeks earlier was also similarly 'unaware' and had played along with the Chechen terrorist theory. The Interior Ministry and Ryazan FSB were also unaware of any exercise which means that any such exercise would have been illegal anyway. The use of live ammunition is strictly prohibited in exercises but the local security services had clearly been carrying live ammumition during those 37 hours.

--RAB3L (talk) 03:43, 23 November 2015 (UTC)

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Conspiracy theory?

The tone of this article sounds remarkably like one about 9/11 conspiracy theories, but without the "conspiracy theory" mentioned. They clearly ARE though. Whether they are likely or not is irrelevant; they are theories. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 19:07, 4 May 2016 (UTC)

So where is your proof that the bombings were carried out by Chechens? Or maybe that is what you mean by a "conspiracy theory"? Actually there is not one single Chechen among those accused by the FSB - not one! Trepashkin proved beyond any reasonable doubt that Gochiyaev was set up by the FSB, one of the possible culprits. Gochiyaev even gave the location of at least two caches of explosives to the authorities - not exactly the actions of a terrorist! He did so by mobile phone, an action that could easily be verified. What makes you think that his fellow accused weren't also set up? The two trials at which they were convicted were both held in secret.

Are you aware that FSB personnel (Maxim Lazovosky amongst them) were convicted of terrorist acts in Moscow prior to the first Chechen War by Moscow courts and spent time in jail? Lazovsky (or his double) was eventually shot with a sniper's rifle prior to another court appearance after being freed.

Perhaps the Wahhabi's were responsible? But according to Zakayev, the Wahhabis (who all spoke fluent Russian) were funded by the Russians and made their way to Chechnya via Moscow (using Russian visas), something that could not have gone unnoticed by the FSB! Also the bombings occurred much too soon after the War in Dagestan for the invasion to provide an explanation. Also, as commented by Dmitry Furman, what possible motive would the Wahhabis have had (unless working for the Russians)?

The reason for the so-called conspiracy theories is that the Russian government never allowed a full investigation of the bombings. Instead of a thorough investigation as occurred with 9/11, the debris in Moscow was bulldozed away in a few days. Incidentally, not one single person who worked for the state in any capacity was killed by the bombings.

Do you believe the story about the so-called exercise in Ryazan? Had it been an exercise, countless laws would have been broken and either the career of Putin or Patrushev (or both) would have ended. How do you account for the 36 hour delay between the bomb being found and Patrushev's claim of an exercise (at about the same time that the Interior Minister Rushailo was still making statements about terrorists)? Such an occurrence in a democratic country would bring down the government. The Duma classified the events in Ryazan for 70 years. Why would they have done this if it was just an exercise? This in itself was also an illegal act as it is illegal in Russia to classify a crime.

Frankly your rather shallow statement above suggests a lack of knowledge and understanding of the subject. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 17:05, 8 May 2016

If you cannot find any mention of conspiracy theories in the article just use [CTRL]+[F}. Removed. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 17:05, 29 May 2016

Likewise the two other POV's were added without comment in the talk section, one anonymously. Removed. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 17:05, 29 May 2016

You introduce a lot of long citations. This is not good. Some of them may be viewed even as copyright violations. We suppose to only briefly summarize what sources tell. The shorter the better. My very best wishes (talk) 11:35, 26 June 2016 (UTC)

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Girkin and Zhirinovsky here

Composite pictures of persons, wanted for this crime. Do not you see similarities to Bosnia/Crimea/Donbass terrorist Girkin and his girlfriend Shkoda? http://fakeoff.org/image/resize/900/0/57/a8/57a85fa2555dd71abd98ee08.jpg http://static.uainfo.org/uploads/posts/2014-07/1406375027_snimok-494.png https://v1.std3.ru/55/92/1465321308-5592fcb973096229ac1a81eb159f13ff.jpeg https://v1.std3.ru/68/2f/1465321298-682f46eb80217ca2e93ab0b36b8c95c0.jpeg http://fakeoff.org/politics/top-5-velichayshikh-del-vvputina http://ermalex76.livejournal.com/171331.html https://historyporn.dirty.ru/vzorvannyi-zhiloi-dom-na-ulitse-gurianova-v-moskve-posle-terroristicheskogo-akta-9-sentiabria-1999-goda-rossiia-1101469/#17686417

Duma speaker said "Volgodonsk bombings" before they were made. Deputy of Duma Zhirinovsky requested "Why?". He was denied his right to speak: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfQBM2z2a5A

Why there is nothing about this? It is very important, as well as other evidences in respective films about those events. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Constantinehuk (talk • contribs) 12:16, 2 February 2017 (UTC)

How to protect an article from government intervention (censorship or obfuscation)?

Seems quite obvious that this article has been deliberately obfuscated, and based on data I've acquired from more secure channels (compared to Wikipedia), the reason is obvious. Unless Wikipedia has mechanisms to protect against state-sponsored obfuscation, I see no reason to worry about it. This comment is actually a request for information about how Wikipedia does prevent such interference, if there are any mechanisms in place. (It is also a cautionary annotation that might help some people who find the article confusing because it (presumably) remains obfuscated.) Shanen (talk) 00:21, 21 February 2017 (UTC)

Short answer: there isn't. Except banning sockpuppets and carefully watching edits from users or IPs with either almost no edits or only edits in certain highly specific subjects. But I wouldn't say this one's particularly bad. It always takes a while before any true false flag is actually admitted and verified as one. Then it takes longer for it to be generally known since people don't care anymore. Anyhow, this is directly related to Putin so it's gonna get a lot of heat from both sides as long as he's in power. Don't need government meddling for such a thing to be controversial when most sources on it already are. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 22:19, 3 April 2017 (UTC)

Putin as KGB director?

The article states that Putin served as the director of the KGB, without a reference. Putin's Wikipedia page mention him as the director of the FSB instead; I presume that might be a typo? Andraas (talk) 00:07, 23 February 2017 (UTC)

True, he was in the KGB but never a director, while he was an FSB director. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 22:21, 3 April 2017 (UTC)

Holy hell

In its history I just noticed the sheer ownership User:RAB3L has been holding over this article. Synthesis, OR, editorializing, tone, hidden conclusions, this is entirely inappropriate behaviour. The conspiracy rant and personal attack above suggest the user wants to right great wrongs. This will need some work. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 17:34, 26 June 2016 (UTC)

No examples given of your complaints so how am I supposed to rectify? Synthesis, editorializing, tone, hidden conclusions (whatever that is!), this is just code for disagreement with what I have written. But if you had read the references I have given I don't think you would find a conflict between what is written and the reference. If you do, I'll correct/modify it. There are many aspects of this article that I disagree with but I don't do what you have done. For instance the almost certain lie that Gochiyaev was a lynchpin for the attacks. Gochiyaev used the name of his own company (Kapstroy 2000) to rent the basements in Moscow. He also warned the authorities of two locations where exposive "sugar" was stored, using his mobile phone. Hardly the acts of a hardened terrorist! Since Trepaskhin knew the phone number, this could have been easily checked but according to Trepashkin, the FSB aren't even interested in finding him. Trepashkin, with Blumenfeld's assistance also proved beyond reasonable doubt that Gochiyaev had been set up by Romanov. As someone with known pro-Wahhabi ideas, Gochiyaev was an ideal candidate. But all this was part of the story so how can I object to its inclusion? If you have strong objections to something, I will correct/modify/remove if your objection is warranted but you have specify exactly your point, otherwise how can a contributor respond to your complaint? Also please explain what you mean by hidden conclusions? RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 12:57:05, 27 June 2016

I'm not in the mood for enormous discussions about content. Fact is that you have edited this article tremendously while inserting a very clear bias which you here make clear (that Putin did it or whatever). Great. Just don't use Wikipedia as your own soapbox. You're asserting fringe views as if they are fact. I also notice that nearly all of your edits are to this article. Have you read WP:SPA? And furthermore, do you have another account? Because it sure is suspicious that in all that time you only edit to this article. You might need to be checkuser'd. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 13:23, 27 June 2016 (UTC)

Also, you were previously warned thrice about this article on your talk page. So it's hard to assume good faith. Bataaf van Oranje (Prinsgezinde) (talk) 13:25, 27 June 2016 (UTC)

No, I certainly don't have another account. How can you justify such an accusation? You need to do a little more research if you are accusing me of only editing this article. I think you will find that my edits fairly reflect my references. If not please specify. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 14:42:05, 27 June 2016

Yes, I did receive three messages concerning my edits but I wouldn't exactly describe them as warnings. They were mainly due to inexperience in editing Wikipedia. As for fringe views, would you describe the writings of Dunlop, Satter etc as fringe views? Would you describe the opinion of Andrei Illarianov, an economic adviser to Putin until 2005, on the bombings as a fringe view? Do you think he might know a little more than you about the bombings? I would describe fringe views as those based on trials held in secret and statements from the FSB. Your apparent lack of interest in detail does make me suspicious. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 15:45:05, 27 June 2016

You have done nothing to sustain these tags (no details etc) so I believe I am justified in removing them. Are you sure that you don't have a COI here? Interest in Edward Lucas as well. Oranje? Prinzgezinde (gezinde: national unity government)? PVV? PVV has close links to FN, funded by Putin along with other right-wing (and left-wing) anti-EU parties. PVV funding? Quid pro quo? RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 11:35:05, 4 July 2016

Please do not use very long quotations; briefly summarize what these sources tell. My very best wishes (talk) 13:47, 28 June 2016 (UTC)

Fair comment. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 17:52:05, 28 June 2016

I think your edits are well sourced and on the subject, but the claims should be summarized better, partly rewritten, partly be moved to other pages we have to reduce content overlap, etc. My very best wishes (talk) 19:00, 29 June 2016 (UTC)

Point taken. RAB3L (User talk:RAB3L) 13:05:05, 2 July 2016

I have to agree with Prinsgezinde's analysis. This article in it's current state is over the top non-critical embrace of conspiracy theory and it makes Wikipedia look like kooks. Imagine if the theory that 9/11 was an inside job consisted of the vast majority of the article, with reels and reels of rantings about the "fall of building 7"?

