Battle of Bhorghat

Battle of Bhorghat
Part of Anglo-Maratha Wars
Date 1778-1781 Location Bhor Ghat Result Maratha Victory
Belligerents
Maratha Empire	East India Company Nagpur kingdom
Commanders and leaders
Mahadaji Shinde Madhavrao II Nana Fadnavis Hari Pant Parshuram Bhou Balaji Vishwanath Phadke Sambhaji Ketkar Krishnaji Pant Ghokale Tukoji Rao Holkar Maloji Salvi	Thomas Wyndham Goddard Colonel Parker † Captain Sambers † Lieutenant Gibbson † Raghunath Rao Mudhoji I

In the mid of 18th-century India, the first Anglo-Maratha War unfolded as a political intrigue. It all began with the St. Lubin incident, which ignited tensions between English forces and the Pune Court, exposing deep-seated discontent among factions within Pune.As the conflict began, Nobles like Moroba Phadnis sought English backing to reinstall ex-Peshwa Raghoba, setting off a chain reaction of diplomatic maneuvers and military campaigns. However, the path to victory was fraught with challenges and missteps. Delayed expeditions, internal discord within the British ranks, and the astute maneuvering of Maratha leaders like Nana Phadnis complicated the landscape of war and diplomacy.

Middle of negotiations and military engagements, the British found themselves entangled in a web of shifting alliances, while the Marathas, ever resourceful, employed guerrilla tactics and espionage to defend their territory.The conflict reached its climax with Goddard's strategic march towards Borghat, yet the Marathas' resilience and tactical acumen proved formidable. Through a series of calculated moves and engagements, including the Treaty of Salbai, the Marathas secured their interests and brought an end to the of Anglo-Maratha War.

Background

After Madhavrao Peshwa's death in 1772, his brother Narayanrao became Peshwa but was murdered in 1773. Raghunathrao seized power, but Narayanrao's posthumous son, Sawai Madhavrao, was the rightful heir. Maratha chiefs, led by Nana Phadnavis, supported Sawai Madhavrao's claim. Raghunathrao sought British help, ceding territories for soldiers. Marathas also tried to ally with the French, leading to British suspicions. Colonel Upton annulled the Treaty of Surat, but Raghunathrao found refuge in Bombay. Tensions escalated, with English forces moving towards Pune in 1777.

First Bhorghat Expedition

The St. Lubin incident inadvertently led to tensions between the English and the Pune Court, exacerbating existing discontent among factions in Pune. Moroba Phadnis, along with others, sought English assistance to bring ex-Peshwa Raghoba to Pune, which the Calcutta Council eventually supported, altering their stance towards the Marathas. The Supreme Council ordered a detachment, led by Colonel Lealie, to proceed to Bombay to assist in the matter

Colonel Leslie led a detachment of forces, including sepoys, artillery, cavalry, and Kandahar horse, instructed by the Supreme Council to proceed to Bombay via Bundelkhand and Warhad Subhas. However, Leslie's delays and eventual death in October 1778 led to Thomas Goddard assuming command of the Bengal army. Meanwhile, the Calcutta Government sought to weaken the Maratha State by detaching allies like the Shonsales of Nagpur through political strategies, including negotiations conducted by A.K. Elliot and later continued by Colonel Goddard.

During negotiations, the Pune Government resisted action against them, while the Bombay Government, fearing conflict with the Marathas and French, reinstated Raghoba as regent. Carnac urged immediate action, supported by Mostyn, who believed in Raghoba's success and warned of French influence. Mostyn's confidence led the British to plan an expedition to Pune. Hostyn, with his Pune court experience, influenced the decision. A committee was formed to arrange Rathoba's return, despite Colonel Egerton's objections.

The appointment of field deputies by the Bombay Government, with authority to supersede the Commander-in-Chief's orders, was a grave mistake, as it undermined unity of command crucial for military success. Additionally, the Company's reliance on the overconfidence of Hostyn led to hastily undertaking the Pune expedition without considering unified attacks. Captain Steuart's survey provided valuable geographical insights, guiding the tactical plans of the Bombay Council. The British expedition was staged in multiple phases, starting from Bombay and progressing through the Panvel river to reduce the Belapur fort, strategically weakening Maratha defenses en route to Pune.