The figures who have promoted this theory all have incredibly dubious links or a vested interest in forwarding their claims, almost all of them are connected to Russian oligarchs who fell foul of Putin and fled either to the US, Britain or the EU. David Satter, a fellow of the Hudson Institute (a partisan American neoconservative think tank), the sour-grapes network of Berezovsky the most high profile oligarch who fell out with the Russian government, lunatics like Yuri Felshtinsky who thinks every politician who ever died in Russia was poisoned by the security services (including Vladimir Lenin!). Even the television network which first promoted the conspiracy theory, NTV, was owned by Vladimir Gusinsky, a tri-citizen media oligarch who was hostile to Putin succeeding Yeltsin.

These conspiracy theories should be mentioned in one section of the article and potentially given their own article, since they are notable to due the prominent people espousing them, but the majority of the article should not be dedicated to the conspiracy theory. The mainstream view (and not just the Russian government view) is that this was connected to Ibn al-Khattab and the "Liberation Army of Dagestan". Claíomh Solais (talk) 22:50, 3 April 2017 (UTC)

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Clinton's speeches in the aftermath of bombings

The U.S. officialdom was pretty much unqeuivocal in its reaction to the Russian apartment bombings. The official stance was epitomized in two speeches by Bill Clinton:

Statement on the Terrorist Attacks in Russia (September 17, 1999)

On behalf of the American people, I want to extend our deepest condolences to the families of victims of recent bombings in Russia. Our thoughs and prayers are with the loved ones of the nearly 300 people whose lives were tragically lost.
The American people share the world's outrage over these cowardly acts. These attacks were aimed not just at innocent people across Russia; they also targeted fundamental human rights and democratic values, which are cherished by Russia and other members of the international community. We must not allow terrorists to achieve their underlying objective, which is to undermine democratic institutions and individual freedoms.
People across Russia who have been affected by these attacks are now beginning the hard task of rebuilding their lives. Their courage and resilience sets an exmple for all of us. President Yeltsin and Prime Minister Putin have also made important appeals to their countrymen that these attacks should not lead to new incidents of intolerance or bigotry and that the public should remain calm and unified in response.
In the days and weeks ahead, we will intensify our cooperation with Russian authorities to help prevent terrorist acts. The struggle against terrorism in a long and difficult road, but we must not lose our resolve. America stands ready to work with Russia to protect our citizens from this common threat.
— Bill Clinton, "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999"

Radio Remarks on Terrorist Attacks in Russia (September 18, 1999)

On behalf of the American people, I want to extend our deepest condolences to the families and friends of those who lost their lives in the recent terrorist bombings in Russia. We share your outrage over these cowardly acts. We know what kind of pain such tragedies can cause. Our own citizens have suffered from repeated acts of terrorism.
Not very long ago, a terrorist bombing took the lives of more than 160 Americans in our State of Oklahoma. The World Trade Center in New York City was bombed. Last year bombings at our Embassies in east Africa took the lives of American diplomats, along with hundreds of Kenyans and Tanzanians.
The crimes they suffered remind us that terrorism knows no borders, and that acts of terror anywhere are a threat to humanity everywhere. While we stand united with you in our grief, we also stand united with you in our resolve that terrorism will not go unpunished and will not undermine the work of democracy.
The United States in ready to work with Russia and the Russian people to stand against the scourge of terrorism. We are working with the allies elsewhere to make sure there is no safe haven for terrorists, and we want to work with Russia to isolate nations that support terror. Together, we can ensure that the future belongs to peacemakers not bomb throwers.
In the days ahead, our thoughts and our prayers will be with you as you work to rebuild from these terrible tragedies.
— Bill Clinton, "Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1999"

Document hippo (talk) 21:52, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

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Views of the conspiracy theory in history textbooks

Gregory Freeze

A relevant excerpt from Beinfield Professor of History Gregory Freeze's text "Russia: A History":

The End of the Yeltsin Era
Boris Yeltsin's final months in office could hardly have been more tumultuous. After a band of Chechen commandos invaded the neighbouring Russian republic of Dagestan and inflicted heavy casualties, Yeltsin summarily dismissed the current prime minister Sergei Stepashin and appointed a virtual unknown, Vladimir Putin—the fifth prime minister in two years. Putin came from the former KGB, where he had served as an intelligence officer in East Germany, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, before resigning amidst the abortive coup of August 1991 ('As soon as the coup began, I immediately decided which side I was on') and joining the anti-coup forces led by Leningrad mayor Anatolii Sobchak. Putin subsequently became a top aide to Sobchak, with the specific charge of attracting foreign investment. After Sobchak lost re-election as mayor in 1996, Putin moved to Moscow to serve as an assistant to Pavel Borodin, a Yeltsin aide responsible for managing Kremlin properties. Putin quickly climbed the Kremlin hierarchy, appointed first as deputy chief of staff for relations with the subordinate regions (March 1997), next as director of the secret policy, the FSB (July 1998), and finally as the head of the Security Council (March 1999). In August the Chechnya crisis and Stepashin's dismissal catapulted Putin into the post of prime minister. Within a few weeks, after bombings (officially attributed to Chechen terrorists) in Moscow and other cities cost 310 lives, Putin persuaded Yeltsin to order federal forces to invade Chechnya and eradicate the source of the terrorism.
With Yeltsin's second and final term due to expire in July 2000, the Kremlin came to view Putin as a viable successor. Why Putin was chosen has been the subject of much speculation. The athletic 48-year-old Putin was certainly a striking contrast to the doddering, besotted, 69-year-old Yeltsin. Putin was articulate and well educated; he first received a degree in law, later earned a 'candidate' degree (Ph.D.) in economics, and had strong ties to influential liberal economists. His résumé glistened with experience: the service in Germany, Petersburg, and Moscow provided valuable preparation in critical areas of foreign and domestic policy. Putin also came across as a man of the people, willing—whether as cool calculation or a flash of temper—to use shocking vulgarities to make his point and an impression. He also acted like a president even before he became one: he wielded unprecedented authority as prime minister, playing a far more important and independent role in policy-making than had any of his predecessors. As Yeltsin looked for a successor, Putin's meteoric rise in popularity—from a Yeltsinesque 2 per cent approval rating in August 1999 to 50 per cent four months later—gave every reason to believe that Putin could prevail even in a hotly contested presidential election. Some of Yelstin's critics adduce an additional reason for choosing Putin: kompromat (compromising materials), including allegations that his government, not terrorists, perpetrated the bombings used to justify the invasion of Chechnya. This kompromat, they argue, guaranteed that as president Putin would not dare to turn against Yeltsin and the 'Family'.
While such accusations do not seem credible, they do highlight an important reason for Putin's skyrocketing popularity: the Chechen conflict enabled Putin to demonstrate his mettle in an all-out military campaign to establish Russian control over Chechnya and eradicate terrorism. Contemporary polls showed that the 'second' Chechen war elicited public support both for the campaign and the prime minister, whose decisive leadership promised a clear military victory. And the military campaign appeared to succeed: within months, after relentless artillery bombardment, Russian forces stormed the Chechen capital of Groznyi—from which they had been so ignominiously expelled earlier—and launched search-and-destroy operations against pockets of guerrilla resistance. Although Chechnya hardly became a model of tranquillity, Putin demonstrated a willingness to use massive force, on a far greater scale than in the first Chechen war, and these early victories propelled his approval rating ever higher.
All this provided a favourable background for the new Duma elections of 19 December 1999. This time the Kremlin was determined to ensure the election of a supportive Duma—in contrast to the hostile majorities that prevailed in the 1993 and 1995 elections. Within a month of Putin's appointment as prime minister, pro-Kremlin figures established a new party, 'Unity' (Edinstvo), to represent the regime in the election; it offered no specific programme other than to proclaim a commitment to the country's 'territorial integrity and national greatness'. Bankrolled by the oligarchs, bathed in favourable media coverage, and endorsed by a growing number of weathervane governors, the new party catapulted from nothing to win almost as many votes as the long-established Communist Party. Together with allied parties and independents, Unity headed a pro-government majority in the Duma and, given Putin's popularity (even among Communists), ensured a cooperative Duma—quite unlike what Yeltsin had had to endure.
In the flush of that electoral victory, Yeltsin used his new year's address on 31 December 1999 to drop a bombshell: he announced his resignation, effective immediately, with Prime Minister Putin (as the constitution stipulated) ascending to the office of acting president. Although Yeltsin rhetorically spoke of inaugurating a new millennium with a new president, the main purpose was to hasten the elections, which by law had to be held within three months of his resignation. Seeking to capitalize on Putin's popularity, perhaps fearful that it might fade by summer (especially if the country became mired in a protracted Chechen war), Yeltsin resigned early in order to ensure Putin's election. Putin immediately rewarded the former president: his first act was to guarantee immunity to Yeltsin and his immediate family from prosecution—a step widely regarded as a payback (if not precondition) for his early promotion.
With elections scheduled for 26 March 2000, Putin was the only real candidate. The few serious contenders, such as the former prime minister Evgenii Primakov and Moscow mayor Iurii Luzhkov, became the target of smear campaigns in oligarch-owned media and withdrew their candidacy. As in 1996, the nominally 'independent' media provided lavish coverage of Putin, from his everyday perorations to his bravado as co-pilot in a military jet flown to Chechnya six days before the election (a dramatic contrast to 'Tsar Boris'). Putin won a majority (53 per cent) in the first round and thus avoided a run-off such as Yeltsin had had to endure in 1996. Indeed, whereas Yeltsin barely edged out the communist Gennadii Ziuganov in the first round in 1996, Putin received nearly twice as many votes (39.7 million) as Ziuganov (21.9 million). Despite claims of vote-rigging, Putin was a clear winner; even if a run-off had been necessary, few doubt that he would have dealt Ziuganov a crushing defeat. Putin thus became president with both a cooperative Duma and a popular mandate; he had an unprecedented opportunity to embark on a new course and realize his vision of a new, more prosperous, and more powerful Russia.
— Gregory Freeze, "Russia: A History" (2009)

Document hippo (talk) 03:49, 8 June 2017 (UTC)

Paul Klebnikov

A quote from Paul Klebnikov's book "Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia" (pp. 304-306), which I think might be relevant for this article:

A week later, the French newspaper Le Figaro asked former Security Council chief Aleksandr Lebed if the Russian government had organized the terrorist attacks against its own citizens. "I am almost convinced of it," Lebed responded.
Lebed's pronouncement created a sensation—it was the first time a top Russian official had publicly voiced a suspicion that had merely been hinted at in the national press. Lebed's public relations staff later claimed that the general had been quoted out of context. Berezovsky flew to Krasnoyarsk, where Lebed was serving as governor, to talk to the maverick general. It is not known what the two discussed. But after Berezovsky's visit, Lebed fell silent; he remains conspicuously absent from the Russian political scene to this day.
Lebed's accusations were echoed several days later by Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, who stressed the tremendous boost the terrorist incidents and the subsequent war hysteria gave to the Kremlin clan's political hopes. "Chechnya [is] a testing ground for all these political games, a pawn in all these preelection maneuvers [in Moscow]," Maskhadov told me. "Today there is indeed the smell of war. We will probably have a big war here, a big conflagration. But the fault is wholly with the Russians. All this fundamentalism, extremism, and terrorism has been artificially created."
Maskhadov alternately blamed Berezovsky and the Russian "secret services" for the terrorist wave. The Chechen president did harbor an animus against Berezovsky, if only because of the tycoon's repeated support of the extremist elements in Chechnya at the expense of Maskhadov's own presidential authority. Moreover, now that he had been dragged into a new war with Russia, Maskhadov had an interest in demoralizing the Russian side by portraying the Kremlin as scheming behind the backs of Russian soldiers. Still, the allegation should be treated with respect—Maskhadov was an experienced observer of how Berezovsky and other members of the Yeltsin clan operated in Chechnya over the years.
It is hard to believe that Prime Minister Putin was behind the bombings. While it is true that the blast, more than any other event, ensured Putin's victory at the polls, there is nothing in the man's past to indicate that he would commit such a monstrous crime to gain power. On the contrary, Putin's past career betrays an unusual dedication to a fixed code of conduct (albeit an authoritatian one); there is nothing to suggest the bottomless cynicism necessary to massacre one's own people to promote one's career. If the explosions were organized by the Russians themselves, it is likely that they were the work of maverick members of Putin's camp. The new prime minister, after all, did not control all the levers of power in September 1999. He relied largely on the independent political bosses such as Berezovsky, acting for his benefit or in his name.
Some Russian newspapers speculated that Berezovsky may have been behind the bombings. If Berezovsky had arranged the September blasts, the crime would bind Putin to him forever. Even if Putin had known who was behind the explosions, he would not have been able to say anything at the time. The new prime minister was just finding his bearings in the Kremlin; a shattering revelation such as that the terrorist bombings had been organized by the Kremlin clique would have destroyed both Putin's political hopes and the Russian war effort against the Chechens. Neither could Putin reveal Berezovsky's role in the bombings (if in fact the tycoon was involved) later, after winning the presidential election, since he would have to admit that he had initially covered up the crime. Hence, if Berezovsky was in any way involved in the bombings, this secret would remain an iron bond attaching Putin to Berezovsky.
But all of this is speculation. There is simply too little evidence either way. The most likely explanation is that the attacks were in fact carried out by Chechen militants or by Islamic extremists acting on behalf of their embattled coreligionists. Both Shamil Basayev and other commanders such as Salman Raduyev had carried out terrorist assaults against the Russian civilian population in the past and had boasted of their exploits. The Wahhabi commander, Khattab, was linked to the notorious international terrorist Osama bin Laden. Chechen field commanders gloried in a murderous ferocity toward their foes. These men publicly executed Russian prisoners of war and civilian hostages by cutting off their heads with large hunting knives, and videotaped the procedure. Clearly, there were plenty of candidates in the bowels of the Chechen underworld capable of carrying out the 1999 apartment bombings.
— Paul Klebnikov, "Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia"

Document hippo (talk) 21:44, 22 June 2017 (UTC)

Removal of info

I don't understand the reasoning behind the removal of this info. Why is this WP:CHERRYPICK? What information is not given? It's explicitly written that "In the last days of August, the Russian military launched an aerial bombing of the villages." Obviously it was deliberate as it was part of Dagestan war and the village was the centre of the insurgency in Dagestan. Alæxis_¿question? 11:18, 9 April 2017 (UTC)

My two cents. After discussing the threats made by Wahhabis the book by Reddaway (p. 616) says:

On September 4, a week after the attack began, the first apartment bombings took place in the Dagestani town of Buinaksk, not far from the Wahhabi-controlled villages. Possibly the villagers had precise contingency plans for their fellow believers of other ethnicities—once the deterrent effect of their explicit threats to all who would listen over the previous year had failed—to set off bombs in revenge in Buinaksk, Moscow, and Volgodonsk. If that is so, then we believe it is impossible that the Moscow authorities did not know about the plans, at least in general terms. Even before Stepashin visited the district a year earlier, they must have been receiving numerous reports from, in particular, the FSB, the Interior Ministry, and probably the eavesdropping agency FAPSI. After all, the villages were the only off-limits area for officialdom, apart from Chechnya, in the whole of Russia. Thus the possibility arises that the Moscow decision to attack the villages was made with the deliberate intention of provoking a terrorist response that was partly or wholly anticipated. Alternatively, the decision could have been made impulsively, without reviewing the appropriate intelligence about the target. In either case, the officials in Moscow would have had plenty of reason to organize a cover-up. Individuals guilty of negligence or deliberate intent regarding the deaths of three hundred civilians obviously would have much to fear.

That Moscow deliberately provoked the attack is not a claim made by the authors or a view endorsed by them. It's one of two possibilities they considered. Other books (such as Paul Klebnikov's "Godfather of the Kremlin") consider lots of intriguing possibilities such as e.g. Berezovsky being behind the bombings.

I believe the removed text should be in the article.

Document hippo (talk) 00:32, 24 June 2017 (UTC)

Talk history

The early talk history reaches until 2005 but the oldest contribution in this page is from 2016. An archive link says that no archive has been created. Could you restore the old talk history or move it to a reachable archive? --Error (talk) 18:30, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

Maps

Map needed

It is requested that a map or maps be included in this article to improve its quality.
Wikipedians in Russia may be able to help!

--Error (talk) 18:34, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

More info

Expanding Strobe Talbott's claim

Here's how I'd like to rewrite the passage about Talbott's claim. Below are the sources:

According to Strobe Talbott, "there was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory". [1] Similar points were raised by British journalist Thomas de Waal [2][3] and other analysts. [4][5][6][7]

[1] There was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory, although Russian public opinion did indeed solidify behind Putin in his determination to carry out a swift, decisive counteroffensive.

Strobe Talbott, "Russia Hand"

[2] Meanwhile others in Moscow are still wondering whether there is a domestic political aspect to the crisis and whether rogue elements of the security services are in some way involved in an attemtp to provoke a state of emergency in Russia or the cancellation of elections.

There is absolutely no proof of this, but a little noticed article in the Moscow newspaper Moskovskaya Pravda by a respectable journalist Alexander Zhilin is now attracting attention.