The British commanders decided to establish their first base-camp at Panvel due to its strategic advantages, including ample water supply and the ability to store ammunition. Capturing Panvel and Belapur fort would secure their communication line with Bombay and prevent enemy surprises. The next stage was to establish a base at Khopoli, which guarded the entrance to Borghat and was also overlooked by the Marathas. Finally, the British aimed to reach the summit of Borghat, which required constructing a pathway for infantry and transporting artillery, mainly medium and light cannons, with the help of elephants and laborers.

The British plan to halt at the summit of the Borghat and establish an advanced base exposes a weakness in the Maratha defense strategy. The Marathas neglected to fortify the Borghat range, which could have given them a strategic advantage. Additionally, the British, lacking powerful cavalry, relied on defections from Maratha leaders to clear their path to Pune. However, the British underestimated Nana's intelligence network. The British advance was slow due to the rugged terrain, leading to a loss of surprise in their attack. Nevertheless, they attempted to win over local inhabitants along their route.

The situation in 1778 saw Raghoba attempting to gather support against the Marathas with the backing of the British. However, his efforts faced challenges as key Maratha leaders remained loyal to the existing administration like Parshuram bhau . Nana, the Peshwa, skillfully managed alliances and secured support, while delays in British reinforcements and Raghoba's legal and moral position weakened his cause. Military strengths and weaknesses were also apparent, with the Marathas relying on cavalry and lacking effective artillery, while the British focused on disciplined infantry and superior firepower. The exact troop numbers varied, but the Maratha army was estimated around 40,000, mainly comprising cavalry. Despite Raghoba's attempts, his cause ultimately faltered due to Nana's political maneuvers and the logistical challenges faced by his supporters.

The British army, under Lieutenant Colonel Cockburn's command, faced challenges in January 1779 during clashes with Maratha forces. Cockburn's attempts to negotiate with the Marathas were unsuccessful, leading to a retreat. The retreat was marked by attacks from the Marathas, resulting in casualties for the British. Cockburn's leadership was tested amidst desertion rumors and European soldiers' unease.The desertion of key British personnel and troops, coupled with effective Maratha cavalry tactics, caused panic among the British ranks, showcasing the low morale within the British army. Maratha commanders, including Balaji Vishwanath Phatak, strategically cut off British supply lines and encircled them, leaving them no choice but to seek peace. British commanders' failure to follow their own plans and maintain strategic positions led to further vulnerability. Negotiations ensued, with the British conceding to Maratha demands, including relinquishing Western Indian territories acquired since the treaty with the late Peshwa. The catastrophe at Vadgao dealt a significant blow to British prestige in India, revealing internal discord within the British civil and military administration. Despite the partial success for the Marathas on the battlefield and in negotiations, they faced political setbacks, highlighting the complexity of their victory.

The Vadgao treaty exposed flaws in Maratha governance, allowing Mahadaji Shinde to make a separate deal with the British, undermining the central authority of the Chhatrapati. Nana Phadnis's astute tactics during the Battle of Talegao thwarted British advances, relying on effective espionage to outmaneuver them. Despite this, the treaty's conclusion marked the end of the second phase of the first Anglo Maratha war in January 1779.

Second Bhorghat Expedition

The reduction of Vasai and Arnala forts fulfilled the Court of Directors' territorial ambitions in Western India. However, negotiations with the Pune Government were necessary to end the costly war with the Marathas and focus on defending Madras against Haidar Ali. Governor Hornby proposed a plan for Colonel Goddard to offer peace terms to the Pune Court while continuing military movements to enforce acceptance. Goddard disagreed with the plan, arguing for immediate occupation of Borghet to exploit favorable conditions. He believed this approach would expedite the campaign and lead to an honorable conclusion of the war. However, the Bombay Council favored a different strategy, focusing on reducing forts in the Konkan, which Goddard deemed inefficient and costly. He presented his plan to the Council, emphasizing the need for direct negotiations and swift military action in the Deccan.