BBC, "Russia's bombs: Who is to blame?", by Tom de Waal (1999)

[3] There was very little in the allegations made by Berezovsky, which had not been reported in small-circulation Russian newspapers and a book written by an ex-KGB officer over the last two years. <...> Chekulin's testimony was the nearest thing to a "smoking gun" but even he admitted that he had no direct documentary evidence directly related to the three apartment block bombings.

IWPR, "Berezovsky Alleges Chechen Plot" by Tom de Waal (2002)

[4] By no means is the author saying that Russian special services were involved in Basayev's attack on Dagestan or in the blasts at the apartment buildings in the Russian cities. Mere suspicions are insufficient for such an assertion. However, the Russian public's fixed opinion that "they attacked us," is also disputable. In any case, there is no proof whatsoever that official authorities in the Chechen Republic were involved in the aforementioned acts.

Military Review, "The Second Chechen War: the Information Component" by Emil Pain, Vol. 80 (2000)

[5] Of course, it was valid to state that there was some suspicion over the discovery of devices left in a Ryazan apartment block, which were similar to those used in Moscow, and appeared to have links with the Russian secret services. However, the more general inference drawn from this, that all the September bombings were carried out by the Russian authorities, was uncorroborated by evidence.

"Chechnya: From Past to Future" by Richard Sakwa (editor). Chapter 11, "Western Views of the Chechen Conflict" by Mike Bowker, University of East Anglia (2005)

[6] There has never been evidence that the houses were blown up by the FSB, but there has been no counter-evidence either.

"Politics and the Ruling Group in Putin's Russia" by S. White (editor). Chapter 3 "The Russian Federal Security Service under President Putin" by Eberhard Schneider (2008)

[7] Although it is possible that Russian security forces were complicit in the bombings, no direct evidence has ever been presented linking the government to the attacks.

"Russian way of war: post Soviet adaptations in the Russian military" by James Copp, U.S. Army Major (2013)

Document hippo (talk) 22:54, 22 June 2017 (UTC)

Review of the links supporting/mentioning the conspiracy theory

The statement about the conspiracy theory (before my recent edit) looked that way:

Yury Felshtinsky, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Berezovsky, David Satter, Boris Kagarlitsky, Vladimir Pribylovsky, and the secessionist Chechen authorities claim that the 1999 bombings were a false flag attack coordinated by the FSB in order to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya. This war boosted the popularity of Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, who was previously the director of the FSB, and helped the pro-war Unity Party succeed in the elections to the State Duma and helped Putin attain the presidency within a few months. [6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17]

There are actually two claims made in this passage. The first one is that the bombings were a false flag attack. The second one is that the war in Chechnya boosted Putin's popularity and helped him and his party win the elections.

While the false flag attack theory is a subject of controversy, no one doubts that the bombings helped Putin gain popular support. So, I believe the two claims should be separated.

To separate the claims, it's necessary to review the links to see which of the two claims does each of the links support or mention.

Let's get started!

[6] Litvinenko's details on apartment bombings in Moscow, an interview with Sergei Kovalev, radio Echo of Moscow, 25 July 2002 [1]

S. Kovalev. Yes, of course. I think it would be natural to check that. Moreover, I don't want to speak about likelihood, truthworthy or even serious doubts of that material without a most thorough and very tedious analysis. FSB will check that, and we will check, to the extent of what's accessible for us. Now, about the belief in this or that version. Yes, Felshtinsky and Litvinenko claim: "FSB explodes Russia". I won't like to believe in that, but I try to be impartial, and I don't rule out that version. I don't rule out any of them, including the Chechen connection, the FSB connection, or any hybrid versions which are possible too. Experience shows it's a frequent situation. Generally, I'm not a big proponent of conspiracy theories. But Litvinenko's and Felshtinsky's theory is a pure conspiracy. But regardless of what one feels is the preferred option, I believe that an investigator should follow the golden rule of a researcher, there's a similarity. There shouldn't be a more sharp and more demanding criticist of a hypothesis, than its author. Because it's he who knows all of the details. And he should strive to kill his own hypothesis, to destroy it. But if he doesn't succeed, then he exhales with a relief and says: "Well, now it's not a hypothesis, it's a proven thing, now it's a theory at least." One simply cannot see such desire on the side of the authors of the book. I won't even mention that the very book itself, the episodes which are known very well to me as a participant, there's incredible amount of fiction. For example, Budennovsk. It's pure fiction, and not even a single link. That's not how serious books are written, which pretend to be truthworthy.

T. Pelipeyko. Thanks, Sergey Adamovich. To sum it up, the very fact of errors in something else causes you to doubt that which was claimed by Litvinenko and Felshtinsky today?

S. Kovalev. I don't think such doubts should offend them. I think they have given the material to the commission so that it would be subject to impartial and fair minded analysis.

I think that should be mentioned in the article: "Sergey Kovalev expressed doubts over the conspiracy theory, citing an "incredible amount of fiction" in the book by Felshtinsky and Litvinenko".

[7] Reference to Boris Kagarlitsky's Novaya Gazeta article. [2]

Boris Kagarlitsky, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Institute of Comparative Politics, writing in the weekly Novaya Gazeta, says that the bombings in Moscow and elsewhere were arranged by the GRU (the Russian military intelligence service). He says they used members of a group controlled by Shirvani Basayev, brother of the Chechen warlord Shamil Basayev, to plant the bombs. These killed 300 people in Buikask, Moscow and Volgodonsk in September.

Mr Kagarlitsky, who, from internal evidence in the article, is drawing on a source with close knowledge of the GRU, says that invasion of Dagestan by Shamil Basayev himself in August was pre-arranged with a senior Kremlin leader at a meeting in France in July.

Clearly, a voice in support of the conspiracy theory. However, it says GRU not FSB, which should be mentioned in the text.

[8] David Satter – House committee on Foreign Affairs" (PDF). [3]

For “Operation Successor” to succeed, however, it was necessary to have a massive provocation. In my view, this provocation was the bombing in September, 1999 of the apartment building bombings in Moscow, Buinaksk, and Volgodonsk. In the aftermath of these attacks, which claimed 300 lives, a new war was launched against Chechnya. Putin, the newly appointed prime minister who was put in charge of that war, achieved overnight popularity. Yeltsin resigned early. Putin was elected president and his first act was to guarantee Yeltsin immunity from prosecution. In the meantime, all talk of reexamining the results of privatization was forgotten.

Support of the conspiracy theory.

[9] Felshtinsky & Pribylovsky 2008, pp. 105–111

Don't have that book.

[10] Video "In Memoriam of Alexander Litvinenko". Will let it pass for now and review it later.

[11] "Russian Federation: Amnesty International's concerns and recommendations in the case of Mikhail Trepashkin – Amnesty International" [4]

A very detailed summary of injustice experienced by indepent investigator Trepashkin. The article doesn't try to make a point about the apartment bombings being coordinated by the FSB, merely mentions that Trepashkin was investigating such allegations. Should be moved to the statement about Trepashkin.

[12] "Bomb Blamed in Fatal Moscow Apartment Blast" by Paddock, LA Times. [5]

Some opposition politicians have expressed concern that the war and bombings could give Yeltsin a pretext to declare a state of emergency, cancel presidential elections set for next summer and continue to rule. The Kremlin insists that Yeltsin plans to step down next year on schedule and hand over power to an elected successor.

That doesn't mention any theory saying that the FSB coordinated the blasts. The link should be moved to one of the leading sentences in the article because it was published after the first blast in Moscow.

[13] "At least 90 dead in Moscow apartment blast", from staff and wire reports, CNN, 10 September 1999 [6]

A hard-line Communist leader alleged that the blast was linked to a political feud between Luzhkov, the Kremlin and other forces. Luzhkov is considered a strong favorite to succeed Yeltsin after presidential elections next year, and he has accused Yeltsin and his circle of being jealous of his popularity. "Political hysteria is being fanned artificially, including by way of explosions, to cancel parliamentary and presidential elections through a state of emergency," Viktor Ilyukhin was quoted as saying by the ITAR-Tass news agency.

Ilyukhin didn't say either the FSB or GRU coordinated the bombings. Perhaps the claim deserves to be discussed separately. For now, the link should be moved to one of the leading sentences.

[14] Evangelista 2002, p. 81 [7]

In Russia, a country particularly susceptible to both conspiracy theories and genuine conspiracies, many observers began to wonder if the federal security forces had arranged the explosions. At least two candidate theories have been proposed.

The first is linked to Yeltsin's purported campaign to undermine his political rival, Moscow mayor Luzhkov. What better way to discredit the popular Luzhkov than to demonstrate that he could not keep his own residents safe from terrorist attacks? The second theory suggests a deliberate effort to provoke a "rally 'round the flag" effect on the Russian populace to solidify the rule of Yeltsin and his designated successor. Russian journalists once asked Putin himself about such theories. He reacted with characteristic bluster: "What? We blew up our own houses? Nonsense! Total rubbish! There are no people in the Russian secret services who would commit such a crime against their own people. The very suggestion is amoral and fundamentally nothing more than part of an information was against Russia."

Purin's denials failed to allay suspicions about the apartment bombings.

Evangelista mentions a conspiracy theory that federal security services arranged the explosions to solidify the rule of Yeltsin and his successor. Alright.

[15] "Did Putin's Agents Plant the Bombs?" by Jamie Dettmer [8]

Only days before, Russia's acting president, Vladimir Putin, had been forced in an interview to dismiss mounting domestic and international speculation that Russian security agents had been behind the deadly explosions last fall in Moscow and in two other Russian cities that left nearly 300 people dead and 500 injured. "Delirious nonsense!" the Russian leader had declared with his trademark firmness. "There are no people in the Russian secret services who would be capable of such a crime against their own people."

The link is broken and should be fixed. But, it mentions the theory of FSB involvement.

[16] "The consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia" by Joel M. Ostrow, Georgil Satarov, Irina Khakamada p.96

Evidence of FSB involvement and Kremlin complicity, however, is strong enough to demand it not be brushed aside as wild conspiracy theory, particulary in the absence of evidence to support Putin's claim.

Alright.

[17] McCain decries "new authoritarianism in Russia", John McCain's press release, 4 November 2003 [9]

Under President Putin, Russian citizens in Chechnya have suffered crimes against humanity at the hands of Russian military forces. It was during Mr. Putin's tenure as Prime Minister in 1999 that he launched the Second Chechen War following the Moscow apartment bombings. There remain credible allegations that Russia's FSB had a hand in carrying out these attacks.

Alright, I see the point. Meanwhile, the link is broken and should be fixed.

Document hippo (talk) 16:29, 23 June 2017 (UTC)

Meanwhile, neither of these sources says that the claims that FSB was behind the bombings were reiterated by Chechen authorities. I believe that caution should be exercised here because, in particular, Aslan Maskhadov had publicly accused Boris Berezovsky of financing the Dagestan incursion with ransom payments: Conflagration in Russia, Forbes, Nov. 1999 by Paul Klebnikov.

So Maskhadov speaks with a certain prejudice as he interprets recent events. But what he says is persuasive–and pretty disturbing: “These people, who have grown their beards long and are preaching the Great Jihad, are controlled and financed by someone else, including the oligarchs who surround Yeltsin in Moscow.”

When pressed, Maskhadov names the man he sees as the prime villain in the affair: tycoon Boris Berezovsky. For the past several years Berezovsky has been channeling ransom payments to terrorists in Chechnya who have kidnapped visitors. Berezovsky boasts of his rescue efforts, but, says Maskhadov, the ransom money has dark consequences: It finances the Islamic militias, which are now attacking Russia. (It is still unclear who carried out the bombings.) The chaos, says Maskhadov, is not all bad for the folks in power in the Kremlin. It may destabilize the country enough to force a delay in elections, elections that would probably put those folks out of power.

I believe that's not the only statement Maskhadov has made. My point is that the details of which statements were made by Chechen authorities are more nuanced than alleged in the article.

So, the fragment about "the secessionist Chechen authorities" should be removed, OR claims made by Maskhadov should be reviewed with greater consideration.

Document hippo (talk) 16:39, 23 June 2017 (UTC)

Mention of Khattab in the leading section

I'd like to add a couple of lines to provide the reader with the context of the bombings.

On August 7, 1999 Dagestan was invaded by two thousand radicals headed by Shamil Basayev and Ibn Khattab, a Saudi citizen who competed on an equal footing with Osama bin Laden. [1] From 3rd to 13th September Khattab made several threats against Russia, which mentioned "reprisals" and "explosions". [2][3][4]

[1] pp. 108-109, "Inferno in Chechnya: The Russian-Chechen Wars, the Al Qaeda Myth, and the Boston Marathon Bombings" by Brian Glyn Williams.

However, by this time, the Chechen rebels were not entirely on their own. The previous year a small band of approximately eighty Arab jihadi "brothers," led by a globe-trotting professional holy warrior named Amir (Commander) Khattab, had traveled to the country via Dagestan. The charismatic Khattab, a Saudi citizen whose real name was Thamir Saleh Abdullah Al-Suwailem, had previously fought volunteer jihad in eastern Afghanistan on behalf of the Afghan mujahideen rebels in the late 1980s. When that war was over, the jihadi paladin had traveled to neighboring Tajikistan to wage war alongside Islamist fighters who were trying to overthrow the post-Soviet Communist regime in that country in the early 1990s.
These events took place at a time when another Saudi citizen, Osama bin Laden, created a separate terrorist group known as Al Qaeda al Jihad (based in Sudan from 1992 to 1996), which was dedicated not to fighting Russians or Communists frontally, but to the expulsion of US forces from the Arabian peninsula. While bin Laden later asked Khattab to join his nihilist terrorist group in its war against America, the famous warrior rejected bin Laden's request. Khattab chose to continue his own frontline struggle against his traditional foes from Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the Russians. Terrorism expert Fawaz Gerges has analyzed the Arabic language correspondence between these two distinct Saudi jihadi leaders and has concluded:

Khattab not only competed on an equal footing with bin Laden, but assembled a more powerful contingent of jihadis than the latter. In the 1990s the two Saudi jihadis communicated with each other and tried to pull each other into their own battle plans, but Khattab and bin Laden had defined the enemy differently and both were too ambitious to accept a subordinate role.

p. 135, ibid

The Wahhabi Invasion of Dagestan
The unsanctioned August 1999 Wahhabi invasion of Dagestan from Chechnya actually behan when one of the Dagestani leaders of the Chechnya-based "Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan" was lured back into the Tsumadi-Avaristan Wahhabi enclave of Dagestan by local authorities on August 2, 1999. Once there, the Dagestani police besieged his enclave and tried to arrest him and his followers. The Dagestani authorities then began to attempt to reestablish administrative authority in the surrounding Wahhabi region. This gave Basayev, Khattab, and Bagauddin Magomedov (the exiled Dagestani leader) the excuse they were looking for to launch their grandiose invasion of the Russian province of Dagestan with the aim of "liberating" it.
On August 7, 1999, between fifteen hundred and two thousand primarily Dagestani Wahhabis, joined by hundreds of Chechen radicals and a smaller number of Arabs, calling themselves the "Islamic International Peace Keeping Brihade" and driving armored personnel carriers and jeeps, crossed into the mountainous Avaristan region of the Russian province of Dagestan. At their head were Basayev, who was styled the "military emir" of the operation, and Khattab, his deputy. Russian television showed images of camouflage-wearing, bearded mujahideen, who were fighting under the black banner of international jihad, not the green wolf flag of Chechnya. Basayev proclaimed, "It is not a Chechen army, but an international corps," while Maskhadov's defense minister said, "We asked Basayev not to attack Dagestan." Tellingly, the name of the military invasion was Operation Ghazi Mogamed (Ghazi Mohammed or Mogamed was a nineteenth-century Dagestani ghazi, or holy warrior, who fought to expel the Russian invaders and establish shariah law in the land).

[2], [3] and [4] should be familiar to the editors of this article.

Document hippo (talk) 04:00, 25 June 2017 (UTC)

Conflicting report about Basayev and Voloshin July 1999 meeting in Nice

p. 167, Ilyas Akhmadov "The Chechen Struggle: Independence Won and Lost"

I had with me an article from a Russian newspaper that contained pictures purportedly of Shamil meeting with Voloshin in Nice on July 4, 1999. I didn't believe this article was based on fact and I didn't think he had actually been in Nice, but I wanted to see his reaction to it. As he was reading it, he started to chuckle and called over to Khattab, "How do you like my legs?" Khattab didn't understand at first, so Shamil had to explain. "This article claims that this is a picture of me meeting in Nice with Voloshin. I'm the one in the shorts." They both laughed. Chechen men, and especially fighters, do not wear shorts. That was all that was said about this article. I don't take the Nice story seriously. Here are three simple facts explaining why: first, I saw Shamil in Vedeno in June, a few days prior to my June 27 appointment; second, Shamil was a participant in a rally for reconciliation that was held in Grozny on July 3; and third, I don't know of any instance when Shamil left the North Caucasus in the postwar years. On one occasion Shamil was invited to Moscow for the wedding of Tim Guldimann, the former OSCE representative who had played a crucial role in ending the war and signing the Khasavyurt agreement. Shamil had sent me there with an enormous carpet that was adorned with Shamil's face. I had gone to Moscow in his stead because he had not wanted to travel.