Goddard, backed by the Bombay Council, aimed to compel the Maratha Government into accepting favorable terms by displaying British military might and exploiting the chaotic political landscape. Despite initial plans for peaceful negotiations, they pivoted to aggressive operations, underestimating Maratha resilience and political astuteness. Nana, informed about British vulnerabilities and aided by fellow sardars, was prepared for a sustained resistance. Goddard, appointed as chief commander, prepared for the Borghat expedition but faced delays due to the Arnala fort's pre-capture requirement.

In 1781, financial difficulties hindered Goddard's immediate actions during his fight with the Marathas in Gujarat. His troops faced pay arrears for over three months, leading to reliance on revenue from conquered territories, which was delayed. Goddard sought financial aid from the Bombay Council, receiving relief only after the fall of Arnala when funds arrived from Surat. Meanwhile, both sides monitored each other's movements, with a month passing since the capture of Vasai and Arnala. Nana coordinated Maratha troops' movements, preparing for future conflicts on multiple fronts. Reconnaissance trips and raids occurred as both sides strategized.

Goddard was detained in Vasai until the fall of the Arnals fort on January 18, 1781. On January 22, he departed Vasai towards Horghat with his artillery and supplies, leaving Captain Nugent in charge of garrisons. Moving towards Vajreshwari, then to Fali river near Titwala, and eventually to Sodalapur, Goddard encountered Maratha resistance, which he successfully dispersed. Concurrently, the British planned to capture forts in the Thane region to secure their position and intimidate the Marathas. Despite Maratha reinforcements, some forts fell to the British. Haripant Phadke urged for more support, but internal financial and logistical issues hindered the Maratha response. On February 1, 1781, Goddard marched towards Badalapur, anticipating a possible attack, which he successfully repelled, allowing his forces to advance.

Goddard's strategic march aimed at securing the Borghat and establishing a strong post there, ensuring control over territories from Bombay to the Ghats summit. The Marathas planned to disrupt Goddard's advance by guerrilla tactics and flank maneuvers, focusing on defense and disrupting British supply lines. Despite some Maratha attempts, Goddard's superior artillery and secured rear territories gave him an advantage, forcing the Marathas to eventually cease their opposition.

In February 1781, Goddard's troops faced Maratha resistance at Khopoli. Despite Maratha preparations, Goddard launched a night attack to prevent reinforcements. The Marathas blockaded the passes, but Goddard's forces, led by Colonel Parker, swiftly overcame the obstacles with strategic planning and support from Lieutenant Brown and Richardson. Their success puzzled the Marathas, and Nana Phadnis was displeased with his commanders' failure to stop Goddard. There was no progress in peace negotiations, leaving the campaign's future uncertain

Hari Pant utilized an efficient espionage system to gather information on Goddard's army and plans, relying on local informants and prisoners. Maratha forces made tactical errors, concentrating near Borghat and neglecting their territories in the Konkan, leading to panic in Pune. Goddard's movements caused concern, prompting strategic retreats and exchanges of fire, with difficulties in targeting due to British entrenched positions.

The British advance into Chat was met with swift retaliation by the Marathas, who counterattacked and drove them back. Realizing their mistake in focusing solely on frontal attacks, the Marathas shifted tactics to concentrate on the rear of the British forces. Parashurambhau, with 10,000 men, descended through Bolanba pass to aid Baghunathrao. The Marathas also disrupted British supply lines and raided their territories, employing a scorched earth policy to hinder their enemy's movements. Maloji Salvi fought bravely in this battle killing many generals of British Army.

The Marathas employed tactics like strong guards, looting, and burning enemy territories to disrupt British supply lines during battles. This scorched earth policy affected both sides' finances and logistics. The British, already financially strained, struggled with war expenses exacerbated by their inability to stabilize newly conquered territories. Meanwhile, Maratha financial troubles stemmed from feudal army structures and administrative inefficiencies. Goddard's prolonged presence at the Borgnat perplexed Maratha leader Nana Phadnis, but skirmishes didn't tip the scales decisively in either direction.