Document hippo (talk) 03:56, 26 June 2017 (UTC)

Chiesa's 1999 article

Террористы тоже разные
Джульетто КЬЕЗА, шеф-корреспондент московского бюро итальянской газеты "Стампа"
Терроризмов много. И все они разные. Хотя нередко у людей складывается о них путаные представления. Взять хотя бы бомбу в отеле "Интурист", подложенную, скорее всего, с целью уничтожить конкурента - политического или экономического. У таких акций ограниченная цель, они не являются частью какой-то более масштабной стратегии. Организаторы подобной операции не заинтересованы в том, чтобы спровоцировать бойню. Если же погибают невинные люди, прохожие, случайно оказавшиеся на месте взрыва, это считается "сопутствующим фактом" - таким, скажем, как гибель гражданских лиц во время натовских бомбардировок Югославии.
Все это я назвал бы "малым терроризмом", "терроризмом преступных банд", или, пользуясь итальянской мафиозной терминологией, "сведением счетов".
Но вот совсем иной пример терроризма (какие, к сожалению, очень хорошо известны в Италии) - взрыв бомбы во Владикавказе, унесший жизнь семидесяти ни в чем не повинных людей. Взрыв был устроен на рынке в час пик, и его очевидной целью было как можно большее число жертв. Перед нами то, что в Италии в годы расцвета терроризма называлось "стратегией напряженности". Здесь преступный акт задуман и осуществлен не просто группой уголовников. Как правило, речь идет о широкомасштабных и множественных акциях, цель которых - посеять панику и страх среди граждан.
У акций этого типа, как правило, очень мощная политическая и организационная база. Часто террористические акты, имеющие отношение к "стратегии напряженности", - это дело рук какой- нибудь секретной службы, как иностранной, так и национальной. Во втором случае речь может идти об отдельных группах секретных служб, действующих независимо от официального руководства и прикрывающихся своей "секретностью".
Терроризм этого типа (его еще иногда называют "государственным терроризмом", так как он затрагивает одновременно и государственные интересы, и структуры, действующие в тайных лабиринтах современных государств) - явление сравнительно новое. Можно сказать, что одними из первых этой стратегией стали пользоваться сразу же после окончания второй мировой войны секретные службы Израиля, а позднее - алжирский Фронт национального освобождения. Во многих случаях терроризм был побочным продуктом национально-освободительной борьбы или самой настоящей войны, как, скажем, палестинский терроризм в 60-70-х годах, ставший международным по определению. В наши дни одиссея палестинцев близится к завершению, но международный терроризм жив, как никогда. Все говорит о том, что он становится одной из перманентных форм международной политической борьбы.
Обо всем этом стоит напомнить в момент, когда стратегия террора все чаще заявляет о себе в России и в странах бывшего СССР. С высокой степенью уверенности можно сказать, что взрывы бомб, убивающих неповинных людей, всегда планируются политическими умами. Они не фанатики, они - убийцы, преследующие политические цели. Нужно оглядеться вокруг и попытаться понять, кто заинтересован в дестабилизации обстановки в стране. Это могут быть иностранцы (пусть и из стран ближнего зарубежья, например, с Кавказа), а могут и "свои", пытающиеся запугать страну, прежде чем с них за это спросится. Так было в Италии, так может быть и в России. И когда (как, например, недавно в Риме, где террористы убили скромного сотрудника министерства труда) призрак "красных бригад" вновь начинает тревожить людей по ночам, можно быть на 99,99 процента уверенными, что и за этим преступлением стоят особые политические планы и интересы.

Document hippo (talk) 23:35, 2 July 2017 (UTC)

Just thought I should translate Giulietto Chiesa's 1999 article:

Terrorists are different as well
There are multiple terrorisms. All of them are different. Although often people would confuse them. Consider for example the bomb in hotel "Intourist", which was most likely planted in order to destroy the competitor (political or economical). Such acts have a limited end goal, they are not a part of any kind of a broader strategy. Organizers of such an operation aren't interested in provoking a massacre. And if innocent people, bystanders who were unlucky to be at the place of the explosion die, that's considered "accompanying facts" — such as, let us say, deaths of civilians during NATO's bombings of Yugoslavia.
That's what I would call "small terrorism", "terrorism of criminal gangs", or using Italian mafia language, "settling a score".
But here's a completely different case of terrorism (the kind which is unfortunately very well known in Italy) — a bomb explosion in Vladikavkaz which claimed the lives of 70 innocent people. The explosion was arranged during the rush hour at a market, and its obvious goal was maximizing the number of victims. It's what was called a "strategy of tensions" during Italy's peak years of terrorism. Here the act of felony is conceived and performed not just by a group of criminals. Usually this means wide-scale and multiple acts, the purpose of which is to disseminate panic and terror among citizens.
Actions of such kind usually have a powerful political and organizational base. Often terrorist acts related to the "strategy of tensions" are the work of some secret service, either foreign or national. In the second case it could be separate groups of [in?] secret services which act independently of the official leadership and use their "secrecy" as a cover-up.
Terrorism of that type (which is sometimes called "state terrorism", since it involves both state interests and structures that act in hidden labyrinths of modern states) is a relatively new concept. One can say that secret services of Israel were among the first to use that strategy right after the end of the Second World war, and were later followed by Algeria's National Liberation Front. In multiple cases terrorism was a byproduct of national liberation struggle or a real war, such as e.g. Palestinean terrorism in 60-70s which became international by definition. In our days Palestineans' Odyssey seems to approach its end, but the international terrorism is alive like never before. Everything suggests that it becomes a permanent form of international political struggle.
That should be reminded in the moment when the strategy of terror asserts itself increasingly frequently in Russia and post-USSR countries. One can speak with high likelihood that bomb explosions which kill innocent people are always planned by political minds. They are not fanatics, they are murderers who pursue political goals. One needs to look around and try to figure out who is interested in destabilizing the situation in a country. That could be foreigners (even if they are from neighboring countries, e.g. from Caucasus) as well as "ours", who try to frighten the country before they would be taken accountable. That's how it was in Italy, and that's how it could be in Russia. And whenever (such as recently in Italy where terrorists killed a humble employee of the Ministry of Labor) the spectre of "Red Brigades" starts to disturb people at night, one can be 99.99% sure that there are special political plans and interests behind that crime, too.

Document hippo (talk) 01:12, 3 July 2017 (UTC)

Basaev lured into Dagestan

Allegations by Tretyakov that Basaev was lured into Dagestan weren't removed. They were moved to a different section of the article.

I don't think the text really provides an important point that should be discussed that early. If you feel it does, I'm fine with that, though.

The more important (and separate) point is that the text itself is not WP:NPOV. Relevant points by Ware:

6. It is far from obvious that the Kremlin would have wished to lure Basayev into Dagestan in order to start the war. Moscow has long failed to understand Dagestan, and Russian officials and Caucasus experts had assumed that Dagestan was lurching toward instability and separatism. Even in Dagestan, it would have been difficult to predict, last July, how the Dagestani population would respond to an incursion from Basayev. Thus if it had intentionally fomented the insurgency the Kremlin would, from its own perspective, have been risking civil war in Dagestan, the dramatic expansion of rebel forces, and the creation of an internationally financed radical, hostile, sustainable, Islamic state with a Caspian seaport on its southern flank, severing it from its interests in the Transcaucasus. This would seem a desperate gamble indeed.
<...>
Hence, a simple explanation of events in August and September is that Basayev became over-confident as a consequence of surrounding himself with representatives of that small minority of Dagestanis who supported him, and who appear to have misled him concerning the support he was likely to receive from the broader Dagestani population. It is likely that Basayev concluded, as indeed the Kremlin appears to have concluded, that most Dagestanis would join him in an attack upon Russian forces, which indeed were not popular in Dagestan until later on when they began to defend the Dagestanis against Basayev. Thus Basayev undertook the invasion because, like virtually everyone else outside of Dagestan, he simplistically assumed that separatist elements in Dagestan were in he ascendance.

Document hippo (talk) 20:44, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

Further points by Ware

Related points:

And if the Kremlin were interested in bribing Basayev to commit a raid on Russian territory in order to fire popular opinion in support of an invasion of Chechnya, then surely it would have been preferable for the Kremlin to instigate a raid into Russian ethnic territories in Stavropol or Kalmykia. Anti-caucasian prejudices, and the general Russian expectation that Dagestan would follow Chechnya, would render Russians less likely to support Dagestanis against Basayev than to support members of their own national group.
<...>
7. It is equally difficult to understand why Basayev might have accepted a Kremlin bribe to invade Dagestan in order to justify a Russian invasion of Chechnya. Here the difficulty is not in imagining that Basayev, and indeed Dagestani Wahhabis, could be bribed by the Kremlin. That is well within the realm of possibility. The problem comes in imagining that any bribe could persuade Basayev to attack his ethnic and Islamic cousins in order to legitimize the Kremlin's destruction of his homeland. Surely Basayev would know that such an arrangement would be difficult to conceal, and he certainly would know that its revelation would mean the end of his life at the hands of his own compatriots and, probably at the hands of his own teip.
Any deal that might justify the Russian conquest of his homeland would seem to be completely out of character for Basayev. And contrary to published reports, Basayev's power within Chechnya was not clearly waning in the summer of 1999. Indeed, it appeared to be growing.

Document hippo (talk) 21:59, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

Rumors about the impending terrorist attacks

An important point in view of this edit: no, Giulietto Chiesa didn't warn about the possibility of a terrorist attack organized by Russia. Actually even Dunlop doesn't claim that.

If you want to keep that point, please, find the quote from Chiesa's article which proves he did indeed warn about such possibility (feel free to use my translation if you wish). If you want to keep that sensence preceded by "According to John Dunlop", please, find a quote from Dunlop which proves he did indeed allege that Chiesa warned there could be a terrorist attack organized by the Russian state.