Nana sent Bahiro Pandit and Ranchod Shenoy to Goddard for negotiations, but they lacked credentials and only discussed peace in general terms. Goddard realized Nana's attempt to leverage Haidar's success for better terms. Goddard proposed a plan to the Bombay Council, suggesting keeping a small force at the Ghat and the main army in the Konkan during the rainy season. The Committee advised against maintaining a post at the Ghat due to difficulties and dangers. Instead, they recommended reducing Maratha strongholds and stationing troops at strategic locations like Panvel. Goddard agreed but faced difficulties executing the plan due to Maratha harassment. The Marathas aimed to disrupt British supplies, leading to several encounters between Parashurambhau's cavalry and British escort companies. In one such encounter, Captain Mackay repulsed Maratha attacks with exemplary conduct and military skill tho causing his death in process.

Marathas engaged in multiple encounters with the British troops, utilizing guerrilla tactics and ambushes to plunder their supplies and harass them during their march. Despite suffering some casualties, the Marathas inflicted significant damage on the British forces, forcing them to retreat and relocate their camp. Ultimately, the constant harassment and scarcity of supplies led to the British commander, Goddard, deciding to put his army in a defensive position and eventually retreat.

The Marathas launched an attack on Goddard's troops as they advanced through difficult terrain, but Goddard's forces managed to reach Chowk. The Marathas mainly used infantry and kept their cavalry and guns at a distance. In subsequent encounters, the Marathas harassed Goddard's rear but were eventually repelled. Goddard's strategic retreat demonstrated the importance of controlling the base of a pass. The Marathas' use of irregular tactics, including Pendharis, highlighted the deterioration of their military effectiveness. Despite this, the Marathas achieved some strategic successes, forcing Goddard to retreat down the Ghat. However, their reliance on irregular forces ultimately contributed to their downfall.

After Goddard retreated from Khopoli to Panvel, the conflict between the English and the Marathas didn't end as previously assumed. Marathi records reveal continued fighting until the end of 1761. Nana Phadnis devised a plan involving small Maratha cavalry units to harass the British from Panvel to Thane and Vanal, aiming to pressure them psychologically for peace. Despite initial setbacks, reinforcements were sent to forts like Kohaj and Fohaj, with Balaji Vishwanath Phatak and Maloji Salvi successfully repelling British attacks on Fohaj fort in April 1781. Subsequent skirmishes occurred, including an encounter at Manor, where the Marathas engaged British troops but couldn't prevent their retreat across the Vaitarana river.

The Marathas discovered a fording point across the river, prompting the British troops to abandon their post and head towards the riverbank. A confrontation ensued, leading to the British attempting to flee, only to find themselves surrounded. Many jumped into the river in an attempt to escape, resulting in heavy casualties for the British. Balajipant Phatak later initiated an attack on Kanor village, burning its market and destroying rice stores. He then targeted the port of Manor, burning three out of four British ships. English records briefly mention the Manor incident, downplaying the Marathas' success. Balaji Vishwanath Phatak resumed his activities by stationing troops in Gorne village and later marching towards the Surya river. Although he claimed to be heading to Tarapur, he attacked Mahim instead, but faced resistance from the British garrison Before the Mahim incident, Balaji Vishwanath and Maloji Salvi engaged in negotiations with the Raja of Juvar to capture Gambhirgad and Segava forts from the British. With assistance from Juvar, they successfully seized Tandulwadi and Segava forts.

Balaji Vishwanath, focusing on reclaiming Laknak fort from the British in 1781, independently tasked Maloji Salvi,Madanrao Terunkar and Gangadharpant to recapture Taknak fort, which they successfully achieved. Following the year-end, Maratha troops seized Tandulwadi and Faladurg forts from the British. Though not a major offensive, Balaji Vishwanath's counter-offensive inflicted economic and psychological pressure on the British, leading to peace negotiations and the Treaty of Salbai in 1782, marking the end of the first Anglo-Maratha War. This strategic move was crucial, as it was the only time during the conflict that the Marathas actively engaged in systematic warfare on British territory.