If I'm wrong, it would be fairly easy for you to prove so, since you have all the sources at your disposal.

Document hippo (talk) 21:17, 6 July 2017 (UTC)

Pages 19-20 of The Moscow Bombings of September 1999 from which I quote in part "With a high degree of certainty, one can say that the explosions of bombs killing innocent people are always planned by people with political minds. They are not fanatics, rather they are killers pursuing political goals"

RAB3L (talk) 18:08, 15 August 2017 (UTC)

Hi there, RAB3L! Yup, you are correct, but in the article Chiesa spoke about various countries, not only Russia. It's a broad enough statement. If it was a warning, he surely made it fairly vague.

Meanwhile, I've answered to your comment at my talk page. Thanks for it, just mentioning my reply so that you don't miss it. Document hippo (talk) 18:18, 15 August 2017 (UTC)

Hi DH, I don't agree. Chiesa was talking specifically, in the middle of June, about bombings in Russia, according to Dunlop's account. There's no mention of any other specific country. He was, after all, the Moscow correspondent of Stampa.

RAB3L (talk) 19:01, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

Hi RAB3L, I suggest you to read my translation of Chiesa's article, rather than the fragments cited by Dunlop. Chiesa spoke extensively about Italy -- after all he was the Moscow correspondent of Stampa of Italian origin -- and mentioned some other countries as well.

Note that you don't have to trust my translation, but could try to make one of your own. Document hippo (talk) 20:15, 16 August 2017 (UTC)

Strobe Talbott's take

Somehow missing from this article is the opinion of U.S. diplomats. Needless to say, the U.S. had boots on the ground in Russia who closely followed all the developments and informed the U.S. policy towards Russia. In that capacity, a most influential person was the Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (also a friend of Bill Clinton). In 2002 (after retirement) he published a book of memoirs, "The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy", in which he reflected on the 1990s in Russia as seen from his position.

Since the book is not in public domain, I will cite here the relevant fragment:

THE REACTION IN RUSSIA to Putin's appointment ranged from shoulder-shrugging and head-scratching (just another "normal surprise") to prophecies of doom on the part of many of the young reformers ("a very, very big mistake" that would lead to the disintegration of the country, said Boris Nemtsov).
Yeltsin's announcement that he was not just appointing a prime minister but anointing a successor was taken as further evidence that he had lost his grip on reality.
In Washington, our initial judgment was that the implausibility of Putin's candidacy made some version of the Luzhkov-Primakov scenario all the more likely. In addition to Putin's dearth of relevant experience and connections, he didn't even look the part. Yeltsin, Yavlinsky, Nemtsov, Lebed, Luzhkov, Zhirinovsky, Zyuganov—they were all endomorphs, with some combination of height, bulk and booming voice. Putin was slightly built and had the manner of a disciplined, efficient self-effacing executive assistant.
But Putin also had, on top of the full force of Yeltsin's backing, a gruesome bit of luck. The war in the North Caucasus burst back into flame, this time with a difference that made it as much of a political winner for Putin as it had been a loser for Yeltsin.
At about the time of Putin's appointment, Chechen forces under the militant leader Shamil Basayev crossed the eastern border into Dagestan, driving thousands of people from several villages and killing or wounding scores of Russian troops who were manning outposts in the region. In and of itself, the raid was a bolder version of one that Basayev had conducted in June 1995 when he took hostages during the Halifax summit of the G-7. That earlier episode was one of the few occasions when the secessionist struggle in Chechnya spilled into other parts of southern Russia. Because the Chechen conflict had been mostly contained within the republic's borders, many Russians had come to see, and oppose, the war that Yeltsin waged there in 1994-1996 as an attempt to cling to a remote and hostile fragment of the old empire.
However, the Chechens' foray into Dagestan in August 1999 seemed to be explicitly part of an aggressive strategy that would take a new round of warfare into the heartland of Russia. Basayev proclaimed a jihad to liberate the surrounding Muslim-dominated areas from Russian tyranny. That claim seemed all the more credible when it was followed within weeks by a series of bombings against apartment buildings in Volgodansk, Buinaksk and Moscow, killing some three hundred civilians.
The Chechens denied responsibility for the explosions. Some Russians and observers in the outside world suspected a covert provocation by the Russian security services, presumably on orders from their most prominent and powerful alumnus, Putin himself. Berezovsky figured in some of this speculation. In addition to being one of Putin's backers for the presidency, he had extensive ties among the Chechen warlords and therefore might have been able to prod or bribe them into providing the new government of Moscow with a pretext for what might be a popular war.
There was no evidence to support this conspiracy theory, although Russian public opinion did indeed solidify behind Putin in his determination to carry out a swift, decisive counteroffensive. It was organized by General Anatoly Kvashnin, the chief of staff of the armed forces who had played the heavy during the confused drama in June when Russia "accidentally" deployed its troops into Kosovo ahead of NATO.
The Russian armed forces began a massive bombing campaign against Chechnya, killing thousands of civilians and adding to the nearly 200,000 refugees, many of whom fled to the neighboring republic of Ingushetia. Once again, Grozny came under intense bombardment. In early October, thousands of Russian troops invaded Chechnya, secured what they called a buffer zone in the northern third of the republic and launched a pincer movement around Grozny. At the end of October, a rocket attack on a crowded market in Grozny killed dozens of people.
The incident bore an eerie resemblance to the Serb savageries that had galvanized the will of the international community to use force against Milošević. That similarity occurred to some Russian hawks, who had predicted earlier in the year that NATO's war against Belgrade over Kosovo was a warm-up for the one it would someday unleash against Moscow over Chechnya. Now they could imagine their worst fear coming true.
In fact, the West had neither the desire nor the means to engage diplomatically in the Chechen conflict, much less intervene militarily. The U.S. and its allies had no leverage on the rebel leaders, nor did we have sympathy either with their goal of independence or the raids in Dagestan that had precipitated the conflict. They had indisputably—and, it seemed, deliberately—brought down the wrath of the Russian armed forces on their people. That meant there was little we could do but cite Russia's obligations under various international covenants to protect civilian life and call on Moscow to let representatives of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe into Chechnya to help deal with the refugee crisis and monitor the behavior of the Russian troops.
The Russians fended off these appeals on the grounds that they couldn't guarantee the safety of the OSCE mission. That was true enough, since most of the republic was in chaos, but it begged the question of Russia's indiscriminate use of violence against civilians, which was turning the entire population against Moscow and increasing popular support among Chechens for their leaders' demands.
— Strobe Talbott, "The Russia Hand: A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy"

The quotation can be easily verified and could be used as a raw source for further edits. I think it's essential that although it's a view not sympathetic to Russia by and large, the U.S. seem not to have bought into the theory of Russia security services involvement in the apartment bombings while the events took place. It's an important source which should be mentioned in the article. Document hippo (talk) 10:54, 6 June 2017 (UTC)

The US government officials, Strobe Talbott included, might well have had problems getting into the minds of those responsible for the bombings. There is no convincing evidence that Chechens were responsible, unless the Russians chose to keep it secret! There is also no evidence that they were capable of such acts. Also quite what they had to gain by blowing up the apartments of poor Russians has never been explained. On the other hand, Ryazan, at least, suggests that the FSB could have been responsible. Who benefitted from the apartment bombings? Certainly not the Chechens. Beslan proved that the FSB were willing and able to commit such acts, firing tank rounds and thermobaric RPG rounds into a school in which there were hundreds of innocent schoolchildren, simply to forestall Maskhadov's attempted negotiations.

RAB3L (talk) 17:30, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

I have read your response, RAB3L. Please, tell me about Beslan. Do you suggest Maskhadov played any role in Beslan? That's something I have never heard of before. Document hippo (talk) 18:18, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

"The US government officials, Strobe Talbott included, might well have had problems getting into the minds of those responsible for the bombings." — Not actually. Some of them, like Talbott, were better-connected than most of the Russia experts.

"There is no convincing evidence that Chechens were responsible, unless the Russians chose to keep it secret!" — That's an argument every conspiracy theory makes.

"There is also no evidence that they were capable of such acts." — Paul Klebnikov disagrees with you.

"Also quite what they had to gain by blowing up the apartments of poor Russians has never been explained." — Spreading jihad to the North Caucasus, hopefully getting Russian scared with the effect of ending the war in Dagestan. (Like Yulia Latynina believes.)

"On the other hand, Ryazan, at least, suggests that the FSB could have been responsible." — On Ryazan, my position is only that we have to carefully study the details of the incident. I'm not taking a side there.

Thanks for your interest, Document hippo (talk) 18:34, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Allegations that Russians negotiated the incursion into Dagestan with Chechens

Under the above:

"Former foreign minister of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria Ilyas Akhmadov believes the story about Basayev and Voloshin meeting in Nice wasn't based on fact, and Basayev hasn't actually been in Nice. According to Akhmadov, Basayev was portrayed in shorts while Chechen men, especially fighters, do not wear shorts. Additional reasons not to take the story seriously are that Basayev was a participant of a rally in Grozny a day before the alleged meeting, and that Akhmadov doesn't know an instance when Shamil Basayev left the North Caucasus in the years after the First Chechen War.[224]"

In the original Versiya article, there is no mention of Basayev being present in Nice. Therefore this non-fact cannot be used to prove that Basayev did not travel to France. According to Versiya, Basayev landed at Beaulieu, which is between Nice and Monaco, from a British or English yacht 'Magic' which had sailed from Malta. Beaulieu was the location of Khashoggi's villa. He was identified by both French and Israeli intelligence. Surikov also denied being in France but he lied; public records showed that he flew to Paris by Aeroflot and returned from Nice. How is it that Akhmadov was so aware of Basayev's every movement?

RAB3L (talk) 19:10, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Indeed, Versiya article said about Basayev being near Nice (Beaulieu-sur-Mer is located at a distance 9.7 km from Nice), rather than in the city itself. We might point out that Akhmadov has spoken about "Nice" rather than "a place near Nice". Still, there are no doubts he referred to that article. Assuming otherwise would be cherry picking.

"How is it that Akhmadov was so aware of Basayev's every movement?" -- Akhmadov was in a top leadership position. He got acquainted with Basayev during the First Chechen war. In 1999 he started serving as a Foreign Minister of Chechnya. As a top politician, he communicated extensively with Basayev. Document hippo (talk) 19:55, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

Also, Akhmadov is not the only source claiming that the day before the alleged meeting Basayev attended a public rally. Document hippo (talk) 19:56, 22 August 2017 (UTC)

So we can rely on Akhmadov's knowledge of Basayev's everyday movements more than that of the French and Israeli intelligence services? The Versiya articles mentions that Basayev was identified by his passport. How come that Basayev was able to travel to France without risking arrest when he was supposedly considered such a threat by Russia? Suspicious or what? The Russians only issued an international arrest warrant for him in February 2000: http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jan/20/news/mn-55816 You'll notice also that Surikov lied about travelling to France. RAB3L (talk) 17:41, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

"So we can rely on Akhmadov's knowledge of Basayev's everyday movements more than that of the French and Israeli intelligence services?"

As Wikipedia editors, we must not add any text which would prioritize one version over the other, and which would constitute original research.

It's up to the reader to make his/her own judgement based on the facts reviewed in the article.

Similarly, I cannot tell you how to feel about this issue. Document hippo (talk) 18:28, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

Russian-language sources such as "Open letter to Irina Smit from Chechenpress.org"[10] confirm the information that on July 3, 1999 Shamil Basaev attended a public (and televised) meeting in Grozny. Document hippo (talk) 18:46, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

Also, while Akhmadov authored the book, he was a sufficiently high-profile figure for Zbigniew Brzezinski to write an introduction to the book (he is actually listed as a co-author). Document hippo (talk) 18:51, 24 August 2017 (UTC)

P.S. I've added a mention of a press report cited by Timur Muzayev from the International Institute of Humanities and Political Research about a rally in Grozny on July 3, 1999, that was attended by Basayev. Just wanted to mention that while that institute doesn't have an English page, it is a real thing. Here's an English bio of its director which includes a bit of information about the institute [11]. Document hippo (talk) 12:35, 25 August 2017 (UTC)

WMD claims

From Fawaz Gerges, pp.59-60, "The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global" (2005), comparison of Ibn al-Khattab to Osama bin Laden:

“

Both also sought, Abu al-Walid reports, to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction (WMD), or at least dirty bombs, in their confrontation with the great powers. One of the major reasons for bin Laden’s contacts with Khattab was a quest for WMD because Al Qaeda hawks were convinced, Abu al-Walid says, that their Chechen counterparts could acquire these weapons ready-made from the scattered arsenal of the former Soviet Union, or by seeking help from experts, who worked during the Soviet era and are now suffering unemployment.

According to the author, after the failure of the Khattab–bin Laden correspondence, Al Qaeda hawks in Afghanistan wrote to Khattab and warned him against complacency and overconfidence in his fight with the Russians, who would militarily persevere until they prevailed and punished the Chechens: “The only way to protect the Chechens aganist this danger is to obtain WMD. . . . They also drew his attention to the point that Chechen mujahedeen are by law Russian citizens and that the Chechen mafia is able to obtain anything in Russia.” But Khattab paid little attention to the warning from the Al Qaeda hawks, Abu al-Walid tells us, and when in 1999 the Russians struck militarily in retaliation for Khattab’s failed attack on Daghistan, the mujahedeen government in Grozny, Chechnya, fell and the fighters met defeat; had Khattab planned for the worst-case scenario and listened to the free advice proffered by Al Qaeda hawks, he would have been more cautious and reluctant to do battle with Russia. Ironically, Abu al-Walid reports that after Grozny’s fall, a Chechen mujahedeen delegation visited Afghanistan and sought assistance from the Taliban and the Afghan Arabs there; delegation members even asked if there were any WMD available in Afghanistan so that they could use them in Chechnya against the Russians to stop the mass killing of the Chechens. The moral of the story, Abu al-Walid concludes, is that neither bin Laden nor Khattab had reflected critically about their confrontation with America and Russia and, instead, had a superficial plan to win a quick and easy battle that would not require WMD: “Two years later, Afghanistan was lost and so was Chechnya. As for the ambitious plans of the Saudi jihadist leadership, they too failed.”

”

From Walid Phares, p. 206, "Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America" (2005):

“

RUSSIA

The jihadist networks have been extremely clear in anointing Russia as a main enemy, despite the fact that it continues to supply Iran and to some degree Syria with weapons and assistance. But the Wahabi mother ship has ordered the destruction of the Russian empire in the same way it fought the Soviets. In the Wahabis’ geopolitical perception, Moscow remains a major infidel power (quwat kufr) that occupies “Muslim lands.” The Salafists do not see Russia as a nation with Muslim minorities; to them Russia is an occupier of Muslim territories. Fatwas have been issued online to “liberate these lands” from the occupation. The Wahabi network that follows up on the Russian front does not focus on Chechen national rights, inasmuch as it sees Chechnya as a part of the caliphate. And it does not limit its call for jihad to Chechnya, but encompasses also Dagestan and other areas within Russia. The jihadist plan for Russia is to dismember the country and bring down its power and economy.

To do so, the jihadists consider Chechnya a staging base for their Russian action. And in view of the wars that ravaged that area since the mid-1990s, the “Caucusus jihadists” have pushed their strikes into Russian mainland in Moscow and beyond. They have also adopted the mass killing of Russian civilians, such as the Moscow theater hostage-taking and the Beslan school massacre. From these strategies it seems clear that the jihadists eventually would use mass murder weapons or provoke incidents with genocidal consequences.

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I believe it would be a bit of overkill (no pun intended) to introduce the WMD claims to this article, but please don't tell me poor mujahideen had no reason to attack Russia. Document hippo (talk) 17:22, 25 August 2017 (UTC)

Mmmmmm...at Dubrovka it seems that the FSB had an agent on the inside, Ruslan Elmurzaev, who survived the siege, according to one of the negotiators, film director Sergei Govorukhin. Arman Menkeev, a retired GRU explosives expert made all of the "terrorist's" bombs, most of which lacked a vital component. After questioning by the FSB in Lefortovo, they commented that he was "loyal to the Russian government", adding that "He knows how to keep a military and state secret". Needless to say, he is not in custody. At Beslan, it was the FSB terrorists that fired tank rounds and thermobaric RPG's into a school containing hundreds of innocent schoolchildren, just simply to forestall Maskhadov's attempt at mediation. All in Dunlop's book on Dubrovka and Beslan. Not to mention all the wahahbis whose only route to Chechnya/Dagestan was via Moscow with a Russian visa! Back to the drawing board for you!

There's no better answer to the above than that of the late Dmitry Furman: "it proceeds from a model not of rational conduct by intelligent evil-doers but from the conduct of idiots, whose motives are impossible to understand.... The first idiocy is that of the terrorists.... For what reason did the 'Wahhabis' need to blow up houses in Moscow? Did they think that by doing so they would halt the war in Chechnya? Or, on the contrary, did they want to provoke it? But for what reason? To be sure, terrorists are evildoers and fanatics, but any evil deed must have some goal. Analogies with the events of 11 September or Palestinian terror do not help. In both of these cases the goal is clear.... But no rational goal is visible behind the organization of the Moscow explosions by 'Wahhabis'. The second "idiocy" contained in the official version is "the idiocy of the FSB." The Ryazan maneuvers (if they were that and not a failed terrorist act) are so ungainly that all attempts to explain them fail, since they presuppose almost unimaginable stupidity. Why then has no-one been sentenced to prison or even removed from his post for such a stupidity?" — Preceding unsigned comment added by RAB3L (talk • contribs) 13:36, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

RAB3L (talk) 13:24, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

I'm not currently looking into Dubrovka and Beslan cases. I would need to do some research before I could comment on those claims (in case I would). Document hippo (talk) 13:34, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

It's you that brought them into the discussion, not me!RAB3L (talk) 13:39, 28 August 2017 (UTC)

Didn't have the intention to expand the scope of the current discussion. Sorry for not making that clear. Document hippo (talk) 13:56, 28 August 2017 (UTC)